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THE EMPIRE CITIZEN

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THE EMPIRE CITIZEN

CHAPTER I

THE EMPIRE, WHAT IT IS

WE use the name the British Empire because it is difficult to find any other name by which to describe the great body of allied British States and territories under the control of Great Britain which are spread about the world. But the use requires explanation, for it is not what has been generally called an empire. An empire has always been used as a name for a dominion which is not inhabited by one nation only, but in which several nations have been held together under a common rule, usually more or less autocratic. But also in the case of all ancient empires, and of some more recent, like the Spanish Empire and the Turkish Empire, the whole has been ruled in the interests solely of the central power, and has generally paid tribute to the central government. Now the most important parts of the British Empire rule themselves, and no part of it is tributary. We do not draw a penny in taxation for the exchequer in England from any part of the Empire. We make no money out of it directly, and long have ceased to try to do anything of the kind. Even when the British Government put taxes on the American Colonies in the eighteenth century, the produce of those taxes was intended for use in paying civil and military services in the colonies themselves. Nor are those parts of the Empire which are not self-governed controlled in the interests of Great Britain now, though they used to be. The interests of the inhabitants are the great object of their government. The only exceptions are places like Gibraltar and Aden, which are garrisons, held for the interests of the whole Empire.

The British Empire must serve as a name ; only we must remember that it is not thereby meant to say that it is like

what the Roman Empire was, nor the Spanish Empire, nor the Napoleonic Empire, nor the German Empire, which was a federation of States. We are not a federated State yet, perhaps never shall be. But that is a matter for further consideration later.

What the British Empire practically amounts to is an association, very loose, of British people about the world, and a great number of large and small territories not chiefly inhabited by, but ruled by, the British race, in accordance with British ideas of law and justice. Its existence is an expression of the habits and the ideals of the race.

How was it founded? Why was it founded? What is it like now? What reasons are there to wish for its continuance? What right had we to found it? These very large questions must be answered briefly in the course of this book.

For the most part, we did not deliberately scheme for its foundation. We did deliberately encourage our population to go to some places, chiefly for the sake of trade when they got there. We did deliberately conquer some places, for the sake of trade or for the security of other places and routes of trade. But for the most part we stumbled into empire, bit by bit and place by place, with very little conscious balancing of advantages and expenses incurred by each step. Our people were enterprising and as sailors and traders sought new places and new markets, individual adventurers went out, and trading companies were formed to traffic in new lands and in old lands, like the Turkish and the Moghul Empires, where new openings for trade appeared. The trading companies, especially in America, were anxious to encourage the settlement of an English population in the places where they traded. Emigration began, and when once a nucleus of English-speaking people was established anywhere beyond the seas, the spirit of individual adventure again came into play, and emigrants who were dissatisfied with their positions at home went out to reinforce the various colonies. This went on in all places where the climate was suitable for Europeans to live and work in it, and in some places where it was not—as in the West Indies—but where land was vacant. Settlers did not go to Syria under the Levant Company, nor to India under the East India Company, not merely because of the climate but because of the existence of a settled foreign community there already.

Especially did adventurous traders go, and settle, in places where comparatively uncivilized people were sparsely settled in countries the resources of which they failed to utilize.

If you have followed this closely you will have begun to find an answer to the question, What right had we to extend the British Empire? Its foundation was based upon the nature of our race. Our people were individually adventurous. Had they no right to seek new openings for trade, or to utilize resources which a handful of barbarians never tried to utilize, or to seek shelter from troubles and persecutions where there was room to find it? We are thrown back upon the primeval question whether man may or may not replenish the earth and subdue it. If he does he will sooner or later come into competition with "the other man"; if he does not he will rust for want of use, deteriorate, and die out.

The alternative to the foundation of the Empire was not a different action by a British Government, but a radical change in the nature of individual British men, which, whether desirable or not, was impossible. Was the Government to forbid them to cross the seas, like the Chinese formerly? But the Government might have let them cross the seas at their own peril—which they did mostly—and have refused to support them or to acknowledge them at all outside Great Britain. That would scarcely have mended matters. Some traders and settlers would have been murdered by Indians or by Spaniards. But generally they would have murdered the Indians, and beaten the Spaniards as the buccaneers of the West Indies did. If our English traders and adventurers were in foreign countries, where their superior energy and political aptitude were sure to make them powerful, it was far better that the Government should step in, not merely to protect but to control them. A regulation by the Government at home was far better than a rule entirely directed by desire for trade profits and land seizing. In course of time these adventurers, in countries where they could live and increase, might safely and rightly become self-governing, like our great dominions now; but, to begin with, it was essential that they should be reduced to regular colonies, ruled by the home State—that the British Empire, in short, should be founded. The successive steps by which the British Government first controlled and then took over

the governing powers of the East India Company is an illustration of the necessary march of events, and of the salutary results of that progress.

Now our responsibilities have been assumed; till, our eyes shut or our eyes open, we have become the inhabitants of great parts of the earth and the guardians of law and order in a great deal more. Our ideals of what government ought to be—the expression of the will of the majority; and of what it ought to seek—law, justice, the security of property and of individual liberty (the two stand or fall together), are widely established, upon a wider and safer basis than the territory of one small island. Where the government cannot yet be in the hands of people themselves, where these people are strongly divided and not trained by some centuries of law and self-dependence as our own people are, there we have undertaken the task of doing justice, keeping the peace, and educating men for self-control. These responsibilities are what is meant by the British Empire. Responsibilities are not something to be taken up lightly, though we assumed some of ours lightly enough, because they cannot be laid down again at our pleasure. Of course a people, as a man, may be lost to the sense of what is right and wise, and lightly throw off any of its responsibilities. They themselves are not got rid of because we say we want to be without them. A man may wish to repudiate his debts, to get rid of his wife, to disown his children; but even if the law of man in such matters can be evaded, the law of nature, let us say the law of God, cannot. His nature is debased, his character destroyed, the qualities of his mind suffer. Nations, too, cannot lightly wash their hands of their obligations without suffering degradation. But our obligations are very heavy, and on their due performance depends a good deal of the future of the world. We should not be proud of them. We may be proud of trying to fulfil them. We may say that the future of the world depends much upon the maintenance of the ideals of the British Empire. It is not merely our responsibility for the peace and justice, and for the political education of 300,000,000 of people in the Indian Empire which justifies our saying this. For the peace and justice among how many in Africa and Polynesia, and elsewhere, we are responsible, it is hard to say. But over and above all this, the self-governing dominions of the Empire and Great Britain are a

league of nations in the making. We may hope that our common origin, law, language, and literature with the United States, makes them a cousin at least to the same brotherhood. Upon the success of these allied nations in their own affairs, and in their common affairs, depends the credit of ~~our~~ common political institutions. Kinds of government are judged by their results. The victory in the Great War was a victory for liberty against over-regulation by a despotic State. But Liberty has got to vindicate its superiority now in peace. It is all our own affair. You and I in England cannot directly affect the policy of Canada and Australia, we can only infinitesimally influence that of Great Britain. But it is upon the aggregate of our common characters and of our united powers that the policy of each, and of the whole, depends. We live and vote in England, but, increasingly our connexions are beyond England. Time was when few Englishmen had any connexions outside their own country. Now how many have kindred in the dominions? Indeed, how few have not? It becomes increasingly our business, our interest, and our duty to know something of a greater Britain than these islands, and the duties of the English citizen include the gaining of some knowledge of the great heritage of his race. A considerable proportion of the children in any English school at this moment will not spend all their lives in England. They ought not if they are alive to their own interests and true to the traditions of their blood. Our historical and political education should embrace the affairs of more than these islands.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST ERA OF TRADE EXPANSION

BEFORE the discovery of the New World there was no British Empire. Britain was land which was, to some degree, colonized by Scandinavian settlers and traders, not a land which sent out colonies. When our Plantagenet kings held large possessions in France they were not an English empire. They were foreign countries ruled by the same dynasty which ruled these islands.¹ We had no surplus population to send out to them. Indeed, it is probable that the number of French and Gascon traders who came to settle here was far larger than the number of Englishmen who went to France. Those provinces were acquired by our kings by marriages or conquest for the sake of power, they were utilized by their subjects for the sake of trade. Trade was much easier with places under the same ruler than with foreign-ruled countries. The absurd idea, not yet extinct, that free intercourse only benefits one party to it, and that buying from a foreigner impoverishes the buyer, was the ruling opinion of the Middle Ages. When our kings had lost all their foreign possessions except Calais, that remained as a very valuable commercial depot for the wool trade with the Netherlands. Nearly surrounded by the territory of the Dukes of Burgundy, who ruled Flanders, merely touching France proper on one corner of its territory, it was rather important as a gateway for commerce, and a convenient place for assessing and collecting the customs on exported wool than as a place of arms. It was something like the earliest English colony, entirely inhabited by Englishmen, ecclesiastically under an English bishop; it was in the

¹ One trace remains of the arrangements of that time. Judicial appeals from colonies still come before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England. That arose when Gascons and others appealed to their overlord, King of England and Duke of Aquitaine, sitting in his Council.

diocese of Canterbury, and ruled by an officer of the king. When that was lost in 1558 we had no possessions outside the British Isles. The reign of Elizabeth, so rich in the promise of expansion, was the only reign since 1066 in which the ruler of England had no effective possession whatever outside these islands.

In the latter part of the fifteenth century several European nations were trying to find sea routes to India and Asia generally, because the spices, silks, jewels, and other valued products of Asia, but spices especially, were no longer brought so freely overland either to the Black Sea or to the eastern Mediterranean, owing to conquests by Turks and Tartars. The Portuguese found the route to India round the Cape of Good Hope, and Columbus discovered the West Indies for the Spaniards in 1492. No one wanted to discover a new world; they wanted to trade with Asia. Columbus lived and died under the belief that he had got to Asia; but the discovery of America was a certain event of exploration, even had the great Genoese been forced by his mutinous crew to turn back, as nearly happened. The Norsemen had been on the coast of North America, somewhere, five hundred years before. There is some reason to believe that the Portuguese touched on Brazil as early as 1447. In 1480 some citizens of Bristol set out for the "Island of Brazil"; the name was of old use for some land or other over the Atlantic, but were driven back by bad weather. In 1498 the Spanish ambassador in England wrote to his master that for the last seven years the men of Bristol had been sending out expeditions westward. In 1497 Henry VII empowered John Cabot, a Genoese by birth, a Venetian by naturalization, and then a Bristol man by residence, with his sons Sebastian and Louis (the former was born at Bristol), to sail to "Cathay"—China that is—and to explore and take possession of land and cities. He was to have a monopoly of the trade, paying a fifth of the revenue to the crown. He went, and found no cities, but coasted about Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, and further. It is thought that this was not his first voyage, but that as early as 1494 he had touched North America, on June 24th at five a.m. The terms of his patent in 1497 certainly refer to lands "found," not "to be found." Other voyagers followed in the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII. They were all seeking openings for trade, not places to

colonize, and were annoyed by the interposition of a continent between themselves and the Spice Islands. The record of these voyages is very fragmentary; for if an explorer thought that he had achieved any success, if he thought that inviting openings, like the Gulf of the St. Lawrence or Baffin's Straits, pointed to a sea passage to India, or if he picked up anything worth having, furs or supposed ore in America, or sampled the wealth of the Newfoundland fisheries, he was the less likely to publish the news abroad when he came back. But this last source of profit was soon very widely known. In 1549 Edward VI's government regulated the Newfoundland fisheries by statute. They had been frequented by English fishermen since about 1536. In 1530 William Hawkins had sailed and traded to the west coast of Africa and across to Brazil. It was not he but his son who, following in his steps, started the slave trade thirty years later.

In 1553 some London merchants, despairing of the western passage to India, formed a company to try for a north-east passage. The now old man, Sebastian Cabot, was the general adviser of the expedition. Willoughby, one of the commanders, perished with his ship's company on the coast of Lapland. The other, Richard Chancellor, got to Archangel. He went overland thence to Moscow, made friendly arrangements with the Grand Duke of Muscovy, and started the trade of the Russian Company. An embassy from the grand duke came to England in 1557, and the Company actually did Indian and Persian trade overland. One of their servants, Antony Jenkinson, went as far as to Bokhara and into Persia. Much trade with India did not spring from this effort, but that with Russia became important, and a side result was English participation in the whale fishery towards Spitzbergen. People forget that something happened in Mary's reign besides the burning of heretics and the loss of Calais. Indeed, the disaffection at home had another effect upon the ultimate colonial development of England. Discontented Protestants took to the sea, reinforced the channel pirates, plenty of whom existed already, and made the beginnings of the piratical enterprises against Spain which were to fill such a place in the story of Elizabeth's reign.

The forty years from soon after Elizabeth's accession till her death in 1603, were a time first of irregular and then of avowed warfare with Spain at sea; and, by the consequent

experience in naval warfare and in geographical knowledge which our sailors acquired, prepared the way for colonial settlement and colonial conquest. But the avowed object to begin with was trade. The seas in those days were terribly lawless, always had been, and so continued. Chaucer's Shipman, we may remember, was a pirate when opportunity offered. The merchant adventurer always went prepared to defend himself against foreign rivals, and, if he could not trade, was inclined to take. The exclusive policy by which Spain and Portugal tried to keep the trade of the West and East Indies, respectively, to themselves justified in their own eyes English, Dutch, and French in taking violent measures to force an entry into it. Growing religious and national animosity accented the hostility. Spanish and Portuguese subjects were by no means always averse to profitable trade, but the government forbade it. Only in the Canaries the tacit connivance of the Spanish Government allowed a good deal of English trade. John Hawkins traded to the Canaries in 1562, went on to the Guinea coast, shipped negroes there, and took them across to the West Indies and sold them to the Spaniards. No one thought it wrong, except the Spanish government, whose objections were not on moral grounds. Hawkins' ship was called the "Jesus," and no one suspected the terrible irony. In 1564 he repeated his voyage. In 1567 he made one on a larger scale with several ships. He had Francis Drake with him, and on this occasion they were caught at San Juan de Lua in Mexico by the Spanish ships of war (in 1568) and severely handled, Hawkins and Drake barely escaping with a part of their crews. This was the origin of Drake's deliberate piratical attacks on the Spanish West Indies in 1571 and in 1572-3, when England and Spain were supposed to be at peace. Drake's great voyage of circumnavigation (1577-80), was somewhat different. It was undertaken with secret official support to strike at the sources of Spanish financial resources in the Pacific. Drake came back round the world because he was afraid of being intercepted if he tried to return the way he came. But the voyage was marked not only by extraordinary success in plunder and geographical discovery: he took possession, nominally of course only, of New Albion, Vancouver, and neighbouring mainland, in the name of the queen, and he made a commercial treaty, equally nominal for the time,

with a ruler¹ in the Moluccas. Thomas Cavendish's voyage round the world (1586-88) was a deliberate act of war, after all pretence of peace with Spain had been dropped. The acquisition of territory abroad, and its settlement, still as a basis for trade, began to be an object with English speculators, if not with the Government. Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Raleigh's half-brother, published "A Discourse" upon a north-west passage to China in 1576, and recommended English colonization upon the route. In 1583 he attempted a colony in Newfoundland, which came to nothing. He himself was lost at sea on his return. Raleigh planted a colony in "Virginia," in what is now North Carolina really, in 1583 and 1585. But the colonists, an unsuitable collection of adventurers, younger sons of gentlemen, and bad characters, lost heart and were brought home by Drake in 1586, on his return from a regular warlike voyage against the Spaniards. A renewed settlement in 1587 disappeared, probably killed by the Indians. But Elizabeth called herself Queen of Virginia, and the idea of an overseas empire was started. Raleigh clung to it, not content with the nearer but equally hazardous colonization which was being attempted in Ireland. In 1594 he sent an expedition to Guiana; in 1595 he went himself. His object was not merely trade expansion. He was persuaded that we could establish an Empire on the Spanish Main,² with the aid of the Indians who were to rise against their Spanish conquerors. Here, as in all his efforts and schemes, he was the pioneer of ideas, not the actual founder of material success. The conquest or the retention of the West Indian Islands, much more of the Spanish Main, was utterly beyond the power of Elizabethan England. Sixty years later, Cromwell, who was much stronger for foreign enterprises than Elizabeth, who had a large regular army, adequately paid, while she had none, and a fleet four times as powerful, and a weaker Spain to deal with, only succeeded in conquering Jamaica, when there was no force to oppose his officers, Penn and Venables, but failed in Hispaniola.³

¹ That is, South America. It is commonly and erroneously used for the sea. The Elizabethan use for "the mainland" is invariable.

² The expedition did not consist of the best of Cromwell's army, but his veterans would have died of yellow fever as surely as the bad soldiers who were sent.

While the Elizabethan sailors explored the paths to empire, and founded the naval supremacy which was to achieve it, the object of trade, to which except perhaps to Raleigh's inspired vision any colonization or empire was subordinate, was steadily pursued. Frobisher's voyage to seek a north-west passage (1576) and John Davis's voyages (1585-7) were efforts to open a way to the East Indies. The true way was explored by James Lancaster, who from 1591 to 1594 boldly followed the track of the Portuguese round the Cape. It was not the first attempt. In 1582 Fenton was sent by London merchants with four ships, but he never got beyond the coast of Brazil. Portugal had been conquered by Spain in 1580, and many Portuguese were so hostile to Spain as to be ready to give information, or services even as pilots, to English and Dutch enemies of Spain, whether in Brazil or down the African coast. Lancaster touched in Saldanha Bay, or Table Bay, before any Dutch captain had taken possession of the Cape. One of his ships went back thence with his numerous sick, another was lost. In the third he reached the East Indian Islands, and traded successfully. But on his return voyage he lost his ship on the coast of Brazil, and ultimately returned home alone, by the good offices of a French captain. The Dutch, with Portuguese pilots at first, were trading round the Cape about the same time. But it was only in 1595 that the Dutch Government sent out an expedition, nor was their United East India Company incorporated till 1602. On the last day of 1600 the English East India Company obtained its charter from Elizabeth. An event so pregnant of future consequence belongs fitly to that great reign. Lancaster again commanded the first expedition, which reached the East Indies, traded in the Spice Islands as they were usually called, including Ceylon, took some Portuguese prizes, and returned with a rich cargo. The voyage was from 1601 to 1603. It was necessary in those days for ships going to India to stop and take in water and fresh provisions, and clean and repair, in Brazil, or on the African coast, or in Madagascar or Mauritius, or in some of them. Ships were very small, and preventives of scurvy unknown. Meanwhile the Asiatic trade was being pursued on its old course in the eastern Mediterranean. As far back as 1513 we had an English consul at Scio, and in 1530 in Crete. We made agreements with the Venetians, who still tried to

keep the relics of the eastern trade in their hands, and in 1581 Elizabeth incorporated the Levant Company for trading in the dominions of the *Grand Signior*, the Sultan. This company surrendered its charter just before Elizabeth died, being assailed as a monopoly. But the English Turkey merchants were incorporated as a company and had factories at Constantinople, Aleppo, Scanderoon, and elsewhere for two centuries more.¹ There was as little expectation that the company of London merchants trading to the East Indies would ever become rulers of the territories of the Great Moghul, as that the Aleppo merchants would rule the Turkish Empire. Both would have seemed equally impossible dreams to the early seventeenth century Englishman, Moghul or Turk.

To sum up the results of Elizabeth's reign: we still had no overseas empire, but we had dreamed of one, and had tried unsuccessfully to begin one. We had extended trade in three continents, we had explored sea passages, and we had established the naval power, tested in the American voyages and confirmed by the defeat of the Armada, which was to make a British Empire a fact. The tradition of the Elizabethans remained to make us henceforth believe that the inheritance of the world was within the grasp of resolute Englishmen.

¹ The new Levant Company was not finally dissolved till 1825. Up to that year it appointed and paid consuls, who administered affairs for English traders in the Turkish dominions, by the capitulations or treaties with the Porte allowing our people their own courts.

CHAPTER III

THE ERA OF COLONIAL SETTLEMENT

THE era of successful colonial settlement began after the peace with Spain in 1604, when James I was king. The unsatisfactory constitutional position, the beginnings of dissensions between king and parliament, which really reflected little credit on either, and the ignoble character of a not unlearned, nor badly intentioned, nor in all things an unwise king, have obscured the truly momentous achievements of his subjects. An age which saw the first successful colonies in America, the completion of the first voyage of the East India Company and their establishment in India, the colonization of Ulster, the union of the crowns of England and Scotland, the production of the greatest plays of Shakespeare and of the other dramatists, the philosophical works of Bacon, and the making of the Authorized Version, should be considered as one of the most famous in our history. The character of the king had not much to do with many of these performances, but his peace policy was his own, and was a necessary prelude to colonial settlement. We might have gone on fighting the Spaniards and have won plunder, but the absorption of national energies in schemes of conquest, for which we were not yet strong enough, would not have been beneficial to commercial ventures nor to emigration.

The earliest successful colony was Virginia. The company received a charter in 1606, and the first settlers arrived in America in 1607. In 1609 the charter was amended. It was an influential company, 56 city companies and 659 private persons were incorporated in it, and of the latter 21 were peers and about 50 members of the House of Commons. The avowed objects were the propagation of the Gospel, all commercial enterprises, including the slave trade, were missionary in their aims, the transplanting of superfluous people from England, of whom there were not many except

the ne'er-do-weels, and the provision of a British supply of various useful products which we now bought from foreigners. Some of the promoters may not have looked beyond the commercial gains, but surely some shared the views of Raleigh, who still looked to see an English nation established in Virginia.

It was well that the enterprise should be undertaken by a company, a device learned from the Dutch. Single men, with all the energy of a Raleigh or a Gilbert, were not able to carry a settlement over its first unproductive years. All necessaries, including much food, had at first to be provided for the settlers. It was a joint-stock company. The earlier commercial companies had been associations of persons engaged in the same trade, but pursuing their own private ventures with no common stock—regulated companies like the city companies at home. The East India merchants had so started, but soon became a joint-stock Company like the Dutch. They continued, as we all know, for over 250 years, long after their usefulness as a Company had declined or ceased, but in the early days of colonial enterprise, in New Zealand and in Africa as well as in America, and to this day in North Borneo, the service of a company might be highly beneficial. It provided resources for common objects, and concerted action when settlers were too few and too resourceless for an independent existence. The alternative to a company was the proprietary colony, in which a great territory was granted to a single man, or a few men, with powers to assign lands to colonists and to make laws for the government of the country. English feudal land law was curiously continued in the colonies just when it was about to expire, or had expired, in England. The tenure of land under the crown, the power of making grants of parts of the land to others, and the right of local rule over the land, were lodged in the hands of persons, or a person. The Virginia Company and William Penn were both somewhat in the position of a Norman baron endowed by the Conqueror with English manors. It was a system more favourable for the growth of self-government than a direct control by the crown. The grantee was not so powerful as the Crown, and more easily bought out. Other countries preferred direct government control.

So the Spanish colonies were established and governed,

and so the French Government sent settlers to Canada and ruled them. But this was never done by us, unless the establishment of convicts in Australia, and the subsequent state-aided emigration there, be taken as an exception. The national preference for private enterprise was exhibited from the first in our colonies. With this the national habit of self-government found a natural expression. When the first charter was given to the Virginia Company a royal council of Virginia, nominated by the crown—a committee in fact of the English Privy Council—was the dominating power. In 1609 the Directors of the Virginia Company became the ruling body in England. But there was from the first a local council, and in 1619 a local elected assembly. The charter of the company was abrogated in 1624, and the Privy Council assumed direct control at home. But it made little difference in America. There was friction occasionally between the assemblies and the governors appointed by the crown, and in the proprietary colonies between the interests of the proprietor and the colonists. Everywhere however, though to a different extent, the English practice of self-government by election and representation prevailed, aided by the practical difficulty of anyone in England exercising constant control over the internal affairs, imperfectly understood, of a scattered population thousands of miles away, with whom intercourse was a matter of several months. Only in foreign relations and in external commercial regulations did the home government exercise constant control in the supposed interests of the whole empire. Down to the English civil wars it was not allowed that the English Parliament had any control over the colonies. When the Long Parliament, and then the Commonwealth, took over the executive functions of the crown, they assumed the right of legislating for the colonies, and the power continued after the Restoration. It is not immediately pertinent to the affairs of the British Empire to-day, but it has something to do with a side-issue, the development of part of the former British Empire into the independent Federal State of the United States, that the separate Republics which came together under the federal constitution were accustomed to a large measure of self-government tempered by a power of disallowing local laws lodged in the hands of an outside authority. It made them more easily conceive and more

readily admit the powers of a federal government, interpreted by a federal supreme court, for over-ruling State independence.

The earliest charter had granted to the Virginia Company the whole coast of North America from Carolina to Nova Scotia. But a northern and a southern colony had been projected under divided companies—the Plymouth and the London Companies. The latter only had been successfully launched. In 1620 the North Virginia, or Plymouth, Company was revived. It did little except sell rights of occupancy to settlers who went out at their own expense and risk. But that little was much, for in 1621 they gave a legal footing to the Pilgrim Fathers, the 102 Independents who, after emigrating from Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire to Holland in search of religious toleration, had determined to sail for America, and had reached the bay behind Cape Cod in December, 1620. The name of this settlement, Plymouth, may have been suggested by that of the last port at which they had touched in England, but probably was assumed because they had come into the territories of the Plymouth Company. Certainly the Plymouth Company was not named from the New England town. The population of New England has not sprung from the Pilgrim Fathers, but undoubtedly they gave an example, and stamped a character upon the subsequent English settlements in that neighbourhood. They were from the first self-governing, by their own action, and protected in their independence by their insignificance. They were few, and raised no produce for general export like Virginian tobacco. In 1626 the Company made over their rights in the soil to the actual colonists. In 1629 the Massachusetts Bay Company was incorporated, and bought land from the Plymouth Company for the purpose of founding a Puritan settlement there. This was not a colony of poor separatists like the Plymouth settlers, but rather of the wider, more moderate Puritan party, who had hoped but now despaired of Puritanizing the Church in England. It included many men of comparatively high social position, like Winthrop, the Suffolk squire, who became their first governor. From the first the Massachusetts Bay settlers were nearly independent in politics. The seat of the administration of the Company was fixed in America. The freemen elected the governor and his executive council, or assistants, as they were called. By 1634 an assembly

of elected representatives was established in Boston. The freemen who elected were heads of families, and Church members. The Puritanism of Massachusetts tended to become more narrow, and more intent on regulating the social habits of the people, a not unnatural result of local separation from other forms of opinion, and from the influences of a mixed society. They were honourably distinguished by zeal for education, and not only schools existed, but as early as 1636 John Harvard of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, founded Harvard College in New Cambridge, close to Boston. Providence and Rhode Island were founded by religious dissidents from the religion of Massachusetts; Newhaven by a separate Puritan emigration from England. Connecticut was occupied by emigrants from Massachusetts who kicked against the theocracy there. Others overflowed into what was afterwards New Hampshire. The coast of Maine was granted in 1638 as a proprietary colony to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, but it had in fact been partly occupied by roving settlers from the Puritan colonies before that, and independent settlers came in afterwards. It was thinly inhabited, and was not altogether Puritan. In 1643 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Plymouth, and Newhaven federated themselves as New England—a union which continued till 1684. It was formed for defence against the Dutch in New York, the Indians, and the French. The last were far away in Canada, but by their influence among the Indians were threatening aggression. Providence, Rhode Island, and Maine were excluded—the two former on religious grounds, because they were of the wrong shade of Protestantism, and were tolerant of differences among Protestants; the latter because they were not religious enough. Alas! for the principles of democracy and toleration, the offences of Maine included their having elected a tailor for their mayor and an excommunicated person for their minister.

The conquest of New Amsterdam from the Dutch, in 1664, and its re-christening as New York—a conquest reversed in 1673¹ but restored finally in 1674²—was a necessary step for the security of New England. It further linked up the northern Colonies with those further south, and made the present United States a possibility. It took with it the acquisition of New Jersey. The Duke of York had received a grant of the Dutch territory from Charles II. He sold his

rights in what was afterwards New Jersey to Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret. The latter had been Governor of Jersey, which he had held for the king in the Civil War, hence the name of the colony. After the usual disputes and vicissitudes, complicated by the claims of New York to include it in its own territory, the Jerseys, East and West had been divided, were united as a crown colony in 1702. In 1703 the small adjacent territory of Delaware, which had once been Swedish, then Dutch, then part of Pennsylvania, was made a separate crown colony. Meanwhile further south the territory between Virginia and Spanish Florida was granted to a Carolina company by a charter of 1663. The prominent men in the company were the Restoration statesmen, Clarendon, Shaftesbury, Monk, and Lord Southampton, advised by the philosopher John Locke. The governing people in England, from the king himself downwards, took a keen interest in the extension of commerce and colonies, but the original Constitution of Carolina, drawn up chiefly by Locke, was probably as unworkable as the political schemes of philosophers often are. It contained one remarkable provision—that no law should be perpetual, but should expire in a hundred years, unless previously repealed. Nevertheless, South Carolina rapidly developed, partly by the settlement of planters from the West Indies, who, of course, brought slave labour with them. North Carolina lagged behind in prosperity. After wars with the Indians and Spaniards, and actual rebellion in the colonies, South Carolina became a crown colony, but self-governing in fact, in 1719,¹ and in 1724 the proprietors surrendered their rights in North Carolina.

Maryland was founded as a proprietary colony by a charter to Lord Baltimore in 1632, and a few settlers arrived the next year. It was intended by him as a refuge for persecuted Roman Catholics, a purpose discreetly, and very profitably, veiled under a promise of complete religious toleration. It was still a proprietary colony down to the War of Independence. So was Pennsylvania, also founded on a basis of general toleration, but intended in the first instance to shelter Quakers. William Penn received a charter for it in 1681, and settlement began in 1682. Lord Baltimore had first tried unsuccessfully to settle colonists in New-

¹ The surrender of proprietary rights was not completed till 1729.

foundland. In 1621 King James had made extensive grants to Sir William Alexander and other Scots in Nova Scotia, but no effective occupation was made. The French, who claimed the country, recovered it by treaty in 1632. Much further north the Hudson Bay Company was established in 1670, under the patronage of Prince Rupert (hence Rupert's Land) for trade in furs and what else they might find, and for the opening of the still desired north-west passage to Asia. There was no question of settlement here. The commercial object was, and remained, the sole reason for the enterprise. In the colonies briefly enumerated above the expansion of population had become more and more the dominant factor, if not the chief consideration.

CHAPTER IV

THE ERA OF COLONIAL SETTLEMENT—*Continued*

THE colonies on the mainland of North America had a subsequent history of such importance that they receive the greatest attention at the hands of all writers. But in the seventeenth century they were not so valuable for the commercial object as was the occupation of the West Indian Islands. The Spanish discoverers had neglected the smaller islands. Some they occupied for a time, and then abandoned, some they never occupied at all. They were not productive of gold and silver, the Spanish Government did not encourage colonization, and the Spaniards were generally too poor, and too lazy, to make plantations for growing tropical produce. Some of the islands became the resort of seafaring adventurers, English, French, and Dutch. They began as illicit traders, and as wagers of national war in the name of their respective countries against the Spaniards. They became mere pirates, and as the buccaneers were the terror of all peaceful people, and about the latter half of the seventeenth century would, if organized, have been the strongest naval power in the West Indies. Their exploits culminated in the sack of Panama by Henry Morgan in 1670. He had previously sacked Porto Bello and invaded Venezuela. An enormous booty was taken, and Morgan, knowing where to expend some of his share, died a knight and Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica. Their piratical exploits extended into the Pacific, to the coast of Africa, and to the Indian Ocean. They were not finally put down in their original seats in the West Indies till the eighteenth century, when the English and the French Governments had assumed effective control of their respective islands: an instance of the necessity of home governments taking over the rule of their national adventurers, as pointed out in Chapter I. Piracy lingered in the West Indies much later.

The beginnings of English occupation of the islands followed

James' peace with Spain. Barbadoes, where the Spaniards had never settled, was claimed in 1605, but not really occupied till Richard Courten established a colony in 1624. English and French settlers had divided St. Kitts in 1623. The shipwreck of Sir George Somers on Bermuda, while sailing to Virginia in 1609, led to a Bermuda Company colonizing the island. Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, and Dominica were all settled before 1640; the Windward Islands, St. Lucia, Grenada, etc., constantly disputed between the English and French, from about the same time. A colony went to Guiana from Barbadoes in 1652, but the country was conquered by the Dutch in the first war of Charles II's reign. The Bahamas were first occupied in 1629, and settled between 1646 and 1666, and in 1670 were made a colony under the Carolina Company. They had been, and continued to be, the seat of pirates and wreckers. Jamaica, as will be described later, was deliberately conquered from the Spaniards in 1655. The West Indies were not merely valuable in themselves, but were on the usual route to other parts of America. Ships made for the Cape de Verd Islands and the Azores, and then had a comparatively short passage with favourable winds to the West Indies. Thence they turned north or south as occasion demanded. Closely connected with the West Indian were the West African settlements. The slave trade was very much in English hands from the first. In 1634 a trading factory was set up at the mouth of the Gambia, and Charles II's first Dutch war gave us security from Dutch claims on the Gold Coast. The African Company had been founded in 1662, and was practically a slave-trading company. The early Elizabethan adventurers had brought gold from the Guinea Coast, and the supply thence is recorded still by the word Guinea for a gold coin, first used after the African Company was started. But gold, ivory, and palm oil were not so valuable as slaves for our own colonies, Brazil, and the Spanish Colonies. The privilege of exclusive slave-trading to the last, granted by the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, gave an immense impulse to a traffic which greatly enriched English merchants, but inflicted horrible disasters upon Africa, and saddled America with a great difficulty for the present and the future. The successful establishment of trading stations in India belongs to this same period, but is noticed separately later on.

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Whatever possibilities for the expansion of the race, of English political ideals, and future influence lay in the North American colonies, the West Indies were the most valuable trading possessions which we had, down to the nineteenth century. Certainly in the seventeenth century the tobacco of Virginia, the colony which did the largest trade with England, was not so valuable as West Indian sugar. In the first thirty years of its existence as an English colony Barbadoes became one of the richest places in the world. A planter needed a capital of about £25 an acre to start a plantation, but once started it yielded 50 per cent a year on the outlay. No wonder that merchants invested money, and that royalist gentlemen in England went with what capital they could save from sequestrations to settle in Barbadoes, or other islands. Cromwell's conquest of Jamaica led to an enormous trade there. A century later, in 1763, the shop-keeping spirit recommended restoring Canada to France, and keeping the small island of Guadaloupe, the trade of which was far more valuable than that of Canada. Fortunately the view was overruled. Before it was ruined by the Revolution and the negro rebellion, St. Domingo produced more wealth for France than the East Indies did for England, or Peru and Mexico for Spain. In the reign of Charles II it was said that about one person in seven in England was interested in the plantation trade, that is, chiefly the West Indies. The great increase in English commerce in the time between the Restoration and the Revolution of 1688-9 was mostly owing to this trade. In that period our mercantile tonnage about doubled, and the customs, which were farmed for £390,000 at the beginning of Charles' reign, were producing £550,000 at the end. The uses of an empire then began to appear. William III's wars for the independence of Europe, and the War of the Spanish Succession, which finally humbled Louis XIV, were fought on the resources of the West India trade. Just so, earlier, the Dutch could never have carried through their long wars of liberation from Spain without their East India trade. To carry the matter beyond our present point, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were fought by us upon our colonial resources. When Pitt was reviled by his opponents for neglecting great issues "to filch sugar-islands," he was in fact winning the resources which made the decision of the great issues possible. It was

only because we possessed all trade outside Europe that we beat Napoleon. To go further still, it was because of the naval blockade and the maintenance of world commerce that we beat the Germans.

The other, and the greater, use of an empire—the planting and spreading of a population, and of political ideals—was much more slow to come about. The Virginia Company, other companies and proprietors by colonial grants, might wish to encourage population. It was a harder matter to induce population to go. Writers might descant upon “relieving the rankness of the body politic” by settlement overseas, but England was not really over-populated. Some writers have probably exaggerated the results of the enclosures, and of the displacement of agricultural populations, in producing unemployment or permanent distress in the seventeenth century. The price of corn was not rising more than all prices were rising, owing to the great increase of the amount of silver brought into Europe from America. When Virginian settlement was first attempted the price of wheat in England was round about 40s. a quarter; other cereals, which the labourers used much more than wheat, were very much lower. Oats were a quarter the price of wheat. Labour by statute was 2s. 6d. a week. During the civil wars there was a time of distress and high prices, but increased wages followed. Early in the eighteenth century wheat was back at much the Elizabethan figure; oats had risen, but wages were 4s. 6d. to 5s. a week by statute. The wages of artisans had risen from 4s. to 6s. There was growing employment at home in the early colonial period by the increase of manufactures and of shipping. There was no such general want of employment as to drive ignorant labourers into the great adventure of emigration. There were of course thriftless ne’er-do-weels then as always. They went to the plantations, and nearly wrecked Virginia.¹

Strong inducements were necessary to make cautious men emigrate. Voyages in the small ships of those days, with bad water and salt provisions, were perilous for all, and

¹ Though one of the ne’er-do-weels, Captain John Smith, saved the colony in its earliest days when the discouraged adventurers would have returned home but for him. The story of his life being saved by the Indian princess, Pocahontas, is romance only. Smith told the same legend of his rescue by a Tartar lady in the Ukraine. Pocahontas married Rolfe, a colonist, not Smith.

always fatal to many. In the new settlements there were hardships, dependence on home supplies for necessities, ignorance of all sanitary laws, which rendered life insecure and the prospect unattractive. Gentlemen with some capital might be tempted to Virginia, to lead a country life and grow tobacco, or to the West Indies to make fortunes in sugar, to Carolina and to Bermuda, but a supply of labour and of any population for the less attractive settlements was very difficult unless other causes had supervened to furnish it. Had it not been for religious and political troubles the peopling of the colonies would have been very slow. It was the settled opinion of all governments then that religious uniformity was necessary for the proper unity of any State. Fortunately in England we were always politicians rather than theologians. Though Laud once showed a wish to meddle, even Charles I did not think that the unity of the State was imperilled by Independents in New England following their own practices; rather were the settlements regarded as a useful safety valve for opinions which could not be tolerated at home. From their foundation till the civil wars began some 20,000 people had gone out to New England. Then when there was a war for their principles at home some few returned. In Virginia, where no religious motive prompted emigration, it was computed in 1623 that, though some 6,000 or 7,000 persons had been sent out since 1607, the whole population was only 1,277. But there had been an Indian massacre of a few hundred people in 1622. After that date Virginia also increased. Political disturbances helped the increase, and discontented Royalist gentlemen, including in 1657, Washington's great-grandfather, went to Virginia, to Barbadoes, and to other colonies. But religious toleration was more and more in favour among English politicians. Maryland, as noted above, was founded for persecuted Roman Catholics, with toleration for all. Carolina imposed no religious disabilities. Pennsylvania was planted for persecuted Quakers, and all sects were tolerated. Persecuted foreign Protestants betook themselves to America. Irish Presbyterians, from Ulster especially, who had no share in government at home and suffered from repressive trade laws, came in large numbers; they could more easily evade repressive trade laws in America. Criminals were transported to work as indentured servants in the plantations.

Prisoners of war in the civil wars, Scotch and Irish especially, were sent as servants to the plantations. After Worcester 7,000 Scotch prisoners were destined to go; a good many died before they went. During the desultory Highland warfare under the Protectorate some Highlanders murdered their English prisoners, with the apology "that they had no plantation to which to send them." Children, and others, were kidnapped and sold really as slaves. But with all such efforts to obtain white labour, the West Indies and southern provinces of North America would never have been exploited as they were, nor would the tobacco, sugar and cotton trades have grown up, nor the country been cleared for any crops, without black slave labour. In Maryland and Virginia very possibly, but not in South Carolina, much less in Barbadoes and Jamaica, could white men have done the work. The system was in itself wrong; it led to many other wrongs: it debased the whites where it prevailed, and it was fatal to the original self-governing constitutions of the West Indies, because representative institutions became a sham and an abuse when confined to a small aristocracy of planters, but the productiveness of the early British Empire depended upon it. So did that of the French, Dutch, and Portuguese in Brazil. With or without it, the Spanish colonies were never productive; but the Spanish Government, keeping a tight hand on its colonial people, and working through well-intentioned though stupid churchmen, treated its negroes and its Indians better than the English, French, and Dutch did—that is, after the first atrocities of the Spanish conquest. The French hit it off better with the Indians than the rest of the Europeans did. They tried to convert them, intermarried with them sometimes, and did not make such babies of them by over-much care as the Spanish Government did through its priests.

CHAPTER V

COMMERCIAL CONTROL OF THE COLONIES

NATIVE populations, American or African, were treated from the point of view of supposed Colonial convenience. But the European colonist was himself looked upon as a factor in the commercial interest of the mother country. The monopoly which the Venetians had insisted upon in the trade of their Levant factories was imitated by the Portuguese in their East Indian trading ports, and by the Spaniards in their colonies. But, apart from their examples, it is certain that the prevailing economic ideas of the seventeenth century would have led Dutch and English, and all others, to regard their colonies as private preserves of their own. We have seen that commercial reasons were the basis of their foundation; and all nations were protectionist. They all believed that their true policy was to encourage native industry by hampering the trade of foreigners. But the great series of Acts—the Navigation Acts—which for so long expressed English colonial policy, were originated not only by a desire for keeping the trade of our own colonies in our own hands, but also were inspired by a design to encourage English shipping and to injure the Dutch. Holland was the leading commercial power of Europe. The Dutch understood banking, the financing and management of joint-stock companies, and all sorts of international trade, better than anyone else. They had not even native timber for building their own ships—their main native export was only dairy produce—but they built and sailed ships more cheaply than other people; they carried goods for every one, and they nearly monopolized the whale fishery of the Arctic seas and the herring fishery off our own shores. They had invaded our colonial trade, and carried goods from Barbadoes and Virginia more cheaply than English ships bore them. The civil war time had not been favourable

to English trading ; but just at that time English colonial production was increasing, and the Dutch intermediaries were reaping the harvest. Besides this the English Commonwealth was aggrieved against the Dutch. There was an old quarrel springing from rivalry in the East Indies, where the Dutch usually had the upper hand of our East India Company. The Prince of Orange, Stadtholder of Holland, was the son-in-law of Charles I, and had supported Royalist exiles. The Commonwealth ambassador was murdered by them at The Hague. The Stadtholder died in the midst of a quarrel with the Dutch Republicans, and the English Commonwealth thought it an opportunity for making a close league with the States General of the Netherlands. But the wary Dutch were averse from the project. They were swayed by merchants who knew that we were commercial rivals. They did not relish any engagement which would mix them up in the wars with the yet unconquered Ireland and Scotland. They had independent European policies of their own with which they did not want us to interfere. So they refused an alliance, and complained in their turn of various outrages at sea upon the shipping. Then the Commonwealth Government¹ took decided steps at once to encourage English shipping, monopolize our own colonial trade, and injure the Dutch. But the last object was not mentioned in any words of the Navigation Act of 1651 ; it was very well understood. No goods of Asia, Africa, or America were to enter English ports, home or colonial, except in English ships. From European ports goods might only be brought into English ports, home or colonial, in English ships or in ships belonging to the country which produced the goods. Salt fish and fish oil were to enter English ports, and salt fish was to leave English ports in English vessels only. There was nothing in the Act to prevent Dutch ships from carrying Barbadoes sugar to, say, France ; but as Dutch butter and cheese, the home produce, were not wanted in

¹ The Navigation Act of 1651 is often wrongly called "Cromwell's Act." He had nothing to do with its inception. It was prepared and debated while he was in Scotland, though not finally passed till a month after the battle of Worcester. Of course he approved of it ; every one did. But perhaps St. John and Strickland, the ex-emissaries to Holland, had as much to do with its passing as anyone, except Sir Harry Vane, the chief colonial and naval statesman of the Commonwealth.

the West Indies, the Dutch ships would have had to go out empty, and that would not pay. A Dutch war followed, but was not solely caused by the Navigation Act.

The policy of it was thought so truly national that the Restoration Parliament continued and extended it. We have seen that Charles II and his leading statesmen were keenly interested in maritime and colonial affairs. There were several Acts; indeed, the subject was seldom out of the consideration of parliaments for long. But the main features of the Restoration Acts were that certain enumerated articles, of which sugar and tobacco were two, might be exported from our colonies only to England or to other colonies (not to Ireland or Scotland), and that goods imported into a colony must be shipped only from England. Of course they might be of foreign origin, but our merchants and shipping were to handle them. We think the whole policy mistaken. It hit the Dutch very hard, but it certainly injured English consumers at first. We had not got the immediate means for dealing with what had been Dutch trade. But undoubtedly also it was followed by a great increase of English mercantile shipping and fishery.

The original Act injured the colonies, by taking away their cheapest freight and their access to continental markets. But the later Acts did them more harm, by creating such a strict monopoly for the English merchants. By successive Acts inter-colonial trade was interfered with. Manufactures were discouraged in the colonies for fear of competition with those of England. Woollen goods made in a colony were forbidden to be exported anywhere, not even to a neighbouring colony. Ironworks were hampered by heavy duties, and the manufacture of steel forbidden. A typical absurdity, though not the most onerous instance, was the forbidding of the making of hats in America—though hats were made of American beaver skins—for fear of injuring the hatters of England. The natural trade, as we may call it, between English North America and the French and Spanish West Indies was forbidden. Yet Nature triumphed, by illicit trade, and as a token of its prevalence, the Spanish dollar is the standard coin of all North America now. One natural result was a contempt for the law, especially in the New England States, whence smuggling to the West Indies was most common. The restrictive commercial policy tended

to become stricter as the mercantile interest gained influence in England after the Revolution of 1688-9. The whole system was so firmly believed to be necessary for the interests of English trade, that no statesman of the eighteenth century could have ventured to abolish it entirely. When Chatham defended the justice of American resistance to internal taxation, he still asserted the right of the English parliament to regulate American trade in the interests of the whole Empire. The bargain was reciprocal, we said, if the colonies would only trade with us, and use only English goods, we consumed only Virginia tobacco, West Indian sugar, Carolina rice, and Jamaica rum. We protected the colonies from France and Spain. This answer was weighty in the case of West India Islands, but of little weight for the northern colonies after the French had been conquered in Canada. It was this continued friction from repressive trade laws which lost the North American colonies. No Stamp Act, repealed quickly, no incompetence of North nor of any other statesman, not even the obstinacy of the king, lost North America. It was the attempt to carry on the rule of a great empire on the principles of the shop; so Arthur Young put it correctly. The New England colonies, which were the chief seafaring and commercial colonies, and might have been manufacturing communities were the centre of resistance. They had no great staple export to Great Britain to compensate by its exclusive market here for the checking of their trade with the West Indies, and of their manufactures. One of the few concessions made was when that very wise statesman, Sir Robert Walpole, allowed Carolina to export its rice directly to Southern Europe without passing it through England. As a result we might, if there had been wiser management on the spot, have kept the slave States in 1781-2. Fortunately we did not. The whole story of the results of a one-sided Imperial union for trade is well worth consideration by adherents of empire preference to-day. If attempted now it is not the Dominions probably which would have the worst of the bargain as the Colonies had then; much more likely Great Britain. The evil is trying to make Imperial unity depend upon any bargain at all.

THE ERA OF TRADE AND SETTLEMENT

1553. Attempt to reach India by a north-east route ~~of~~^{on} this trade with Russia.
1562. Hawkins begins the slave trade in America.
1568. The attack on Hawkins and Drake at St. Juan de Lucia turns avowedly commercial English voyages to America into avowedly plundering expeditions.
- 1577-80. Drake's circumnavigation of the world.
1583. Gilbert takes possession of Newfoundland. No immediate occupation follows.
1583. Raleigh's first Virginia colony (in North Carolina). The settler's return in 1586.
1587. Raleigh's second colony. The colonists lost.
- 1591-4. Voyage of James Lancaster to India round the Cape.
1595. Raleigh in Guiana.
1600. Charter to East India Company.
1604. First attempt to settle Guiana abortive.
1605. Barbadoes claimed; occupied in 1624.
1606. First charter to Virginia. Settled 1607.
1609. Bermuda occupied.
1612. East India Company's factory at Surat established. First successful settlement in Newfoundland.
1620. The Pilgrim Fathers settle at Plymouth, New England.
- 1622-3. Settlers in New Hampshire and Maine.
1623. St. Kitts occupied by English and French.
1629. Massachusetts Bay Company chartered, with head-quarters in America.
1632. Charter to Maryland.
- 1635-6. Connecticut and Rhode Island settled. (Chartered 1663.)
1638. St. Lucia, Grenada, and other Windward Islands partly settled.
1640. Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat and Dominica partly settled.
- 1646 (and onwards). Bahamas occupied.
- 1650-2. Guiana successfully occupied, chiefly by settlers from Barbadoes. Lost to the Dutch 1667.
1662. Royal African Company occupies Gambia.
1663. Carolina founded by charter.
1670. Hudson's Bay Company founded.
1681. Charter to Pennsylvania; settled next year and onwards.
1702. East and West Jersey made one colony.
1703. Delaware made a separate colony.
1733. Georgia first settled.

CHAPTER VI

THE ERA OF COLONIAL CONQUEST

AN inevitable result of exclusive trade policy was war between colonial powers, each striving to acquire or defend its own protected markets. No war waged by Great Britain with any European power between 1652 and 1814 was unconnected with colonial and mercantile objects. The Abbé Raynal, a French philosopher, who wrote a history of the European colonies in America, frankly said that he hoped all colonies would separate from their mother countries, because it would remove a great cause of war between those countries in Europe; but this was written after the French had lost their North American colonies. From the very first we have seen that it was the Spanish monopoly in America which led to the trading expeditions of Elizabethan England becoming openly piratical, and then a part of national war. The Dutch fought the Portuguese for a share in the East Indian trade, but then the Dutch were already at war with Spain, which ruled Portugal at this time. But the English and the Dutch merchants in the East Indies were continually hostile, when their countries were not at war, and when their common interest in opposing the Roman Catholic powers in Europe should have kept them together. The massacre by the Dutch of the English traders at Amboyna in 1623 was the worst outrage. When the first two Stewart kings took little notice of such actions, we must in fairness allow that it was not only want of spirit and want of power which kept them quiet. They were hampered by European politics, being engaged in wars or negotiations on behalf of the Palatinate and the German Protestants, which made it inexpedient to quarrel with the Dutch. When the Spaniards ravaged the English island of St. Kitts in 1629 Charles I was already at war with Spain, and had far too much trouble on his hands, at home and abroad, to revenge the injury. But when Captain Best defeated the

Portuguese at sea in Swahili Roads, near Surat, in 1612, we were not at war with Spain and Portugal in Europe.

When communications with Europe took so long a time, and so irregular a time, it was certain that European merchants and settlers in distant continents would follow their own policy in many cases. Colonial independence, including colonial wars, were a natural consequence of geography as well as of exclusive trade policy. A complete account of colonial wars is beyond our scope. It would involve a review of the foreign policy of Great Britain for two centuries. From the time when we had any colonial interests at all, down to the time of the conquest of French and Dutch colonies in the Napoleonic War, there was an era of fighting between the colonists of England and of other countries, and of deliberate conquests by us of new markets, or conquests undertaken to protect our existing markets and settlements.

Turning from naval warfare with the Spaniards in the West and with the Dutch and Portuguese in the East Indies, we find in North America very early collision between English and French settlers. In 1613, when Virginia was still a delicate child five years of age only, an expedition from Virginia, under Samuel Argall, discovered a handful of French established at Port Royal, now Annapolis, on the Bay of Fundy, and killed or expelled them as interlopers, reducing also some other French settlements on the coast of Maine. We were at peace with France, and they had as much or as little right to be there as we had. In 1628, when Charles was at war with France, Kirk again expelled the French from Nova Scotia, and went on and conquered Quebec. But all conquests were restored at the peace in 1632. The French settlements were thinly occupied, and were no real menace to English colonies till much later. Cromwell, after making peace with the Dutch, went to war with Spain and planned a great conquest in the West Indies. Penn and Venables, his officers, failed in Hispaniola, but conquered Jamaica (1655) with little trouble. Almost at once the island began to grow prosperous under English management and settlement.

Charles II had extensive ideas of colonial aggrandisement. His first Dutch war saw the important conquest of the New Netherlands, which, as New York, linked up New England and Virginia and made the foundation of Pennsylvania possible.

But the small settlement in Guiana was lost to the Dutch in the same war. In his secret treaties with Louis XIV he stipulated for yet further acquisitions from the Dutch; and looking forward, as men already did, to the coming distribution of the Spanish Empire, he planned for the reversion to England of some of the Spanish colonies when the time was ripe. Nothing, however, came of that for the present. A temporary acquisition of his reign, Tangier, has been commonly under-valued: as a refuge for merchant ships, and a base for men-of-war against the Barbary pirates, it was useful. Its more imposing successor, Gibraltar, has played a great part in the consolidation of the Empire, and had Tangier been retained it would have partly fulfilled the same purposes.

William III's French war brought no permanent conquests in the colonies. New England was indeed exposed to great danger from French attack, carried out by the Indians of the French side in Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. New York was protected by the Iroquois or the Five Nations, our Indian allies. Indeed an invasion by them of Canada averted a serious French attack, planned to come down the Hudson as Burgoyne tried to come in 1777.

An era of more deliberate and successful colonial conquest starts with the eighteenth century, and continues, with one great reversal of fortune, till the close, and after. The War of the Spanish Succession was not entered upon by England to turn Philip V off the throne of Spain. We had recognized him as King of Spain, and had his grandfather, Louis XIV, played his cards more wisely we should not probably have joined the Allies in interfering with the self-determination, as we now call it, of the Castilians. In addition to seizing the Barrier fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, turning out their Dutch garrisons, and garrisoning Ostend and Nieuport with French soldiers, and before he recognized James, the son of James II, as King of Great Britain, Louis had allowed talk of a commercial treaty with his grandson by which English and Dutch trade was to be still more rigorously excluded from Spanish America and French trade admitted. French companies were formed to carry on the intended commerce. The Peace of Utrecht (1713), which ended the war, very carefully provided for trade and colonial expansion. It was our first great empire-making treaty. Gibraltar and

Minorca gave us a Mediterranean ascendancy. The acquisition or the confirmation of our frontiers in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Labrador, and the Hudson's Bay territory, planted us in a position on the sea-board of French North America which pointed to the future conquest of Canada. An expedition for that very purpose had been planned by the Tory Ministry which made the peace, but had been frustrated by bad weather. Above all, the exclusive right of supplying the Spanish colonies with slaves for thirty years, and the right of sending one ship a year to trade on the Pacific shores of South and Central America, opened the way to extensive intrusion into the Spanish-American trade. The one ship was filled up several times over with new cargo by tenders in her wake, and the contraband trade in the West Indian seas was openly pursued. Henceforward "the irregularities introduced by the English into the colonial trade" were a standing cause of complaint by Spain, backed up by France, and the family compact, made in 1733, renewed in 1743 and 1761, was not founded upon family connexion nearly so firmly as it was based upon the natural desire of the two secondary colonial and maritime powers, for the Dutch were dropping out of the race, to curb the overbearing pretensions, and the over-great power, of the leading commercial and maritime State, ourselves.

The Spanish war of 1739 was a direct result. It was followed by a French war. It was marked by desultory colonial war. Apart from Indian affairs, which need separate treatment, its most important episode was the capture of Louisbourg, the new French fortress on Cape Breton Island, by the English colonists in 1746. The famous voyage of Anson round the world was planned to conquer trade and naval bases on the shores of the Pacific. That it resulted in merely a great plundering voyage, recalling the days of Hawkins and Drake, was owing to the loss or return of all Anson's ships save his flagship "The Centurion."

After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, a truce merely at the end of this war, which left colonial questions as they were, came the great French efforts to extend their North American colonies, to take the Ohio valley, and to link up Canada and Louisiana, so as to shut off the English settlements from the interior of North America. A war between England and France was certain, and in fact had begun, quite apart from

any European question of the conflicting ambitions of Prussia and Austria.

When the elder Pitt first took office he thought it possible to make an ally of Spain. English spirits were at a low ebb, the French had taken Minorca, there was a general impression that we were not capable of great things, and incredible as it might seem in the light of later events, Pitt was prepared to offer Gibraltar to Spain in exchange for an alliance and the recovery of Minorca. The Spaniards refused the alliance, though they did not join France against us for four years.

But with the success of Pitt's administration a great change passed over English policy and pretensions. Pitt was the Imperial statesman, *par excellence*, a Roman in haughty courage, and we may add ambition, and in supreme devotion to the national interest without regard to the rights of any other nation. He conquered the French fleets, which was the necessary preliminary to all colonial conquest, he conquered Canada, almost a foregone conclusion if once taken in hand intelligently, for the English North American settlers were about ten times as numerous as the French. He conquered West Indian islands, and West African slaving stations. He supplied the means for the final settlement of the fight of the two East India Companies for the supremacy of India. After his retirement, when the war with Spain had supervened, as he foretold it would, expeditions which he had planned conquered Havana, most of the remaining West Indian islands, and Manilla, with the Philippines. His schemes had not stopped here. This was the great attempt to secure, by conquest, not unlimited dominions for the settlement of population, but unlimited dominion everywhere in trade. Havana and Manilla were not to be isolated conquests. Mexico lay between them. The China and East India trade of the Spaniards filled Manilla with huge riches. Cargoes of silk, spices, silver, and jewels, passed thence to Acapulco on the Pacific shore of Mexico through Mexico to Vera Cruz, thence to Havana, where it met the South American galleons from Portobello, and thence to Europe. This trade was to be seized by England, and protected by occupied ports across half the world. The control of the Gulf of Mexico, and the conquest of Mexico itself, was a certain consequence. The French were to be

utterly excluded from the Newfoundland fisheries, the supposed nurse of their navy, and France and Spain were to be no maritime powers at all, France no colonial power, and Spain, if still a colonial power, one existing at the will and for the benefit of England. His more cautious, smaller-minded, but, may we say, more reasonable and considerate successors, abandoned this grandiose scheme. They were content with the whole of French North America, all Spanish Florida, some West Indian islands, some of the African factories, the disarming of the French in India. It is possible that Pitt's inspiration and genius, had he remained in office, would have momentarily achieved his full designs. Would they have done so permanently? Would the resulting monopoly have been a good thing for us, as well as for the world?

As it was, by the Peace of Paris in 1763 we acquired more than we knew how to manage or were competent to hold. The actual acquisitions were all Canada, the country south of the Great Lakes up to the Mississippi, free navigation of the Mississippi, Spanish Florida, Grenada, the Grenadines, Tobago, St. Vincent, and Dominica in the West Indies; the confirmation of our claims in Honduras, Senegal in West Africa, the disarming of the French factories in India and the cession of the Circars, and the restoration of Minorca. Even had we fallen short of Pitt's extravagant intentions, we might have taken more. But it was enough. The establishment of an undisputed British supremacy in North America was a good thing. As the eighteenth century, or indeed the nineteenth century, was really constituted, the French or English element had to be rulers; they would not live peacefully side by side under independent governments. The defeat of the Bourbon powers was a defeat for absolute power and religious intolerance; they were discredited. The British victory was a victory for constitutional rule and religious toleration. It was of course a victory for commercial intolerance; but so would the victory of the other side have been, and for a worse intolerance. But the universal commercial and maritime supremacy contemplated by Pitt—for exclusive monopolists we should have remained—would not have been a good thing for us in the long run. It would have been founded upon slavery, and the rule of alien peoples, negroes, Indians, and Spaniards. It would have strengthened the slave-holding and the narrow com-

mercial interests which, even without this great increase of influence, were to be a grave trouble to us. It would have provoked a coalition against our overweening ambition. The actual war and peace did provoke a coalition in 1778-80. Had the Peace of Paris been more severe, had we been undisputed masters in the West Indies, and had the French marine been destroyed, perhaps we should have beaten this coalition, and our own justly discontented colonists whom it supported. The moral and constitutional loss of such a victory to the world and to ourselves would have been very great.

CHAPTER VII

THE ERA OF COLONIAL CONQUEST—*Continued*

THE details of the American War of Independence which caused the loss of all our original North American colonies and threatened the total loss of the British Empire, are not a part of the story of the Empire which survives. Its causes are a warning of the consequences of a mistaken Imperial policy. As we have already said, the root of the troubles was in the commercial policy, which treated colonies as trade depots, and monopolized shops, for the supposed benefit of the mother country. Colonists enjoying very considerable rights of self-government in all other respects were sure not to put up with the old system as their numbers and power of self-assertion grew, especially when they no longer needed protection by Great Britain from the French and Spaniards. The unwise acts of the Home Government, which exasperated the struggle, and the violent acts of the Americans, which stiffened English obstinacy, were incidents rather than causes of dissension. But another cause for the war itself perhaps, and very probably for the issue of the war, was the jealousy of the English maritime and colonial supremacy among other powers. Our supremacy was a monopolist supremacy. Though we had dropped the extravagant schemes mentioned in the last chapter, we were beyond the seas in a position similar to that which Louis XIV had occupied in Europe, and as surely provoked a coalition against us. France, Spain and Holland successively joined the colonists, and the Baltic powers—Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia—were united against us in an armed neutrality which was almost as harmful to us as open war. The foreign intervention had been counted upon from the beginning by those Americans, and they were not all by any means, who meant Independence when they took up arms, and the foreign intervention decided the conflict. No historian can possibly say for certain what would have

happened if things had been other than what they were; but the belated conciliatory offers of Lord North, and the extreme exhaustion of America, might very well have brought about a dissolution of the armies of Congress if it had not been for French aid and for the saving character rather than genius of one Virginian gentleman—Washington, the typically English hero. The pacification might not have been lasting. The eighteenth century had not got the political experience which allowed of the pacification after the Transvaal War, and brought about the South African Union, and the co-operation of Generals Botha and Smuts with the rest of the Empire against Germany. The exclusive commercial policy of England would not have been completely changed in that age, and the coming revolutionary wars would have much more likely seen a disastrous renewal of war in America than colonial co-operation with Nelson and Wellington. It is to be remembered, however, that the American War was a civil war. A considerable force of loyalists fought for the king, still more did not want to fight against him, and in England the Whig party supported the Americans because they did not wish George III's methods of government to be successful. American independence not only made the United States and ultimately, though not at once, altered our colonial system of government, but possibly averted a revolution in England a dozen years later.

The foreign coalition might have been much more disastrous. In justice to the king and to those who resisted to the last the acknowledgment of defeat, we may remember that they feared with some reason a total dismemberment of the British Empire. The recovery of Canada by France, the loss of the West India Islands, the loss of India, the independence of Ireland, the relegation of Great Britain to a third-class power by the total loss of colonial trade, all seemed possible. The French had undertaken to the Americans that they would not recover Canada; but had a French army marched into Canada the logic of events might have been too strong for any treaty. But it so happened that though America achieved independence, her European allies came off badly. Rodney saved the West Indies by his naval victory, the Battle of the Saints, in 1782. The French and Spaniards—the latter especially—spent vast sums and efforts in vain against Gibraltar, the great attack being

defeated that same year. Warren Hastings saved India, and his general, Sir Eyre Coote, defeated the French ally, Hyder Ali, at Porto Novo in 1781. The Dutch merchants were ruined, the Spanish colonies were naturally infected by the example of the English, France was practically bankrupt, and Minorca, Florida, Tobago, and Senegal were the only spoils of the nominal victors. Florida was sure to go ultimately with the United States; the other three we took again when we wanted them.

A renewed era of acquisition by us set in at once. Australia, nominally annexed in 1770, was occupied as a convict station, because we could no longer transport convicts to America. Steps were taken to control and consolidate the rule of the East India Company in India, to be mentioned again later. New Brunswick and Ontario came into existence, settled chiefly by exiled loyalists from the United States, and the government of Canada was re-formed—a first tentative step in setting up colonial representative institutions after the war.

In 1789 the incident of Nootka Sound showed the old trade rivalry to be still active. Some English merchants had set up a station on Nootka Sound in Vancouver, and carried on trade thence in furs and other produce with China. The Spaniards, who had only begun seriously to develop their Californian settlements since 1763, claimed the whole coast of the Pacific and took possession of Nootka Sound. The younger Pitt remonstrated warmly and equipped a fleet. The Spaniards did the same, and applied to France for aid; but the early stages of the French Revolution had begun. France was unable and unwilling to interfere, and Spain had to give way. The trade was of very little importance at the time, but the future of British Columbia was at stake, and was secured.

When the disregard of the French Revolutionary Government for all treaties, their conquest of Belgium, and their declaration of war against us—they actually began, we should have begun if they had not—forced Pitt reluctantly to become a war minister, a series of colonial conquests began again. They were deliberately calculated to bring the whole colonial trade into our hands as a support to the war, to deprive the enemy of resources, and to occupy the ports whence their cruisers and privateers preyed upon our

commerce. They were not an eccentric scheme by which our forces were dissipated, but were parts of a reasoned plan for controlling Europe by the mastery of world trade, which ultimately succeeded. These conquests, unlike his father's conquests, were not intended by Pitt to be permanent acquisitions in all cases; they were incidents of war. Certainly we did not keep them all when we might have done so. It is to be observed that in these wars Bourbon Spain very soon united with Republican, and then with Napoleonic France, on the old ground of commercial and colonial rivalry with us—so little had the family compact to do with family ties.

The series of conquests is monotonous, but remarkable. In 1793 Tobago was taken; in 1794 St. Lucia and Guadeloupe. The former was recovered by the French in 1795, the latter in the year we took it. Martinique was taken also in 1794. In 1795 we took possession of Cape Colony, Malacca, and Cochin from the Dutch, nominally for the Prince of Orange, whom the Dutch republicans had driven into exile. In 1796 we took Ceylon in the same interest, we recovered St. Lucia, and took Dutch Guiana in the name of the Prince of Orange and with the goodwill of most of the inhabitants, who were many of them English. In 1797 we took Trinidad from the Spaniards, and Minorca in 1798. In the same year we definitely annexed British Honduras, which we had visited for log cutting, that is, mahogany cutting, for a century before. In 1800 we took Malta from the French. In 1801, Denmark having joined the usual maritime coalition against us, we took the Danish West Indies, St. Thomas, St. Bartholomew, and St. Cruz. At the Peace of Amiens (1802) we gave up all these conquests except Trinidad, Ceylon, and Malta. The last we undertook to give up to the Knights of Malta, subject to certain arrangements. These were not completed, and as Napoleon would certainly have had it again had we left it, we stayed there and faced a renewal of the war. It would have ensued in any case. The renewed war was signalized by the reconquest of much which we had given up at the Peace of Amiens, and of something more. At first, it is true, the real danger of invasion tied our fleets to the observation or blockade of European ports, or the pursuit of evading squadrons. After Trafalgar we could more securely resume colonial conquests. However, already in 1803 St. Lucia and Tobago were taken, then Demerara

and Essequibo. In 1804 the conquest of Dutch Guiana was completed by the capture of Surinam, and, in Africa, Goree was taken the same year. Cayenne in French Guiana did not fall till 1809. Before Trafalgar was won (October 21, 1805) an expedition had been prepared against the Cape Colony, which had been restored to the Dutch. It was captured in January, 1806. St. Thomas and St. Cruz were taken and Madeira occupied in 1807; and in the same year Heligoland was taken from the Danes, as a smuggling station whence British goods might be run into the North German ports. In 1809 Martinique in the West Indies, all the Ionian Islands except Corfu, and Senegal in West Africa were conquered. Guadaloupe, St. Eustatia and St. Martin in the West Indies, Amboyna in the further Indian islands—a name of sinister memory—fell in 1810. At the end of 1810 Bourbon and Mauritius (the latter was a base for privateering against our East Indian trade) were taken. In 1811 the important conquest of Java left us sole masters in the Eastern seas. The Straits of Malacca, the Seychelles and Ammirante, had been occupied in 1810, and the defenceless French factories in India had fallen without a blow as soon as war was declared. Every overseas colony of France and Holland had been taken by us. The only conspicuous failure had been the attempt to seize Buenos Ayres and Monte Video from the Spaniards in 1806-7. In 1808 the rising of the Spaniards against Napoleon proved an occasion for throwing open the South American trade to us without fighting first, for South America was virtually separated from the mother country by the events there, so far as any control was concerned, and was only too glad to admit British commerce.

On many occasions in the previous century other nations had had reason to complain of our grasping colonial policy. When the Peace of Paris and the Congress at Vienna tried to restore peace to the world in 1814-15, we displayed conspicuous moderation. We had taken practically everything outside the limits of the United States, and of the Spanish American Colonies on the mainland, which were well on the way to becoming independent. If we had chosen to keep it all there was no one who could have stopped us. The French, Spanish, Dutch, and Danish fleets were sunk or taken, or perishing from long confinement to their harbours. Russia, Sweden, and Turkey, once naval powers of a sort,

had not been able to afford to keep up fleets, and had no concern in American and Indian seas. The United States had a few powerful frigates, but no fleet which could dispute the command of the sea. We did keep much. In Europe we kept Heligoland, which had ceased to be useful, and Malta, which was very essential and which belonged naturally to no national State. We kept a protectorate over the Republic of the Ionian Islands; Greece, to which they have since been united to their great material loss, was not yet an independent State. We gave up Minorca, which had been again occupied during the war. Its great use was as a base for a fleet blockading Toulon, and we did not anticipate having to blockade Toulon again. We kept Ceylon, which we had kept also in 1802, and where we mastered the barbarous Kingdom of Kandy in the interior, which the Portuguese and Dutch, our predecessors, had never done. We kept the Cape Colony as a halfway house to India, but we paid the Dutch for it, and for British Guiana, £6,000,000. We kept Mauritius, but restored Bourbon to France. Above all, we restored Java and other places in the East Indian seas to the Dutch—most valuable trading places. In America we restored part of Guiana to the Dutch, and part to the French. We kept Demerara, where the planters and their capital were mostly of English origin. We restored the Dutch islands, Curaçao and others, and the Danish West India Islands, to the Danes. To France we restored Guadaloupe and Martinique, with some smaller islands. Castlereagh, our Foreign Secretary, very wisely said that if we wanted France to be peaceful we had better not prevent her being a commercial power. Because Castlereagh was a strong Tory at home he has been persistently undervalued and misrepresented as a Foreign Minister. It is highly to his credit that he was instrumental in giving back the most valuable of the French West Indies, and in preventing the German powers from annexing Alsace and Lorraine in 1815. The era of quarrels between European powers for the possession of colonies had ceased for two generations onwards, and with France or Spain we have never been at war again.

An era of conquest had come to an end. The British Empire has been immensely extended since 1815. Australia was scarcely settled at all then, New Zealand not at all, South Africa was a mere fringe near the Cape, the Canadian North-

West was rarely penetrated by a few hunters after furs, Central and Eastern Africa and the Niger Territories were unknown, many Pacific islands were unknown, or merely known by position but unvisited. The Indian Empire had not reached half its present extent. But from the Peace of 1815 a new period of Imperial expansion and of colonial settlement by emigration and increase of population sets in. We no longer contend with European rivals in arms for markets and territories.

Nor was the monopolist spirit which made such rivalry natural so all-powerful as it had been. Adam Smith's book, "The Wealth of Nations," published in 1776, had summed up luminously and supplemented the works of previous economists, and given a powerful impulse to the principle of free trade, and of scope for individual enterprise, seeking the prosperity of the State, not through national laws so much as through the free development of individual efforts. The independence of the United States had made our old Navigation Acts unsuitable for existing conditions. The Acts themselves were modified, and transformed by exceptions and new commercial treaties till they were practically abolished by the Tories, Huskisson and Peel, and formally done away with by the Whigs in 1849. Most nations clung to some form of exclusive trading still, but free trade became more and more the interest and the prevailing policy of the dominant colonial power, Great Britain. In the nineteenth century it was no longer the interest of other powers to enter into a coalition "to correct the irregularities introduced into the colonial trade" by us, as the family compact had done. Here, therefore, we may break off the story of conquering expansion to consider one by one the various colonies which had been founded, and the development of the greatest of them into independent nations. The development took different forms according to local conditions, and has resulted in slightly differing governments, and very different social conditions, all still within one British Empire. Only one great acquisition of the period of conquest for trade purposes has remained over of an importance to be treated alone. How the trading of the East India Company grew into the Indian Empire is the most singular story of modern history, and stands apart from the stories and the lessons of the growth of the Dominions.

THE FIRST ERA OF COLONIAL CONQUEST

- 1612. Best defeated the Portuguese at sea in Swahili Roads, near Surat.
- 1613. Argall captured Port Royal in Nova Scotia from the French.
- 1628. Kirk conquered Quebec from the French. (Restored 1632.)
- 1651. St. Helena occupied by the East India Company.
- 1655. Penn and Venables took Jamaica from the Spaniards.
- 1664. New York, including New Jersey and Delaware, taken from the Dutch. (Lost in 1673; restored 1674.)
- 1667. Conquests at the expense of the Dutch on the West African coast confirmed.
- 1670. Jamaica confirmed to England by Treaty of Madrid.
- 1704. Gibraltar taken.
- 1708. Minorca taken. (Lost 1756; restored 1763; lost 1782.)
- 1713. Peace of Utrecht gave us Gibraltar and Minorca and confirmed our possession of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Labrador, Hudson's Bay Territory, and St. Kitts.
- 1746. Louisbourg (Cape Breton) taken from the French. (Restored 1748.)
- 1758. Louisbourg taken finally. Goree and Senegal taken. (The former restored 1763.)
- 1759. Victory of Wolfe at Quebec September 13th. Quebec surrendered September 18th. Guadaloupe taken. (Restored 1763.)
- 1760. Montreal taken, and conquest of Canada completed.
- 1761. Dominica taken.
- 1762. Martinique, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Havana and Cuba, Manilla and the Philippines taken. All except Grenada and St. Vincent restored in 1763. Florida, which had not been actually taken, and all the parts of North America up to the Mississippi, were acquired by the Peace of 1763. Tobago, Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Vincent, Dominica, and the logwood cutting settlements on the Honduras coast were retained by the Peace. Minorca was restored to us in Europe. The French factories in India, which had finally fallen to us in 1762, were restored unfortified.
- 1765. The Falkland Islands first occupied; confirmed to us 1771. Useful for the whale fishery.

COLONIAL CONQUEST, 1793-1815

- 1793. Tobago taken.
- 1794. St. Lucia and Guadaloupe taken (the latter lost again the same year). Martinique taken. Corsica occupied.
- 1795. The Cape of Good Hope, Cochin and Malacca taken.
- 1796. Ceylon taken. St. Lucia retaken (the French had recovered it in 1795). Guiana taken. Trinidad taken.
- 1798. Minorca taken. Honduras annexed.
- 1800. Malta taken.

1801. The Danish West India Islands taken.
 (All the above, except Ceylon, Trinidad and Malta, given up at the Peace of Amiens, 1802. War renewed 1803.)
1803. Tobago, Demerara, Essequibo, and St. Lucia taken.
1804. *Goree, Surinam* taken.
1806. Cape of Good Hope taken.
1807. *St. Thomas, St. Cruz, St. Bartholomew* (Danish Islands), and *Madeira* taken. Heligoland occupied.
1809. *Cayenne, Senegal*, the Ionian Islands (except Corfu) taken.
1810. *Guadeloupe, St. Eustatia, St. Martin, Amboyna*, Mauritius, *Bourbon* and the Seychelles taken.
1811. *Java* taken.

The places *in italics* were restored at the peace in 1814-5. The Ionian Islands and Heligoland have been given up since.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FOUNDATION OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE

THE Company of London Merchants trading to the East Indies was incorporated on the last day of the sixteenth century, and lasted for nearly two hundred and fifty-eight years, when it lost its governing position in India (1858), but was not finally wound up till 1874. In those two and a half centuries it had founded an empire, but only in the last century of the time. How lasting only a prophet can tell. At any rate it had revolutionized Southern Asia. Of its first voyages in 1601 and 1604, and of its first naval fight with the Portuguese off Surat in 1612, we have spoken. The voyages were profitable, but in those early days the Dutch were the strongest power in East Indian seas. The Dutch East India Company was closely connected with the Dutch Government. The same class of merchants, the same men often, were influential in both. Their ships were more numerous and more powerful than the English ships, and their policy of excluding European competitors from the trade which they had wrested out of the hands of the Portuguese, was persistently followed. The governments of James I and Charles I, occupied with European schemes of peace or war, which they had neither the ability nor the power to conduct successfully, but which forbade a quarrel with Holland, hampered, too, by home difficulties and want of money, gave our merchants little support. After the massacre by the Dutch of the English traders at Amboyna in 1623, we nearly entirely gave up the traffic in the East Indian Islands and Malaya. But this defeat turned our attention more to the mainland of India itself, where all European traders were more on an equality, all humble servants of the Moghuls and their viceroys, but on fairly equal level in opportunities of trading. Since the failure of the Portuguese, European powers did not aspire to rule in

India. The trading factories were merely mercantile settlements leased from the local potentate or the Moghul himself. An English factory was established at Surat in 1612, and received something equivalent to a charter from the Moghul in 1613. One was established at Masulipatam in 1622. In 1639 some six square miles were leased at Madras. In 1633 a factory was set up at Piply on the Hooghly, followed by others, some as far up the country as Patna and Agra, where there could be no question of territorial rule. But Madras was protected by a fort, Fort St. George, and was considered the chief post. In 1661, Charles II received Bombay as part of the dowry of his Portuguese bride. This was handed over to the East India Company in 1668. It was a new sort of settlement, for, being an island, the Portuguese had asserted and kept a sovereignty over it ; and in the island of Bombay, Charles II was king after its cession. At Surat his subjects were living under the monarchy of Delhi or Agra. Fort William was built in 1696 to protect the factories on the Hooghly, where the Company administered a freehold estate where Calcutta now is. Fort St. David, south of Madras, was built in 1690.

The Company shared in the great increase of our overseas trade in the later Stewart reigns. In explanation of the extravagant hopes of subscribers to the South Sea Company in 1720, we may reflect that people remembered that in Charles II's reign the East India Company had doubled the shares held by the proprietors as a bonus, and had paid 20 per cent on the doubled shares for five years afterwards. Even in times of depression during William's French wars the £100 shares had stood at 120. The wars themselves contributed to the prosperity of the East India trade, for they could only be carried on by aid of the saltpetre imported from India. But the monopoly of the company was naturally challenged. Interlopers, as they were called, entered upon private trade in spite of it. A rival company was at last incorporated in 1698, a Whig company, the old Company was Tory. But the two were allied in 1702, the final amalgamation taking place in 1708. The powers of the Company, and its monopoly, had much to do with its subsequent strange history. Single traders had many difficulties to contend with in the East. We had no diplomatic representation at the Court of the Moghul ; no English men-of-war were

habitually present in the Indian Ocean ; no army was to be expected to redress the worst outrage of the native powers, of the Dutch, nor of any other rivals in India. The Company had to be empowered to arm ships, to raise soldiers, to administer law. It had to be empowered to send Embassies, to conclude treaties and alliances with native rulers. It could not trade safely without some means of enforcing respect for its merchants, and keeping order in its own factories.

To begin with, the Dutch and Portuguese, pirates Asiatic and European, and occasional arbitrary acts of local governors, were the sources of trouble with which it had the power of dealing. The Moghul power was far too great to be challenged with impunity by a group of armed merchants. In 1686 Sir John Child, Governor of Bombay, rashly attacked the Moghuls in Bengal, and seized ships of Aurungzeb's off Western India. The wrath of the great emperor at once smote the presumptuous traders. They were expelled from Bengal, they were all but expelled from India. A humble submission, an opportune payment, the recollection by the Moghul of the fact that the trade was useful to himself and his subjects, and the death of Child, saved the Company. It was our one war with a Moghul upon his throne till we besieged a successor to Aurungzeb in his palace in Delhi in 1857. Not till more than half a century after Child's time did it appear that conditions had changed. Then, with no design to found an empire, the foundation of the Indian Empire began.

The Moghul Emperor at Agra, or at Delhi, had been the nominal overlord of the whole Indian peninsula, sometimes its real master, and usually ruler of all Hindhustan proper, the northern part of what we call India, and of most of Afghanistan. In 1526 Baber had founded the dynasty. From 1556 to 1707, one hundred and fifty-one years, there had been four great Moghuls—Akbar, Jehangir, Shah Jehan, and Aurungzeb—really great in power, with an average reign of nearly thirty-eight years each. The last, Aurungzeb, lived too long, was too like Louis XIV, a persecutor—an extravagant *Grand Monarque* who outstayed his capacities and good fortune. In the next fifty-two years, up to 1759, there were nine nominally "great" Moghuls. Three were murdered, three "died" soon after deposition, one was

deposed but died peacefully; two only died as emperors. The next one was blinded by a nominal subject, but lived—one cannot say reigned—many years. The mere enumeration of reigns explains the opportunity for self-assertion on the part of anyone—ourselves and others. Already in the seventeenth century the Marathas, Hindhus, had risen successfully against the Mohammedan Moghuls in the Deccan, or South-central India, and in the West of the peninsula. Sivajee, the great Maratha leader lived from 1627 to 1680. After a generation of confusion following Aurungzeb's death in 1707, the Turcoman Nadir Shah, King of Persia and Afghanistan, sacked Delhi in 1739. He withdrew, but the power of the Moghuls was extinguished. When the French and the English East India Companies began to acquire political influence there was no strong power in India which had an ancient legal title to existence. The Subhadars and Nawabs who had usurped sovereign rights in the provinces which their ancestors had administered, and where they had collected revenue for the Moghuls, were all Mohammedans and foreigners. The Subhadar of the Deccan was a Turk, the Nawab of the Carnatic was a Moghul—a Tartar, that is—the Nawab of Bengal was an Afghan, the Nawab of Oudh was a Persian. The really powerful native Hindhus by race and religion were Maratha freebooters, adventurers who had risen by war and subsisted on rapine. It is one of the beneficent results of British rule that the descendants of some of these men have become highly enlightened rulers of their feudatory States. The transformation is even more complete and more rapid than that which changed the descendants of Norman barons of the Conquest into the leaders of a constitutional party two centuries later. In 1759 Southern India was still further revolutionized by Hyder Ali, a Mohammedan soldier of fortune, once a groom, seizing the ancient Hindhu throne of Mysore. In 1761 the Maratha confederacy was severely defeated by an Afghan invader at Panipat, near Delhi, and their chances of consolidating into a real Hindhu Empire seriously impaired. There were plenty of native Rajahs, of uncomputed antiquity of title, and often of comparative respectability of character, but they were not powerful. The country was a chaos, in which the strong hand and the cunning brain were the sources of power.

It was the ambitions of Dupleix, who became Governor of

Pondicherry, and head of the French Company in India in 1741, which impelled the English Company to interfere in native politics. In the existing confusion the Europeans were obliged to fortify their trading posts, to employ soldiers, and to make themselves respected by the various pretenders to power, if they were to carry on trade at all. But Dupleix had a wider vision, not only of extending French trade at the expense of the English, but of making France the paramount power in Southern India. At first he merely waged war against the English company when England and France were at war in Europe. In 1746 Labourdonnais, the French Governor of Mauritius, appeared with a fleet and took Madras. The English still held Fort St. David, but their credit sank very low. Dupleix intended to retain Madras, in spite of the objection of the Nawab of the Carnatic, and in the same year his officers defeated the latter's much larger army at St. Thomé, demonstrating the great superiority of European troops, and of sepoys drilled and led by Europeans, over a crowd of undisciplined natives. It was in a sense the decisive battle of India; Plassey was a repetition of the same lesson. Dupleix now went further, and successfully intrigued and fought to put his own nominee, Chunda Sahib, on the throne of the Carnatic, and to make Salabut Jung Subhadar of the Deccan, the third choice after the first two French nominees had been murdered. He was selected on the spur of the moment, after an Afghan chief had shot the second choice, by Bussy, a long way the ablest French officer in India. Bussy ruled in his name at Hydrabad, drilled his native soldiers, maintained him against the Marathas, maintained himself against his nominal master's treachery, and got for the French the cession of the Circars, a territory of 600 miles of sea-front in the Bay of Bengal with a land revenue of £500,000 a year. The whole story is too long for our narration. Briefly, the English company, in self-defence, supported a rival pretender as Nawab of the Carnatic, and by great good fortune numbered Robert Clive among the ex-civilians whom the needs of the time had turned into soldiers. Clive seized Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, in 1751, and defended it against the troops of Chunda Sahib and the French. Sallying out, after the siege was raised, he defeated them at Arnee and Kaveripauk. He was then superseded by Major Stringer Lawrence, a very able officer, sent out from England,

but seconded him loyally in further operations, which completely beat the French party. Chunda Sahib was murdered by native enemies, the two Companies had peace imposed upon them from home, and Dupleix was recalled in 1754. Mohammed Ali, the English nominee, was left Nawab of the Carnatic, but all India knew that it was the English Company which had put him in possession. We ruled in Southern India because in a time of confusion we had shown ourselves capable of so doing, not from any set design of conquest.

It was not quite the same in Bengal. The renewal of war in America and Europe between France and England involved one between the Indian factories of the two. A collision in Bengal between the English merchants and the wholly bad and half mad youth of nineteen, Suraj-ood-dowlah, the new Nawab, was inevitable. The latter took Calcutta, and suffocated 123 out of 146 prisoners in the Black Hole. Clive, sent up from Madras, drove him out of Calcutta, and patched up a peace, which could not be lasting. In the course of hostilities against the French Clive took the French factory in Bengal, Chander-nagore, the French appealed to the Nawab, and Clive determined to follow the example of Dupleix and to put an English nominee in the place of Suraj-ood-dowlah. Meer Jaffier, the Nawab's own general, was selected. The plot was successfully carried through, Plassey was fought and won in 1757, and the new Nawab endowed the Company with territory between Calcutta and the sea, and lavished presents of hundreds of thousands upon the leading men of the company. A plot among utterly unscrupulous natives could not be carried out with clean hands. Omichund, the banker who financed it, tried to extort blackmail by threatening to reveal it, and was overreached in turn by Clive's forged treaty. But it is not the fact that Omichund was either killed or driven out of his mind by the disappointment. He lived in good health some time longer, and died a rich man.

The war with France had broken out again in Southern India. Lally, a brave Irishman with no judgment, had been sent out by France with a considerable force, but was at last defeated at Wandewash by Eyre Coote in 1761. Pondicherry fell the next year. English superiority at sea was the really decisive factor in all the wars with France in India. The great military genius of Clive, and the driving power of Pitt

at home, were only contributory reasons. Lally had recalled Bussy from Hyderabad, and the French influence which he had maintained there fell to pieces. The French territory in the Circars was conquered by Clive's officer, Forde, in 1759, and the Deccan passed under English influence.

In Bengal Meer Cassim, the son-in-law and successor of Meer Jaffier, tried to shake off English control. He got the aid of the Nawab of Oudh and of Shah Alum, who claimed the Moghul throne but was not in actual possession. They were defeated at the battle of Buxar (1764), and Clive returning to India as Governor of Bengal in 1765, settled the province by a peace with the Moghul claimant. The Company was made Dewan, or Revenue Collector of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. The actual collection of the land-revenue was in the hands of the Nawab's officers. A sufficient sum was subtracted for the military and civil expenses of the provinces, and £300,000 was remitted annually to the Moghul. This closed the contests which had arisen out of the struggle with the French. The Company had become a great ruling power in India. The territories directly administered by it were still small, compared with the present Indian Empire, but the rich and thickly populated districts of the Carnatic and Bengal were under its influence completely; Hyderabad and Oudh were uneasy allies. There had been no settled plan of conquest. Clive solemnly warned the directors against the danger of trying to extend political influence further; but the arrangements of divided control were obviously likely to be temporary only. Yet rule through native princes was going to continue, though the actual methods then existing were going to be changed. It is not usually recognized that to-day, quite apart from recent experiments in the direction of giving a share in Indian government to natives through elections, or through selection for the civil service, two-fifths of the area and nearly a quarter of the population of the Indian Empire are ruled by feudatory princes under the king-emperor, and much better ruled than any provinces were under the feudatories of the Moghul.

CHAPTER IX

THE CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH INDIA

THE foundations of an Indian Empire had been laid, and Clive's administration as Governor of Bengal (1765-67) had introduced some order into what was to be henceforth its leading province. But the situation called clearly for more control by the British Government of what had become an Imperial concern. The military and political adventures of the Company were very expensive. The Company itself was fast drifting to bankruptcy, while individuals were returning home with vast fortunes, buying seats in Parliament, and, it was complained, corrupting home politics by the plunder and the methods of the east. Clive himself had amassed an enormous fortune, and the private trade, peculations, and bribery which he had done much to put down in India while he was there flourished again after his withdrawal. North's Regulating Act, passed in 1773, was the result. The Governor of Bengal was made Governor-General of all the Company's possessions, appointed in the first instance by the Crown, to be appointed in future by the directors with the concurrence, and in part by the suggestion, of the Crown. Mr. Warren Hastings, the Company's Governor of Bengal, was the first Governor-General, assuming his functions in 1774. He was to be advised by a council of four, appointed by the Crown. A Supreme Court, of a Chief Justice and three Judges, was set up in Calcutta. All military and political correspondence of the Company was to be laid before the Ministry, and no public servant was to engage in trade or receive presents from any natives. The Company was to be relieved by being granted favourable terms for exporting tea to America—it was supposed for its own profit and to that of the Americans, who would get tea more cheaply. The measure had, as is well known, unexpected consequences. But Lord North's Government, for all its errors in America, was the first administration to try reforms in India and

Irish Government, and to begin fair treatment of French Canadians, and of Roman Catholics at home.

The career of Warren Hastings demands a volume for proper consideration. Students must still be warned that the well-known and fascinatingly told story by Macaulay is wrong in facts from beginning to end, and that histories based upon more exhaustive studies of original documents have placed Hastings' actions in a very different light. When the members of the House of Lords who had heard the evidence in his impeachment voted upon the various heads, he was acquitted on them all, and his worst division—that upon the case of the Begums of Oudh—showed 23 votes for him and 6 against. On the other charges the majorities for him were greater, and in some cases the judgment was unanimous in his favour.

In internal administration Hastings abolished the dual government in Bengal. The collection and administration of the land-revenue was taken out of the hands of the Nawab's servants, and put into those of English collectors. The Nawab, a minor, was relegated to the position of a pensioned relic of bad old times. He had £160,000 a year for personal expenses, no niggardly allowance for the representative of a family of tax-gatherers for the Moghuls. The payment to the Court of Delhi was finally stopped when the Moghul and all his so-called government became the tool of a Maratha chief, Scindia of Gwalior, who employed the Moghul's revenues against the Company and its ally, the Nawab of Oudh. Hastings was the preserver of British India. He was involved in war with the Marathas by the ill-judged action of the Bombay Government, which disregarded the Regulating Act and took independent measures of its own. He had to face the dangers of renewed French interference, when France had joined the revolted American colonists in 1778, with the knowledge that little help could be spared to him from home. The French intrigued with the Marathas, and with Hyder Ali of Mysore. That able and ambitious Mohammedan adventurer recognized truly that the English Company was the chief barrier to his founding a great Mohammedan Empire in Southern India. He called himself Sultan, thereby repudiating the supremacy of the Moghul. He would have given no more mercy to the French than to the English had he been successful; but meanwhile the co-operation of a

French fleet from Mauritius, and of a few French soldiers, was useful to him. The Madras Government was singularly helpless, and Hyder Ali was the most formidable enemy whom we fought in India, till we beat the Seikh Khalsa army in 1845-6. Hastings was hampered by the persistent opposition of three members of his council out of four, and by want of money. He was able to make at least a temporary peace with the Marathas, to balance them and the Nizam of Hyderabad against Hyder Ali. His only good general, Sir Eyre Coote, defeated Hyder at Porto Novo (1781) and saved Madras. But peace with France and the natural death of Hyder Ali were a much-needed relief. Tippoo Sahib, son of the latter, was a ferocious tyrant, but not a soldier, much less a statesman, of the calibre of his father.

Hastings returned in 1785 from the country which he had served for us to encounter the long strain of his impeachment. The increased interest in Indian affairs which partly caused it, and partly was caused by it, had already determined the Whigs to supplement North's Regulating Act, and, after the defeat of Fox's India Bill, Pitt passed his Act, under which India was to be governed till 1858. It is wrongly represented as nearly identical with Fox's, for it did not, like that, put the mercantile affairs and the whole patronage of the Company into the hands of a Party Government at home, who would have found in them a most powerful means of influence.

Pitt's Act set up a Board of Control, presided over by a Cabinet minister, going in and out of office with the Government, to superintend all political business. The Governor-General, his Council, the Governors and Commander-in-chief, were to be nominated by the Company, with the approval of the Crown, and were, in fact, Crown appointments. Intended restrictions on the right of making wars and treaties without consultation with the Home Government were of necessity made unworkable by the difficulties of time and distance. The violent quarrel between Hastings and his Council, and the insubordination of Bombay and Madras against Calcutta, pointed to the advantages of an English statesman as Governor-General over a promoted official of the Company. Lord Cornwallis was the first Governor-General of the new class. The practice has been continued almost continuously ever since. Though these highly placed Governors-General or Viceroys have sometimes made mistakes

from ignorance of India, the general advantage is undoubted. When so able a man as Sir John Lawrence—Lord Lawrence as he became—was made Viceroy from the ranks of the Company's service, it is said that some disadvantages resulted from his position as head over former equals. Of course, Cornwallis, though under instructions to keep the peace, had to be at war. Tippoo Sahib regarded no obligations to keep the peace. It takes two to keep the peace, as well as two to make a quarrel. The great act of Cornwallis' first administration was the permanent settlement of the land-revenue of Bengal in 1793. All permanent settlements are open to the objection that values and circumstances change. But though it was based upon a mistaken application of English land-owning conditions to India,¹ it was a well meant and not unsuccessful attempt to do away with arbitrary and sudden alterations in taxation, and to put an end to uncertainties of land tenure. The ignorant or malevolent traducers of the advantages of British administration to the Indian cultivators ignore the fact that under Akbar the Government took from 40 to 50 per cent of the produce of the land in Bengal in taxation, and that it now takes 6 per cent. Another benefit to the peaceful inhabitants everywhere was the overthrow of the Maratha plunderers, which constituted our real conquest of India.

¹ It mistook a zemindar, the hereditary collector of revenue for an English landowner, and made him the squire.

CHAPTER X

THE CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH INDIA (*Continued*)

RIVALRY with the French had caused the beginning of our political influence in India. Rivalry in India and the Colonies had had much to do with our French wars; and then, conversely, our European wars and rivalries—first with France and then with Russia—had much to do with the extension of our Indian Empire. Had England and France lived in perfect peace, Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sahib would have been enemies of ours in Southern India, and in Northern and Central India no peaceful state could exist for long next door to the Marathas. But both Mysore and the Marathas were used by France as convenient instruments for our hurt, even if the chances of France profiting in India by losses of ours there were now remote. It was fortunate for us that the Hindhu Marathas could not unite with the Mohammedan usurper of Mysore, and that the Nizam of Hyderabad was at enmity with the Marathas and was naturally jealous of another Mohammedan who, if he had conquered the Carnatic and the English, might have next attacked the Deccan. When Cornwallis, after defeating Tippoo but not destroying him, left India, Sir John Shore ruled three years, and then Lord Mornington came out, in 1798, as Governor-General. He was elder brother of the future Duke of Wellington, and was himself created Marquis Wellesley. He was a close friend of Pitt, and came with the design of frustrating for good and all any chance of French interference in India by taking the foreign relations of all States into English control. The war with revolutionary France was in full course; Spain had joined France against us; we had evacuated the Mediterranean, and Napoleon was just starting for Egypt. Tippoo was on the warpath. He had solicited French aid, and had some French officers in his service. He called himself *Citoyen* Tippoo, but was as

much like a real Jacobin as the present Amir of Afghanistan is like a real Bolshevik. But the Nizam had about 15,000 men drilled and officered by French Republicans, and Scindia, the greatest Maratha chief, had 40,000 excellent infantry drilled by Frenchmen and a numerous artillery, and Tippoo was negotiating with both. They would not combine permanently, but it was quite possible that they might join forces to defeat us and adjust their own rivalries afterwards. Wellesley at once turned to Hyderabad. By aid of a friendly minister of the Nizam's, and an excellent agent, Captain Kirkpatrick, he procured the disbanding of the French sepoys and their replacement by sepoys in English pay. His anxiety was increased by a letter from an Afghan chief who had invaded the Punjab, and was simultaneously asking for an alliance with the English against the Marathas, and an alliance with Tippoo against the English. Tippoo was peremptorily warned that he must abandon the French alliance, and given the news of the battle of the Nile. But he persisted in defiance, and Wellesley invaded Mysore. General Harris stormed Seringapatam; Tippoo fell fighting. A curtailed Mysore was restored to the old Hindhu dynasty, and became a dependent State, as it remains to-day. This was in 1799. With the treaty with the Nizam it made Southern India practically English.

The Marathas remained. The warlike tribes of Western India who had lifted the banner of Hindhu revolt against Shah Jehan and Aurungzeb had been joined in their victorious course by all manner of adventurers. In the eighteenth century they formed armies of systematic plunderers, who levied *chowdh*, or tribute, or blackmail to avert their ravage, from nearly all India, from Rajpootana to the environs of Calcutta, from Delhi to Cape Comorin. We have seen that they received a setback at Panipat in 1761 from Afghan invaders as ruthless as themselves. There were migratory armies of Afghans in India, dating originally from the days of the Afghan dynasty, which had preceded the Moghuls, and under the name of Pindharis often associated with Marathas in a league of plunder. The first head of the Maratha confederacy, the Rajah of Sattara, had been superseded in power by the Peishwa of Poonah, his Mayor of the Palace. The Peishwa was being rapidly superseded by Scindia, Holkar of Indore, and the Rajah of Berar. Scindia

had possessed himself of Delhi and of the person of the Moghul, who was a blinded prisoner in his hands, and through his prisoner might aspire to govern Hindhustan. There was no room in India for a civilized government and an independent Maratha confederacy.

The discordant races and religions of India (some 220 different languages are spoken in the present Indian Empire) had been loosely held together by the supremacy of the Moghuls. Wellesley deliberately intended to substitute a British hegemony for this now obsolete rule. His subsidiary system put the foreign policy and the defence of each State under our management, and territory was assigned in each protected State for the maintenance of a native force under English control. Mysore, Hyderabad, and Oudh came under the system. The Peishwa of Poona submitted to it in the Treaty of Bassein (1802), fearing for his life at the hands of his own supposed feudatories. These really independent Maratha chiefs refused to concur, and the war with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar followed in 1803. Sir Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) won Assaye and Argaum; Lord Lake won Laswarri and took Agra and Delhi. The Moghul and his capital passed into British keeping, and Scindia and Berar accepted the subsidiary system. The French-drilled army of the former was disbanded. Holkar of Indore maintained an independent resistance, not without some success, and the recall of Wellesley, and the overpowering anxieties of the war with Napoleon, imposed a truce in India for some years. But the war with the Marathas had to be fought out. The task fell to the Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General, 1813-23. The utterly lawless Pindharis were first dealt with in 1816. The rulers of Poona, Indore, and Nagpore supported them. The forces brought into the field far exceeded in numbers any armies the Duke of Wellington had commanded in Spain, and the war was carried on over half India. In 1818 the Marathas were conquered, Poona was annexed, but not the other States. British supremacy was established over all India east of the Punjab and Scinde, and the predatory armies of the Pindharis and Marathas became a thing of the past. Like other abolished abuses they became forgotten except as a picturesque memory; but cultivation was resumed, a population was restored, and peace reigned, where for a century had been scenes of perpetual

plunder and desolation. The conquest of the Marathas was the conquest of India, carried on mostly by native armies, in the true interest of most of the Indian populations. But as war founded on our European and American wars with the French had been the first moving cause for our political assertion in India, so rivalries originating outside India produced further wars. When we ceased to fear French interference in India, we rapidly passed to a fear of the Russians.

An exaggerated idea prevailed in England of the offensive power of Russia, and from the time of the suppression of the Polish insurrection in 1831 a violent dislike of their government. The feeling was intensified by Russian interference in Hungary in 1849, and was responsible for the Crimean War much more than was positive favour for Turkey. But before the Czar Nicholas had become, in 1849, to most Englishmen the incarnation of all anti-liberal and anti-nationalist power, we feared the extension of Russian influence in Asia. Russia became on her part pleasantly aware that she could at least annoy and terrify Lord Palmerston and English Liberals by alarms in Central Asia and Persia, in revenge for irritating opposition in Europe.

These alarms produced Lord Auckland's rashly conceived and badly executed attempt to interfere in Afghan politics in 1839-42. The result was disastrous, though the defence of Jelalabad, and the reoccupation of Kabul for a short time, restored our military honour a little. The Afghan adventures involved us in Scinde, though the conquest of Scinde in 1843 was the most unprovoked aggression committed by us in our whole career in India. A war with the Sikhs of the Punjab was extremely probable whether there had been an Afghan war or not. When Ranjit Singh, the very astute adventurer who had founded a kingdom there, was dead, he left as his successor an infant, the son of a dancing girl; and no minister capable of controlling a great army—the Khalsa army, disciplined by old soldiers of Napoleon's, and animated by a strong religious fanaticism. Sooner or later they were pretty sure to break into India. As it was, the Sikh ministers let them loose upon us, in order to postpone at least their own depositions and murders at their hands. The natural outcome of the two Sikh Wars—1845-6 and 1848-9, was the conquest of the Punjab. There

was no ancient native dynasty to be restored, and the problems of the frontier were too difficult to be in any but British hands. When once we were responsible for the protection of the plains of the Punjab, the regulation of the mountain barrier, and the restraint of the plundering clans of Highlanders there, became a manifest duty. Subsequent attempts to interfere in Afghanistan, still prompted by fear of Russia—Afghan wars were fought between 1878 to 1880—were carried on with more true conception of the conditions, were not meant to lead to a permanent occupation of more than the gateways through the mountains, and had this excuse at least—that Russian Central Asia was some thousand miles nearer British India than it had been in 1839. In 1878 a Russian army could have invaded Afghanistan; in 1839 they could only have incited the Persians to do so, a very different danger.

The conquest of Burmah, which is outside India, in 1884-6, is another case prompted by jealousy of a European rival. The misgovernment of Burmah would have provoked an extension of influence over the whole of it some day, no doubt. The actual conquest was accelerated by French progress on the other side of it in Indo-China. We were on bad terms with the French then, in a renewed era of extra-European rivalry, and we wanted to exclude French influence from too close approximation to India proper.

The final consolidation of the Indian Empire followed the mutiny of the Bengal army in 1857-8. Lord Dalhousie (1849-55) had pursued a policy of direct annexation. He considered that any native State was better off under direct British rule. Besides the Punjab and lower Burmah, directly conquered, Oudh was annexed for the persistent bad government of the Nawab, who called himself king. Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansi were said to have lapsed to the Company, by failure of the direct line of heirs. Native opinion was disturbed, and the introduction of new inventions, the railway and the telegraph, increased distrust. A conspiracy was started to restore the Moghuls, and also the adopted heir of the ex-Peishwa of the Marathas, Dhondoo Punt, called the Nana Sahib. The alliance was likely to be short-lived, and the Moghul dynasty could never have recovered power, but they served as a rallying cry. In some ways it was helpful to us, for the other Maratha chiefs did not love the

heir of the Peishwa, and the Hindhu Rajahs disliked the idea of the Mohammedan revival of the Moghuls. The conspirators utilized the self-conceit of the Bengal sepoys, who thought that they had conquered the Seikhs, and the more legitimate discontent of the people of Oudh. The rebellion was defeated by the English on the spot, by the Seikhs, who hated the Bengal army, and the Hill tribes, who followed the English frontier officers with personal devotion bred of the respect by brave men for brave and just rulers. Delhi was retaken before a single soldier from Europe had arrived. The crushing of the revolt was the work of an army from England. The loyalty to the cause of order of the leading feudatory chiefs had been conspicuous, even in such cases as Scindia, whose own army mutinied. The outcome was the final disappearance of the anomalous rule of the Company, and the bringing of India under the direct government of the Crown. The constitution is explained later.

To understand the position and influence of India in the whole development of the British Empire we must consider the part which it has played in our relations with other powers. It was acquired in rivalry with France; it was the main cause for years of our rivalry with Russia. Its possession, and defence, determined our relations with Turkey and Egypt. The defence of Indian trade and dominions, and the furtherance of her trade, have caused the acquisition of many parts of the Empire. Malta, Aden, with Perim and Somaliland, our present practical annexation of Port Said and Suez, Cyprus, the Seychelles, Mauritius, even Zanzibar, certainly Ceylon, Burmah, Singapore, the Malay States, and, chief of all, South Africa, all in their origin as parts of the British Empire, depend upon the interests first started by a small trading company. The resulting responsibilities are greater than any farseeing nation would willingly have accepted. The responsibilities, however, are there. If the burden is great, the reward of a successfully faced task, and the moral penalties of a shirked duty, are greater still.

CHAPTER XI

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

UNDER Pitt's Government of India Act, 1784, the Governor-General's Council was reorganized. To avoid the deadlock which had occurred under Warren Hastings, the Governor-General was enabled to override it on what he certified as a vital matter. It was reduced to three members, the commander-in-chief and two civilians, servants of the Company. It was empowered to make laws or regulations subject to amendment or disallowance by the Crown, that is, by the President of the Board of Control and the Cabinet at home. Similar councils were set up in Madras and Bombay.

In 1833 an additional Legislative Member of Council was added, who was to be an English barrister of high standing. Macaulay was the first to be appointed. The same Act declared that no native of India was to be excluded from any office or employment under the Company solely by reason of his birth, religion, or colour. It further centralized the Government, and took away the financial and legislative powers of the Madras and Bombay Councils.

In 1853 the Governor-General's Council was further enlarged. The Legislative Member was empowered to sit on all occasions, not only for legislative business as at first, and for legislative business the Chief Justice of Bengal, one Puisne Judge, and four civil servants from Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the North-West Provinces were added, especially for supplying information respectively about those provinces. The abolition of the political existence of the Company in 1858, and the transfer of direct control to the British Crown, revolutionized the administration. The Secretary of State for India was created. He was responsible to Parliament like any other Cabinet Minister, the Indian Budget had to be laid before Parliament, and Parliament had the direct

control of all Indian affairs. The Secretary of State was advised by the Indian Council, of 15 members, of whom nine must have had recent Indian experience. He was not compelled always to follow the advice of his Council, but he had to act *in* Council, taking them into his confidence, and he could not appropriate Indian revenue to any purpose, nor raise an Indian loan, without their consent. He was *in* Council, the supreme Government of India. The Viceroy, or Governor-General, would take action, and pass temporary laws, without waiting for his consent ; but the telegraph made home control much more constant. In 1861 the Viceroy's Legislative Council was enlarged by the addition of some official and some non-official members, some of whom were natives, and subordinate Legislative Councils were restored to Madras and Bombay, and established for Bengal, and at later dates for the North-West Provinces and for the Punjab. The acts of a local legislature were subject to the approval of the Viceroy, and all such acts, and those of the Viceroy's Council, were subject to the approval of the Crown—that is, of the Indian Secretary.

In 1892 the non-official nominated members of the Legislative Council were increased, and some members in it were elected by the non-official members of each of the four provincial Legislative Councils, and one by the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce.

In 1909 the Morley-Minto reforms were made. Lord Morley was Indian Secretary, and the Earl of Minto was Viceroy. The Viceroy's Legislative Council was to be composed of 37 official members and 32 non-official. The latter included 27 members elected by non-official members of provincial Councils, by the larger landholders in six provinces, by Mohammedans of approved standing in six provinces, and by the Chambers of Commerce of Bombay and Calcutta. The provincial Councils were remodelled on the same plan, and additional provincial Councils were established for the Central Provinces and Assam.

Here we see the real beginnings of Indian elections and a sign of their difficulty. The people are not one people, and if the Mohammedans, who are the decided minority in numbers, were not specially provided for, there was no security that they would ever be elected by *Hindhus*, nor receive justice at the hands of the *Hindhu* representatives.

Vice versa, the Mohammedan is not to be trusted to do justice to Hindhus. Moreover, the more or less educated class, which is the only one that takes any real interest in politics, and supplies the only candidates for public service, is so small, whether Hindhu or Mohammedan, in comparison with the population, that representation in the literal sense is very difficult. The native with European education does not "represent" the views of nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand of the population.

There are three questions which interact upon each other, but which are not really identical. First, there is the agitation for Western political institutions, springing from the spread of European political teaching among a small educated minority and nourished by loose talk about self-determination and democracy. Democracy, as we understand it, is impossible in a country where perhaps 4,000, or more, castes and religions cannot touch one another, cannot intermarry of course, and exclude each other from all social intercourse. Secondly, there is the perfectly natural and reasonable desire among natives of India to have careers in their own country—as officials, as officers in the army, and as professional men. Thirdly, there is the administrative difficulty of governing India from Westminster, or of governing the nine great provinces, where conditions differ widely, from one Indian centre. All Europe could not be ruled effectively from Rome, nor all India from Delhi.

To meet these wants, so far as seemed possible and advisable, the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme of government was devised, and embodied in an English Act of Parliament of 1919. The new Constitution came into force in 1921. First, in its inception the principle of decentralization was followed, for the details were determined by rules supplementary to the Act, drawn up in India itself.

The new Government is at home superintended by the Indian Secretary, advised by a slightly altered Council consisting of not less than 8 nor more than 12 members—3 of them natives of India at present. Subject to the criticism and consent of Parliament the Secretary of State safeguards Imperial interests, determines questions arising between India and other parts of the British Empire, and is the ultimate controlling authority over the powers of the Central Indian Government. The Central Indian Government con-

sists of the Viceroy in Council. His Executive Council, or Ministers, are 8 in number—3 of whom are natives. This Ministry is not responsible to the Legislature and cannot be changed by it. The Legislature consists of the Council of State of 60 members as a *maximum*, not more than one-third of whom are to be officials, and 34 of whom are elected. The Legislative Assembly has 140 members as a *minimum*, of whom at least five-sevenths are to be elected. The Viceroy's Ministers are official members of one house or other of the Legislature, but may speak in both. This is like the practice in South Africa.

The Legislature has not the full powers of the English or of a Dominion Parliament. The Viceroy can refuse consent to its Bills, in practice not merely in theory, can suspend Bills pending their submission to the Crown in Council, or re-commit a Bill for further consideration by the Legislature. He can secure what he considers essential appropriation of money for necessary public services, and certain payments, such as interest on public loans, need not be voted by the Legislature.

The most original feature of the new Constitution is in the provisions for Provincial Government. In the first place, the functions of Government, and the proceeds of taxes for carrying it on, are definitely assigned to either the Central or to the Provincial Governments. Decentralization is adopted, and a step taken towards a sort of federal system.

Then in nine principal provinces what is called Dyarchy, or double Government, is set up. The Governor of the Province, with his Executive Council, presides over justice, police, and public order, but education, excise, sanitation, agriculture and industries, roads, and local self-government are transferred to ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislature. For these matters responsible government upon the English plan is established. The ministers—native Indians—must commend themselves and their measures to the majority of the Provincial Legislature or retire from office, and give place to those who can command this confidence. With regard to them, and their measures, the Governor is a constitutional sovereign; in what are called reserved subjects he is really the responsible ruler, irremovable by the Legislature. The plan is avowedly temporary. If the responsible ministers and the Legislatures make a success

of their administration, it is open to Parliament to extend the circle of business committed to them. If they are incapable, and use their powers badly, the experiment is open to revision after a term of years. Whether it would be practicable to curtail such powers without grave disturbances is another matter. It is wise that such a new departure should be tried first in matters which would not upset the whole province if badly done, and in Provincial and not in all Indian government. The danger is that impatient Indians, and unthinking electors in England, may forget how very long it took to educate ourselves in the proper working of responsible government. Very few European nations understand it yet.

The franchise for the elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures rests on a property qualification, most restricted for the Council of State, wider for the Viceroy's Legislative Assembly, wider still for the Provincial Legislatures. There are provisions for special constituencies, a necessary thing as we pointed out above in the case of Hindhus and Mohammedans, and of other groups besides.

Natives of India and Englishmen set side by side in legislative bodies. A native, Lord Sinha, is governor of a province, Behar and Orissa. Native judges sit on the Bench, and the number of native members of the Civil Service is fast increasing. Native officers in the army can now rise to high rank. The employment of natives of India to govern their own country is a fairly obvious and natural course to follow. The importation of western, and very peculiarly English methods of government, is more difficult. The feudatory chiefs govern their territories well as a rule, with sometimes advice from an English resident, but more in the manner which the country has known for several thousand years. Should such a calamity as the destruction of English rule befall India in the course of the next thirty years, the only escape from anarchy would be found not in the establishment of a foreign kind of rule,¹ which would not be self-rule but the rule of a few politicians, but rather in the monarchical and aristocratic rule of the feudatory princes extended over

¹ The extreme Nationalist Party, who refuse to accept the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms as at all satisfactory, seem to appear now to a desire among the backward people to get rid of all traces of Western civilization and education, entirely.

their neighbouring parts of what is now British India. The feudatory princes are, after all, the natural rulers, carrying on the historical lines of political development. A Council for their common interests was opened in 1920 by the Duke of Connaught, and it is possible that without any violent severance from the British connexion they may play an important part in the political development of the country. They have some of them adopted a partially representative system in their respective States. One thing is clear, that whatever be the ultimate power of control lodged in the Government at Westminster, the details of Indian Government are too much for an overworked Parliament here to discuss properly, and must be left more and more to an Indian administration. If peace is to be preserved that administration cannot for a long time be other than English at the top, neither Mohammedan nor Hindu.

SALIENT POINTS OF INDIAN HISTORY

- 1707. Death of Aurungzeb, the last of the great Great Moghuls.
- 1708. Final union of the two English East India Companies.
- 1746. French victory over native troops at St. Thomé.
- 1751. Clive's defence of Arcot.
- 1757. Clive's victory at Plassey.
- 1761. Coote's defeat of the French at Wandewash.
- 1764. Battle of Buxar, defeat of Shah Alum, claimant of the Moghul throne. The Company becomes *Dewan* of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa (1765).
- 1773. Lord North's Regulating Act.
- 1774-85. Warren Hastings, Governor-General.
- 1784. Pitt's Government of India Act. Under it Lord Cornwallis appointed Governor-General, 1786.
- 1799. Storm of Seringapatam.
- 1802-3. Wellesley's Subsidiary System established.
- 1817-8. The Marquis of Hastings defeats the Marathas.
- 1833. Company's charter renewed. Declaration upon the eligibility of natives for the public service.
- 1839-42. First Afghan War.
- 1845-6. First Sikh War.
- 1849. Annexation of the Punjab.
- 1857. The Mutiny.
- 1858. Direct rule of India assumed by the Crown.
- 1861. The elective principle first recognized in the Viceroy's Legislative Council.
- 1878-80. Second Afghan War.
- 1884-6. Conquest of Burmah.
- 1909. The Morley-Minto Reforms.
- 1919. Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (the Government of India Act). Responsible Government introduced for certain purposes only in nine Provincial Governments.

CHAPTER XII

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA

THE end of the Napoleonic Wars, 1814-5, saw the end of the great period of colonial conquest. The overthrow of the Marathas in 1818, which was virtually the conquest of India, nearly synchronizes with it. But we must return to the eighteenth century to review the process by which the question of how to govern the conquered colonies was solved. The most momentous conquest had been that of French North America, and the growth of the Canadian Dominion is first in time, and first in importance, of the stories of the Dominions as they now exist.

When the Peace of Paris in 1763 confirmed Canada to us, the population was entirely French. Some of the small number of French inhabitants had been expelled from the long-disputed territory of Nova Scotia in 1755—a harsh measure but a necessary one in face of the persistent intrigues of their clergy, who organized them in guerilla warfare against the English Government and settlers. In Canada, however, there could be no question of expelling a whole population, nor were they inclined violently to resist their transference to the English Crown. The French officials and soldiers, and a very few leading people, went back to France. The Government was in military hands, but Generals Murray and Sir Guy Carleton, the successive commanders, were administrators of the high type which we have so fortunately produced in many places. Had Carleton been in command in the English colonies at the early stages of the American War, with a free hand to act, matters might have turned out differently there. When the colonial troubles were becoming acute it became advisable to make some permanent arrangements for the government of Canada. The British Government had wished to introduce an English population, but though a few soldiers received land, and a few people came

from New England to see what they could get, there was little success in inducing any number to settle.

The Quebec Act of 1774 was framed for a population which it was assumed would remain predominantly French. It was not realized that the more southern colonies were going to be lost, and if the whole continent remained British the attractions for immigrants of the banks of the Hudson, Delaware, and Potomac were likely to be greater than those of the St. Lawrence. The French inhabitants knew nothing and cared nothing about representative institutions. A Governor, with a nominated Council, of whom one-third were to be French Canadians, were to rule. What the inhabitants did care about was given them. The Roman Catholic Church was guaranteed its liberties and property. It was not to take tithes from Protestants, and its bishops were to repudiate the title of the Pretender, who was drinking himself to death at Rome. The French civil law, upon which all titles to land and settlements depended, was preserved. The English criminal law was introduced. If severe, its severity was not arbitrary as that of the French courts had been, and was mitigated by trial by jury. The great merit of the Quebec Act was its complete religious toleration. When in Great Britain and Ireland no Roman Catholic had any political position, and incomplete personal liberties, it not only tolerated them but opened public service to them. The handful—a few hundreds—of English-speaking immigrants keenly resented this, and it had a sensible effect in exasperating the temper of the New Englanders in their growing quarrel with England. A real grievance was that it extended Canada to the Ohio. It resulted in the French Canadians giving active support to the defence of Canada against the invasion of the Americans in 1775. Their loyalty was never tried by the appearance of a French army. Within twenty years the French Revolution cut them off from France. No one but good Catholics had ever been allowed to go to Canada. There were no *philosophes* in Canada; if they ever heard of Voltaire and Rousseau they thought them diabolical. The whole temper of revolutionary France was as hateful to them as it was to the peasants of La Vendée.

The outcome of the American War made a great difference in Canada. It had been a civil war in the States, and most of the supporters of the king's Government, and the English

connexion, found the independent Republic no place to stay in. Some went to England. Some to the West Indies; but a large number from New England—there were loyalists even there—went to Nova Scotia; and from New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia they went to Canada. Upper Canada began to be occupied. They did not come all at once, but by 1806 it was said that 80,000 had come to Nova Scotia and Canada. New Brunswick was made a colony separate from the former, because of its increased population of this kind, in 1784. Their name—the United Empire Loyalists—expressed an ideal as honourable as that of their neighbours who had broken with the Empire for political and commercial independence.

Their presence necessitated a change in Canadian government. They were accustomed to representative institutions and to English law. If they had the former it was necessary to give it to the French Canadians too. So Pitt's Canada Act was passed in 1791. Upper and Lower Canada were divided. Each province had a Governor and Executive Council appointed by the Crown, a Legislative Council, a sort of House of Lords, nominated by the Governor for life, and an elected Assembly. English law was set up in Upper Canada. Power was reserved for creating hereditary members of the Councils, but it was never acted upon. It was very like the usual constitution of one of the old American colonies, but special provisions were inserted to guard against the quarrels which had arisen with them. It was expressly asserted that the British Parliament was not to impose any taxes, except those which were necessary for the regulation of trade, and that even these must be levied and disposed of exclusively by the Canadian Legislatures. Also all attempts to make Canada responsible for its own defence were avoided. Grenville's American taxation had been started by the desire to make America pay for its own defence, as the Irish Government paid for the defence of Ireland. By the Canada Act, Great Britain clearly contemplated taking the responsibility of defending her colonies. This policy led many people to question whether their retention was worth the obligation when, in the nineteenth century, South African and New Zealand wars became frequent and expensive. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had similar governments, set up in 1758 and 1784.

The North American colonies under these arrangements had representative institutions, but not a responsible government. The Governor and his Executive Council in each of them were not obliged to defer to the votes of the elected assembly upon any point of policy. The Governor was responsible to the Home Government, and no votes of the local assembly could change the ministry. It was a constitution in accordance with the theory of that of Great Britain, so far as that theory was expressed by laws. The practice in Great Britain was in fact changing, but it was by no means developed yet into what we understand by responsible government, and it was not likely that Great Britain would deliberately create in her colonies a system to which she had herself barely attained. So many platitudes are repeated about the effects of the Revolution of 1688, and the change of dynasty in 1714, introducing the rule of the House of Commons, that it is useful to remind ourselves what great qualifications must be admitted to such statements. Now the majority of the House of Commons, or the votes at a general election more truly, may be said to make a Ministry. In the eighteenth century the Ministry made a majority in the House. Whatever Ministry was in office, with the essential support of the Crown, could almost always command a majority in votes for its policy, if not always for its legislation. If its legislative proposals were rejected by the Commons it did not feel bound to resign. Only twice before 1830 had a vote of the House of Commons driven a ministry from office—in 1742 and in 1783.

In the American colonial assemblies before the War of Independence there had been no responsible Ministry. In most of them the assembly had itself usurped executive functions to a great extent. The very delicate and specialized machinery of a responsible Cabinet Government could not have been introduced into any colony in 1791, least of all into Quebec, where the French were untrained in any representative institutions whatever. This is not saying that the system existing was a good one. To give representative institutions, and to withhold the power of the assembly to control policy, has been compared to lighting the fire and blocking up the chimney. The resulting trouble had been manifest in England from 1603 to 1688. It had been evaded after 1688, till, towards 1832, by reason of the Parliament

being dominated by an aristocracy of great experience in politics, of great skill in playing the game, and of great influence not only in both Houses of Parliament, but in their own neighbourhoods. No colony could possess such a ruling class; the members of the assembly lacked experience, and the voters were unorganized. Through troubles, scandals, and mistakes it was necessary to muddle on for a time, until experience had been gained, with experience moderation, and till public opinion had had time to become coherent and stable. There are a good many countries in the world—parts of the British Empire among them—which have found, and are finding now, that the naturalization of a highly complex form of government evolved in peculiar circumstances in England, is no easy matter.

It was often supposed in England that the grant of representative institutions to the Canadas would mean first separation from us and then union with the United States. Certain reasons militated against this conclusion. The United Empire Loyalists of Ontario and the maritime provinces might grumble at the Colonial Office and its Governors, but were loyal to the Crown by tradition. The French Roman Catholics disliked the Puritan New Englanders. The war of 1812-14 saw a deliberate attempt to conquer Canada by the States. It was defeated in both Upper and Lower Canada by the native militia, presently reinforced by some Peninsula veterans, and the States were invaded in turn. To copy the saying of the Scot about the attempt to marry the infant Queen Mary to Edward VI by force of arms, though some had no objection to the match none liked the way of wooing. The Americans owed it very much to themselves that they never absorbed Canada. The irritation was repeated in a minor degree when some absurd Irishmen attempted the Fenian invasion of Canada from American territory in 1867.

Meanwhile in the earlier years of the nineteenth century the two Canadas pursued an uneasy path of constitutional jars. British immigration largely increased in the hard times after 1815. The population of Upper Canada increased from 70,000 to 450,000 in the first forty years of the century. Though the enormous resources of the country were yet very slightly explored the lumber trade was very valuable. The Upper Canadians, accustomed to self-government, wanted more, but worked what they had fairly rationally. There

were some particular grievances. A ring of old loyalist families monopolized places in the Executive Council, the Legislative Council, and all offices. They were called the "Family Compact," and were regarded with jealousy by every one else. Chiefly because the Roman Catholic Church was richly endowed in Lower Canada, an excessive quantity of land was set apart for the Anglican Church in Upper Canada. It was more than they could use, and as a great number of the new settlers were Scotch and Irish Presbyterians, they resented the endowment in any shape. The Executive Council did not consist of ministers presiding over departments, as in an English Cabinet; everything was everybody's business, and in fact the Governor and his secretary decided acts of policy, with the advice of men who had been appointed often long before to the Council or the Legislative Council, who were rarely changed, and were often out of touch with existing conditions and feelings. This evil existed in Lower Canada too. There the assembly was less well versed in self-government and the ways of a deliberative Parliament. Finance was hopelessly confused by private members being able to propose money grants. The salutary rule of the English House of Commons that only the Crown, through its ministers, can ask for supplies, was unknown. Like much else in our practical Constitution it is a rule not written in any law, but a rule of the House. Then English-speaking settlers came into the French province, especially into Montreal, and there was a fear among the French that they were going to be overrun by a more favoured element. Further, the conditions of geography put the trade of Upper Canada—which was on the Great Lakes up the St. Lawrence—very much at the mercy of Lower Canada, which controlled the waterways to the sea.

The Reform agitation in England and the Revolution of 1830 in Paris reverberated across the Atlantic, and from these various causes of quarrel arose a rebellion in both the Canadas in 1837-8. The original leader in Lower Canada was Papineau, an able French politician of middle age, who had been Speaker of the Lower House at Quebec. But he was not qualified to lead a rebellion, and having set it afloat he retired to the United States. In Upper Canada the leader in the field was Mackenzie, an immigrant from Dundee, who had been a journalist and also a member of the Legislative

Council¹. Some American sympathisers tried to help the insurgents, but probably did them no good with the more sober part of the people. The insurgents did not know clearly enough what they wanted, nor did they all want the same things. A separate republic, two separate republics, union with the States, a reform under the British Crown, or the expulsion of British settlers from Lower Canada, appealed to various groups of them. They were all put down with no great difficulty. An armed ship provided by the American sympathisers was sent blazing over the falls of Niagara, without its crew, a magnificent firework. But the rebellion stirred the Whig Government at home to a careful consideration of Canadian grievances and Colonial problems generally.

Lord Durham, a Liberal peer, had been sent as High Commissioner to Canada in 1838, the Constitution being suspended. He was arbitrary in his treatment of some of the leaders of the rebellion, and was recalled. He had, however, drawn up a report upon grievances and reforms, which he published. Perhaps Mr. Charles Buller, who went with him, had as much to do with the report as Lord Durham. It marked, however, an epoch in Colonial Government. It not only recommended a union of the two Canadas, with one elected assembly containing an equal number (forty-two) of representatives from each of the two provinces, and one Legislative Council of at least twenty members appointed for life, but a ministry responsible to the Assembly. The recommendations were made law in the Reunion Act of 1840. The Act says nothing about the working of responsible government in Canada, any more than any English law says anything of its working in England. Only the appointment of his ministers and their dismissal, was put in the hands of the Governor, as it is in the hands of the Crown at home. The recommendation of the report was that the Governor should appoint and dismiss them according as they did or did not command the confidence of the assembly. The system was now fully working in England; Lord Melbourne was expounding it to the young queen; but it was not immediately applied in Canada². After 1840 a governor still

¹ Both Papineau and Mackenzie lived to sit in the reformed and united Canadian Parliament. Papineau to the last protested against the Union.

² In the debate on the Bill of 1840, Mr. Gladstone said that Responsible Government, as understood in England, was impracticable

insisted that he himself was responsible for the policy of his Government to the Colonial Secretary. The modern practice which makes the governor, like the Crown in England, merely a titular head, with political functions limited to those of an umpire among parties, appointing or dismissing ministers in accordance with the wishes of a Parliament, was not immediately adopted. It was the statesmanship of Lord Elgin, Governor from 1847 to 1854, which confirmed the practice. Yet though Elgin was the first Governor to grasp fully his true position as a constitutional sovereign, whose acts are his ministers and whose ministers must stand or fall by the judgment of the Parliament, he was a very active constitutional sovereign. He had in fact a policy of his own, chiefly for schemes of material usefulness and throwing open Church and Crown lands to settlers at moderate prices. But he suggested his policy to his ministers, and at the beginning of a new era the active help of a sagacious statesman was a valuable guide to a young nation.

in a dependent colony. It was true ; but the solution that the colony was not going to be dependent, yet still united with the Empire, had not occurred to him.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CANADIAN DOMINIONS

THE Reunion Act of 1840 did not immediately allay all troubles in Canada. The French were many of them hostile to it, and racial jealousy continued. Parties called Conservatives and Liberals were based very much upon racial divisions. But the good result of responsible government is that, whereas without it political discontent was directed against the Governor and the Colonial Office, with it such discontent was against the Ministry, and found its vent in changing the Ministry, not in rebellion against the Crown. Yet animosity was at first very violent, and a mob which called itself Conservative burnt the Parliament House at Montreal in 1850, after dissolving the Parliament "in the name of the People." The Legislative Council was made elective in 1856, and next year a new choice of a capital was made by the queen. There had been great disputes as to whether it should be in Upper or Lower Canada. Her Majesty was advised to fix upon a new site at Ottawa, on the boundary between the two, and after some delay it was accepted. With Washington in the States, and Canberra in Australia, Ottawa is a capital which is not a real centre of public life, except political. The tendency in every case is to make it more difficult for leading lawyers and business men to serve in Parliament, and to separate the politicians from the busy life of the country.

A great factor in the more settled state of Canadian politics after the middle of the century was increased material prosperity. The final abrogation of the Navigation Acts in 1849, and the throwing open of Canadian trade rapidly increased it. The system of water communication by ship canals, and removal of obstructions in the rivers, made the resources of Upper Canada worth exploiting. The conditions of the country pointed to an enlarged union as obvious in

the interests of all parts of it. To the north Canada is hemmed in by the Arctic zone ; and though cultivation and habitation and mining can extend far further north than was once supposed possible, Nature forbids any regular egress and access on that side. To the south is an artificial boundary with the States, where intercourse may or may not be hampered by changing fiscal policies at Washington. Westward are opportunities of expansion, limitless in possibilities of production and limited in space only by the Pacific. The discovery of gold in British Columbia in 1858 began the growth of population there, and in Vancouver's Island. To the east the maritime provinces were the terminus for railways, to serve the interior for access to the Atlantic when the St. Lawrence was frozen. A common government, administering everything from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was a necessity for full satisfaction of Canadian needs. But the difference of race and religion between the rapidly growing French population, growing by natural increase, and the English-speaking people, growing by birth and by immigration, the separate interests of the maritime provinces, the distance of British Columbia, and the vast yet unsettled spaces between, all pointed to local governments too. The Act of 1840 had provided for municipal government, a sort of county council government, in the two Canadas, under the one Parliament and Ministry. An extension of the idea of the Act, by making a complete federal union, had been early thought of. A plan was elaborated by Canadian statesmen in 1864, and was embodied in the British North America Act of 1867, which constituted the Dominion of Canada. The two Canadas, called Ontario and Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, were joined in one federal State. Only these four were joined at first, but the principles of the Act were capable of indefinite expansion in North America. The Red River Settlement was admitted as a province, under the name of Manitoba, in 1870. In 1871 British Columbia came in, on condition that a transcontinental railway should be made. In 1873 Prince Edward Island, which had enjoyed its own small responsible government since 1851, joined the Dominion. Alberta and Saskatchewan were formed as provinces in 1905, out of the North-West Territory purchased from the Hudson's Bay Company ; and Newfoundland alone remains outside the Dominion, a separate State with its own responsible

government. The North-West Territories, and Yukon, not yet provinces, are administered by the Dominion Government.

A federal State is the natural form for the government of territories which have great interests in common, but which, nevertheless, have local differences, racial, historical or geographical. The United States and Switzerland are two conspicuous examples. The Australian colonies have been federated much on the lines of the Canadian federation. The South African Union has some different features. A federation is by some good judges considered the natural solution for the organization of the British Empire, but of that we will speak presently.

The essence of a federation is a treaty (Latin, *fœdus*), by which independent units give up to the whole some of their freedom of action for common benefits, or by which some previously united body cedes some local independence to its parts. The former is the more usual process, and the one by which all the instances mentioned above came into existence. A federal constitution must be a written constitution, because it is of the nature of a treaty between two or more parties. It must clearly define powers of the parts and of the whole. Sometimes, however, uncertainty may arise about the exact scope of such powers. In such cases the rules of the Canadian Dominion and the rules governing the U.S.A. and the Australian Federation differ. In these two latter, if there is any ambiguity in the words of the Constitution, the assumption is that the doubtful powers belong to the separate States. In Canada any powers not clearly reserved for the separate States are taken as belonging to the federal Government, the central power. The Federal Government of Canada consists of the Viceroy, representing the Crown. He is the constitutional sovereign, whose function is to preside and umpire. In theory he can veto a law, but does not do so. He may reserve assent to a law till it has been submitted to the advisers of the Crown in England, and is supposed by this action, or by advice, to prevent the policy of the Dominion from clashing with that of the Empire at large. But he is not likely to be obliged to do this. He summons the leading man of the party which has a majority in the Parliament to form a Ministry. He can dismiss a Ministry, or can dissolve a Parliament and call another by a general election. The ministers are the heads of departments as in

England, and sit in the Parliament. In the U.S.A. the President's ministers must not sit in Congress; they are emphatically the President's ministers not the ministers of the majority in Congress, which may be in opposition to them. The American Constitution was evolved out of the English Constitution in the eighteenth century, when the king had a very real power and the ministers were really his ministers. The Canadian Constitution, the prototype of those of our other self-governing dominions, was evolved out of the English Constitution in the nineteenth century. But when the Viceroy's ministers retire from office for any reason, they are still members of his Executive Council in name, even as a retired English minister is still a privy councillor. It is convenient for formal business, or even for advice in a political crisis. The leading statesman of the ex-ministry retains a quasi-official position, as a paid leader of the Opposition. The Ministry, subject to the approval of Parliament, control the business which belongs to the whole Dominion, such as finance, trade, defence, currency, post office, communications, and Indian affairs. The Parliament consists of a Legislative Council of 96, nominated by the Viceroy, on the advice of ministers, for life. They are chosen from the various provinces in proportion to the population, as far as possible. The Lower House has 235 members, elected on a manhood and womanhood franchise, for five years unless previously dissolved. They too are chosen in proportion to the populations. The elected House is the influential House, as in England, and alone votes taxes on a requisition from the Viceroy, as the English House of Commons votes money on the motion of Ministers of the Crown. Here is again a difference from the United States. The Senate is the more powerful House in the American Congress, and is elected, not nominated, and not in proportion to population, but including two senators from each State, big or small. Each of the nine provinces in the Dominion has a miniature copy of the Federal Government. There is a Lieutenant-Governor, nominated by the Viceroy on advice of his ministers, who is advised by a body of ministers responsible to an elected Parliament. But only two provinces—Quebec and Nova Scotia—have two Houses of Parliament. These provincial Parliaments and their presiding ministers look after local government, including education, and their ministers appoint justices of the peace.

All higher judges are appointed for life, or good behaviour, as in England, by the Federal Government. The Civil Service is filled by examination and selection, under the authority of the Federal Government. In the U.S.A. judges and civil servants are popularly elected, or appointed by the local State Governments, on political grounds. It is one of the many points in which the Canadian Constitution is better than that of the States: the Judicature and Civil Service are more independent. There is less jobbery and corruption than that which the other system encourages. The provincial Parliaments are much concerned with local roads, canals, and such-like matters, where moneymaking comes in. Indeed, in every new country so much of the business of government must concern communications, the sale of lands, the opening of new avenues of trade, mines, and forests, and so on, that those who take part in it are exposed to temptation often. Unless a man is conscious of high powers for administration, or of oratory, he is not attracted to a political career. He finds so many openings for successful ambition in a new country that ordinary abilities seem satisfied in them, and great abilities can be more richly rewarded in them. No new country attracts so large a proportion of its most able and its most intellectual men into its Parliament as an old country can. There is no class educated for politics, as there used to be, and still is to some extent, in England. There are always some eminent statesmen, and plenty of good practical men, in a Dominion Ministry and Parliament. The men of genius are very likely to be found managing business, or conquering new fields for industry in an ever-expanding country, but not in Parliament.

The Supreme Court of Canada judges differences between the Federal and Local Governments if these disagree as to their powers. An appeal lies to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England, because the question is on the interpretation of an English Act of Parliament—the British North America Act. For the same reason the Constitution of Canada can only be changed by an English Act of Parliament. That is no hardship, for it is well understood that the wishes of the Canadians would at once be met by the Government here. It is in fact a more expeditious way of changing the Constitution than the cumbersome machinery which has to be set in motion for doing so in the U.S.A.

Few countries are more happily circumstanced than Canada. One small rebellion has stirred its peace since the Union. In 1870 Louis Riel headed a rising of half-breeds, and a few others, who resisted hopelessly the turning of the Red River rendezvous of hunters and fur-traders into the settled State of Manitoba. Escaping then, he returned on a still more hopeless enterprise in 1885, was caught and hanged. The relations with their great neighbour to the south are friendly. The States do not want to absorb Canada now, and Canadian patriotism disdains absorption. Canada is, since 1918, recognized as a nation—one of the nations of the British Empire—and has not only her own military and naval forces, but her own diplomatic relations with Washington. The agreement by which neither Canada nor the States keep a war fleet on the Great Lakes is one of the few practical steps in disarmament which the world has seen. A boundary line of 4,000 miles between them has no fortresses and no sentries upon it. But goodwill and good sense prevail on both sides of the line, which makes this happy result possible. No formal compacts are worth much if these are wanting. If these are there formal compacts are unnecessary.

The resources of Canada are so great and so far unexplored that we may call them boundless. The population is growing towards 9,000,000. In a generation it may be 30,000,000, and before very long Canada may be the most populous State of the British Empire, except, of course, India. Yet now there are only two cities—Montreal and Toronto, of over 300,000 inhabitants, and only five others of over 50,000. An unusually large proportion of the inhabitants are of the stable class of farmers. Some three-quarters of the householders own their own houses, and generally land. There is no widespread poverty, and not so many very large fortunes as in the States. The problem—so insoluble apparently elsewhere—of getting two populations of different races and religions to live peaceably together is fairly solved. Racial jealousy is not extinct, but its sting seems to be withdrawn. The English-speaking population is homogeneous; the many settlers who come from the States to take up land in the West are in origin English chiefly, and become good Canadians. So far the alien immigration from Eastern Europe is not large, and the absence of big towns has made the danger of an organized party machine imposing its will upon the

country less than in Australia. Indeed, the good fortune of Canada is such that a superstitious ancient Greek viewing it might recall the story of the ring of Polycrates, the man who was too lucky to please the gods. But the good fortune of Canada is founded upon good qualities taking advantage of good conditions.

CHAPTER XIV

AUSTRALIA

THE Commonwealth of Australia in origin, circumstances, and lines of development differs widely from Canada. There was no conquest involved in its beginnings, not even conquest of native inhabitants, for the Australian "Black Fellows" are so low in the scale of civilization and so few in numbers that their presence was almost negligible. We never disputed the possession of Australia with any other Europeans, as we disputed North America and India with the French, the West Indies with French and Spaniards, and other places with the Dutch. Consequently, there has been no difficulty connected with the presence of an alien European population, as in Canada and as in South Africa. No other European power has been planted close to it, until in the 'eighties of the last century Germany began to establish colonial dominions. No great independent power like the U.S.A. has threatened to attract it to itself, or forced it into union to avoid such attraction. The population is nearly all British in origin. Alone among the overseas dominions, this population is so largely urban as to make this the dominant factor in political life. While in Canada the mass of the population are country farmers or inhabitants of small towns, there are only two very large cities, and the population of the seven largest cities is about 20 per cent of the whole population of the Dominion, in Australia two cities—Sydney and Melbourne—have 25 per cent, and four cities (these two with Brisbane and Adelaide) have 40 per cent of the whole population of the island-continent.

It is hard to say who really discovered Australia. Spaniards (as Luis de Torres for example), Portuguese and Dutch, all sighted it. William Dampier, an Englishman, a fine blend of a pirate and scientific explorer, made more complete surveys of the coast, about William III's reign. Cook took

formal possession of the coast of New South Wales for the English Crown in 1770.

The occupation of Australia was a consequence of the era of colonial conquest, though it was never conquered. When the independence of the old American colonies shut that destination to English convicts condemned to transportation overseas, the Government bethought themselves of Cook's discovery and sent convicts to Botany Bay under Captain Phillip in 1787. In 1788 he arrived with 750 convicts, some marines as a guard, and some of the marines' wives and babies, the first batch of free settlers. He almost at once abandoned Botany Bay for the better site Port Jackson, where Sydney now is. Botany Bay continued to be the popular name for the abode of convicts. Pitt may have been partly moved by a wish to find colonial compensation for the loss of America, but systematic occupation of New South Wales by free emigrants would hardly have been attempted then.

The idea of transporting our convicts to the Antipodes, and supporting them there—for they did not raise enough food for themselves to begin with—and the subsequent arrival of colonists and the quiet acquisition of the whole of the vast island, could only belong to the period of successful naval war and colonial conquest. In the seventeenth century the Dutch would have disputed our monopoly, in the eighteenth century the French, in the later nineteenth century the French and Germans. When the French revolutionary wars were going on, and for some years after the fall of Napoleon, the captain of a British frigate was able to do very much what he liked, or was instructed to do, outside the territorial waters of the U.S.A. So we annexed the east coast, from Cape York to Tasmania, all the country behind it up to longitude 135—that is, two-thirds of all Australia—and Norfolk Island and Earl Howe Islands. In 1829 we settled the Swan River, now West Australia, for fear someone else should put in a claim. West Australia had not any convicts and consequently was short of labour in early days, for its mining and fruit-growing resources were not known, and the few free immigrants often went on to the other colonies.¹

¹ There was a convict station at King George Sound, West Australia, in 1826-36, before the colony was planted. In 1850 West Australia accepted convicts when the other colonies were being freed from them; but transportation ceased altogether in 1868.

Norfolk Island was made a convict station, which was removed to Tasmania in 1807, and Moreton Bay, where Brisbane is, was made a convict station in 1826, and free settlers were excluded from it. Philanthropists were opposed to the transportation system, and the early convicts, supported from half round the world, were often in great want. The intention, however, from the first was reclamation. Convicts were employed to work, trained it was hoped in lessons of industry, given qualified freedom, and finally established as independent settlers. Of course they were often very troublesome. There was a taint of criminality and lawlessness in the population. Bushranging, robbery under arms, became a trouble as soon as increasing population and prosperity made robbery profitable. The gold discoveries increased the lawless population, and gave further temptations to the exercise of their habits. Yet the whole convict population was not by any means composed of desperate criminals. For long after the beginning of Australian transportation the severity of the English criminal law confounded many petty offenders and hardened ruffians in the same punishment. Many a young person was sent to Botany Bay who in these days might very likely have been merely bound over under the First Offenders' Act. A boy, for instance, is recorded to have stolen a goose off a common, to have been transported, to have saved money by selling his ration of rum to other convicts, to have bought land where parts of Sydney now stand, and to have died a much respected millionaire. It was not the best school, but many people of this sort had no great difficulty in becoming respectable inhabitants.

Australia owed much to Colonel Lachlan Macquarie, who was Governor of New South Wales, 1809-1821. He did a great deal for the reformation of the convicts, by improved methods of emancipation, though he was accused of discouraging free settlers in order to keep plenty of work for the emancipated convicts. Further, he encouraged exploration of the interior, and put the convicts on to making roads. The coast of New South Wales, where the earlier settlements were all concentrated near the sea, was shut in by the Blue Mountains, over which no known route existed. Explorers pushing up the valleys found them ending in inaccessible slopes. Under Macquarie's encouragement men tried the ridges of the spurs which enclosed the valleys, and along

them found routes across the mountains. On the opposite side were the great pasture grounds, which gave one great direction to Australian development. Captain Macarthur of the New South Wales Corps had already begun the importation of sheep of good breeds, and now the discovery of the Bathurst Plains in 1815 gave them the finest pastoral country in the world in which to increase. The Liverpool Plains and the Darling Downs were quickly explored northward, and the Mossaroo Downs southward. It was from the Darling Downs that population came when Moreton Bay ceased to be a convict station in 1840, and modern Queensland was in fact begun by the Darling Downs' squatters seeking their natural access to the sea downwards from the interior. One characteristic of the sheep pasturing business was the creation of large estates. Squatters sometimes simply took them by occupation, and later received grants for nothing or for trifling quit-rents. A large expanse of ground was necessary because of the one great drawback to the industry—the droughts. It was necessary to be able to water flocks over a great distance. If water failed in one place the squatter would lose all his sheep if he had not other water, perhaps many miles away. Men bought, or acquired, the widely separated water-supplies, and held all the land in between. The drought was the great obstacle to exploration and to any settlement of the interior. Between 1826 and 1831 the river system, behind the Blue Mountains to the south-west, was explored. Sturt was the greatest discoverer. Captain Eyre—afterwards well known as Governor Eyre in Jamaica in 1866¹—made an extraordinary journey from Sydney to St. Vincent's Gulf, exploring for a cattle track across the hitherto unknown interior. Later he made another less useful but still more venturesome journey, from Adelaide to King George Sound in West Australia. South Australia was settled deliberately in 1836. Further west, however—between South Australia and West Australia—the country proved inhospitable; and further north, in the interior, an altogether uninhabitable desert, with rare places of possible

¹ In Jamaica, Eyre, in 1866, had to deal with a negro rising which might have become very formidable. He suppressed it with extreme vigour and doubtful legality. His conduct was strongly attacked and as strongly defended in England. The crisis led to the surrender by the Jamaican Assembly of their existing constitution. Representative Government is now (1922) partially restored.

existence for a few native tribes. Port Phillip Bay, where Melbourne now stands, was settled from New South Wales in 1834-5. The fine agricultural and pastoral region of Gipps Land behind it at once attracted settlers, and Victoria began to exist.

The colonization of South Australia, which was at once separated from New South Wales, was planned by Mr. Gibbon Wakefield. He was an enthusiast on colonial settlement. He was subsequently with Lord Durham on his Canadian mission, and perhaps had something to do with the famous report. Later still, in New Zealand, his systematic colonization was more successful than in Australia. He had an idea that English Society should be reproduced in the colonies. In South Australia land was to be sold at a high price, and on this English landowners were to be established. The money was to be used for paying the passage of labouring men, who were to go out and receive good wages as agricultural labourers, while artisans and small tradesmen were also to be assisted to emigrate to form a new English countryside with an upper, lower, and middle class. There was a temporary demand for land, but the price paid was often too high, and the almost inevitable depression followed and land became unsaleable at anything near the original price. Moreover, no one stayed in the rut intended to be occupied by him. The labourers did not want to work for wages, unless they were impossibly high. The tradesman was soon to be found driving a bullock cart, and after a time the intended squire had thrown up his profitless land and gone to the gold diggings. The discovery of copper mines, and the wise rule of Sir George Grey (1841-5), saved South Australia. But the practice of selling land and employing the price to assist emigration was successfully adopted elsewhere. The English Government also spent money in assisting emigration, in the hard times at home between 1815 and 1840. In default of assisted emigration the distance of Australia prevented many people, except those with some capital, from going there. They became big squatters and sheep farmers. The assisted emigration provided a necessary class between them and the convicts and their descendants. But the circumstances of Australia, and the gold discoveries especially, led to the representation there of all sorts of Englishmen. Ever since the early days of Virginia and Massachusetts it seems that

more English gentlemen, and the sons of educated people, have gone out to our colonies to make a permanent home than has usually been the case from other countries. French seigneurs had estates in Canada, and lived on them. Portuguese nobility had estates in Brazil ; but the compulsory emigration from other countries, the spontaneous emigration of Huguenot and German Protestant refugees to America and the Cape, and the present-day emigration from Italy and Eastern Europe has usually been that of the uneducated. The highest literary and scientific education is not the strong point of our Dominions now ; but the population is thoroughly representative, though not on the plan drawn up by Gibbon Wakefield. The families of the squire, the parson, the barrister, the naval and military officers, and members of the universities and public schools are to be found everywhere : we may add, doing everything, from road making to sitting in Parliament. Many working-class families have connexions in the Dominions. It is almost impossible to find a middle-class family in England or Scotland which has not got them.

The gold discoveries in Australia brought out all sorts of people, and people besides those from our islands. The foreign elements, however, did not always stay.

The first great rush to the gold-fields was from 1849 to 1853. It sensibly relieved the social and political discontent expressed in the latest movements of the Chartists at home. It immensely increased the labour element in Australia, and gave an impetus to the growth of the great port cities, Sydney and Melbourne. It led to the separate organization of colonies and to the self-government of the new larger populations. Victoria had been agitating for separation from New South Wales since 1842, and was separated in 1851 ; Tasmania had been separated in 1812 ; Queensland was not separated till 1859. The first five years of the gold era saw the population of Victoria increased from 76,000 to over 300,000.

Another result of the increased population was the cessation of transportation—to New South Wales in 1840, to Queensland in 1849, and to Tasmania in 1853.

CHAPTER XV

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

IN the earliest days of convict settlement the Government had of necessity been military and despotic. There were to begin with a few marines to keep order, and then a regiment called the "New South Wales Corps," which was almost as troublesome as the convicts. In 1808 they mutinied and deposed Governor Bligh, but Governor Macquarie reduced the colony to order, and the regiment was presently ordered home. Macquarie protested against being hampered by any Council, but in the time of his successors, Sir Thomas Brisbane and Sir Ralph Darling, a council of officials was constituted and in Darling's time 7 colonists nominated by the Crown were added to it. The growth of population necessitated the growth of representative institutions. In 1842 an Act was passed by Sir Robert Peel's Government, in which Lord Stanley, afterwards Earl of Derby, was Colonial Secretary,¹ setting up a Legislative Assembly, consisting of 6 officials, 6 Crown nominees, and 18 elected representatives for what are now New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria.

The franchise was limited to £20 rental holders, or to owners of a freehold worth £200, which meant the great majority of the settled population. South Australia and Tasmania had similar small Councils. Municipal Government was established about the same time in Sydney, Melbourne, and Geelong. In 1850 an Enabling Act invited New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania to draw up schemes for a responsible government in each. Plans were

¹ Lord Derby, as Colonial Secretary, presided over the birth of self-governing Australia, and of New Zealand. He was Prime Minister when the Indian Empire was made in 1858, and when the Dominion of Canada was founded by the Act of 1867. When he died in 1869 an English newspaper had the effrontery to say that his name was connected with no great acts—a striking instance of the ignorance and carelessness then prevailing about Imperial concerns.

submitted to the Colonial Office, and sanctioned with small modifications by Parliament, and by 1856 responsible governments on the same lines as the Canadian were established in all. When in 1859 Queensland was separated from New South Wales it at once received similar institutions. West Australia was not given complete self-government till 1890. In each there was, and is, a Governor appointed by the Crown who is in the place of a constitutional sovereign. He gives formal consent to legislation, his veto is practically non-existent as in England. The Governor can suspend consent to legislation, and refer a proposal to England, if it is likely to clash with general Imperial interests. But this power is theoretical rather than actual. He calls ministers to form a government, and, acting on this advice, can dissolve Parliament. In New South Wales and Queensland there is a Legislative Council consisting of persons nominated for life by the Crown, that is, by the Ministry advising the Governor. In the other States the Legislative Council is elected by voters with a small property qualification, numbering from 30 to 40 per cent of the whole body of electors. These councils are continuous bodies, a half or a third retiring automatically every three or two years. Queensland has recently abolished its Legislative Council, for the State governments in Australia, unlike the Canadian Government, but like that of Great Britain, can be changed by ordinary Parliamentary processes. Every State has an elected Parliament. In South Australia manhood suffrage was adopted from the beginning. In all the others it was quickly introduced, and female suffrage has now followed. It was first adopted in West Australia. Judges, as in Great Britain and Canada, are appointed for life or good behaviour, by the Governor on the advice of the responsible Ministry. Entire control of customs, land, revenues, and mining rights are vested in the State governments. The last had led to violent disturbances in Victoria after the gold discoveries, which was one reason for the bestowal of complete self-government. A non-popular administration could not cope with them freely; a government backed by popular opinion could use the necessary force. The control of customs had not been expected to lead to what it produced—duties against British imports. Victoria, however, especially became strongly protectionist, from a desire to encourage the home industries of Melbourne. New South

Wales remained more free trade, as long as the party of the squatters, the big sheep farmers, retained political power. Australia is now generally protectionist, but with modifications giving some Imperial preference. In the old days of the Navigation Acts the Mother Country had been protectionist and exploited her colonies. The tendency is now the other way round. The dependence of England upon foreign corn was perhaps necessary to bring about the conversion of this country to free trade. It has been said, with some truth, that every half-educated person is naturally a protectionist so far as his own industry is concerned. It needs training in the consideration of wide questions and of far-reaching issues to enable men to overcome the influence of what seems an immediate advantage. The average opinion of all countries is only half-educated, and to allow that democracy is the only possible government for the British communities now, is not tantamount to saying that it is infallible. No sort of government is.

Besides early economic differences between New South Wales and Victoria, the States otherwise were not exactly alike. Queensland is tropical, or sub-tropical. It became a country of sugar and other plantations. It needed, or thought it needed, coloured labour because of the climate. If it had been settled a century earlier it would have become frankly a slaveholding State. As it was, the importation of South Sea Islanders as labourers came very near to introducing the mischief of the slave trade into the Pacific. The "black-birders," as they were called, were not particular as to how they got recruits for the Queensland plantations, and some innocent persons of course were murdered in retaliation by islanders whose relatives had been kidnapped. The misdeeds, and the mere presence, of irresponsible adventurers in the Pacific led to the extension of the rule of European Governments there. As it was from the beginning, and always will be, unless a civilized government can prevent its individual members going on adventurous and commercial voyages—and that it cannot do—it must in the long run go where they have gone, and introduce regular control in place of irresponsible trading or buccaneering. The stories of the West Indies, of Africa, of the Pacific islands, and of India, itself are all similar. The extension of a British Empire, or of any other European dominion, is a natural consequence,

and a salutary 'control of the personal liberty and personal characteristics of the sons of Japhet.

The Australian States had not got the same strong inducements to federation which existed in Canada. None were in the position of Ontario—inaccessible from the sea except through another. They were not on a transcontinental route, like that from the St. Lawrence to British Columbia. They had no alien element, like the French of Quebec, to be won over by common institutions and satisfied by local self-government such as a federation provides. Each one of the continental States had its own ports and chief centre. They were, in fact, the *hinterland* to Brisbane and Rockhampton, to Sydney, to Melbourne, to Adelaide, and to Perth and Fremantle, respectively. The impulse to federation was partly the feeling that as one body they would carry more weight in their dealings with the Home Government, and with the home money market for raising loans, partly an uneasy fear of foreign encroachments. They were ceasing to be so entirely apart from the world as they had been in their early days. Already the French had occupied New Caledonia and other islands not many hundred miles away. After 1883 the Germans had begun a colonial expansion into the Pacific, and soon in New Guinea. The overflow of Chinese population was a fact to be faced, and the power and ambitions of Japan were rising. North Australia, in nominal connexion with South Australia, lay nearly unoccupied, a tempting field for Asiatic immigration. The result was a movement towards union, which took effect after a time in the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1900, by a vote of the British Parliament confirming the result of a vote in each separate colony upon a draft Constitution adopted at a Convention held in 1897-9.

CHAPTER XVI

THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH

THE Federal Government is presided over by the Governor-General, appointed by the Crown, who is constitutional sovereign. He is advised by a Cabinet of ministers, heads of departments of public business, who sit in the Parliament and are chosen from the party in the majority. There are two Houses of Parliament: the Senate composed of 36 members—6 from each state—retiring in rotation, one-half retiring every three years; and a House of Representatives of 75 members, elected in one-member constituencies apportioned according to population. The Senate is a continuous body, unless specially dissolved in consequence of a disagreement between the two Houses. The House of Representatives has a term of three years, unless the Governor-General is advised by his Ministry to dissolve it earlier. Both are elected by universal suffrage of men and women. All members receive £1,000 a year, a sum which has been raised by two steps—from £400 to £600, and £600 to £1,000—by votes of the Parliament itself not submitted to any popular confirmation or rejection. The six senators of each State are elected by one block vote of the whole State. The Federal Constitution can be amended by votes of the Houses, but amendments must be confirmed afterwards by a majority of the States, and also by a majority of the whole people voting on one day. The Federal Government controls trade, external and inter-state, tariffs, currency, banking, marriage and divorce, weights and measures, granting of patents, and what is most important, arbitration in labour disputes which extend beyond the confines of one State. The State Governments control property, railways, land, mining, education, and labour disputes within their own States. Any point not specifically reserved by the Constitution for its Federal Government is taken to be a

function of the State Governments. The Supreme Court of Australia is the judge of the apportionment of federal and State powers if disputes occur. In theory, therefore, the power of the Federal Government compared with that of the several States is rather less than in Canada. The general policy of the strong Labour party in Australia is to extend it at the expense of the States. The great feature of Australian politics is the influence of the party machine, elaborated by labour, outside the Parliament. The great population of the cities, and of a few mining centres, compared with that of the country districts, has been favourable to such an organization. The block election of the six senators in each State has given the election into the hands of a well-organized party, for the mass of the electors know little of the candidates in such wide constituencies. The secret caucus of the party debates its attitude upon any question before the Houses, and every member of the party is strongly bound by a signed pledge to vote according to the party decision. Thus there may be no real debate in the House; everything is settled outside. This may conduce to swift decisions, but it is not the government by discussion which has been supposed to be the privilege of constitutionally ruled peoples. It is now complained in Canada that the Farmers' Union, a political party strong in the West, is elaborating a similar organization. It is less likely to be permanent among dispersed farmers than among a concentrated population in towns and mining centres. Australia, indeed, is at present the scene of the boldest experiments, and most extreme developments, in the democratic government and legislation founded upon the British institutions. Only New Zealand comes near to it. Nowhere else has the government so directly taken over industrial services, and busied itself so much in questions and disputes between employers and employed. It may be a guide or an example one way or another, to the Empire.

Australia and New Zealand are young lands of enormous and yet only partly developed resources. They can afford experiments, and get into debt with a light heart. They are young men, with health and hopes which tend to put them above the habits bred of prudent experience which characterized their parents. They are young in another way: Australia, from its climate, is the scene of an open-air life. The interests of the people are out of doors. As among

young people at home, their interest in sport, racing, and cricket, is more evident than their interest in intellectual pursuits, or even in politics. The Australian universities and schools are well staffed and frequented, and they are supported by the State. But the proportion of their university graduates in the Commonwealth or State Parliaments is not large. The fixing of the capital at Canberra, a new place of no business importance, will tend still further to separate business men and lawyers from the business of politics.

One great Imperial question must be faced by the Australians—the occupation of their territory. The Commonwealth has taken over the rule of North Australia. The interior of Australia is apparently more habitable than was supposed by the first explorers, who traversed it with sufferings from thirst and hunger, and in several cases succumbed to the hardships of the quest. It is possible by artesian wells to tap water in many of what were thought desert wastes. But North Australia is abundantly provided with means of life for some people. The labour problem, however, of Queensland is still more strongly pronounced in North Australia. The climate is tropical, and coloured labour is, if not actually necessary, distinctly convenient there. The resources of the country are very great, and so far are very slightly developed owing to those difficulties. There is a strong feeling in the country for “a White Australia.” The evils of a mixed community, one part of which is wholly dissimilar, socially, politically, and morally, from the other, are undoubted. The feeling against it has told against coloured Polynesian labour in Queensland even more powerfully than the fear of reviving the slave trade. Meanwhile North Australia remains comparatively empty, in the face of overflowing countries like China and Japan, who have more people than they know what to do with at home. Some of the blacks of North-West Australia are comparatively recent immigrants from places farther north.

Nor is this trouble confined to the North Australian question. All Australia wants population. This is rather over 5,000,000—a smaller number than in London—in a country of about the size of Europe, without Russia. Of these a disproportionate amount are in a few big cities. The countryside is still very empty. This is partly owing to the original influence of the big sheep-runs, partly to the

distance from Europe, partly to the dry climate, which makes agricultural or horticultural settlement, without irrigation works and expensive artesian borings, somewhat hazardous. Over and above these causes the policy of those dominating politics has been set against the encouragement of immigration, from an idea that more people would mean more competition for work and lower wages. The general interest of other countries, especially of Asiatic countries, in finding elbow-room for their surplus population, has tended of late to modify this view. Australia seems now to be inclined to welcome white settlement, because it is becoming clear that an empty continent cannot be kept empty permanently in the present state of the world. Unless there are British people in Australia it is certain that there will be others, and as "Nature abhors a vacuum" it is too probable that these will be Chinese and Japanese. The law of Australia provides for the compulsory breaking up of large estates for the admission of agricultural settlers upon them, and there is room there for many of the overcrowded people of Great Britain. Forty million people cannot profitably live here. There is also room in the Canadian north-west, and on the uplands of Central Africa. The people of these islands have not nearly learned yet the possibilities of their inheritance of the spaces of the world, and the task of Imperial statesmanship, at home and in the Dominions, should be to spread the knowledge of possibilities of transference of people, and to make it more easy. It is merely carrying further a lesson already partly learned. I could cite a case not a hundred years old when a man from Hampshire working in Surrey was known as "foreigner," and it was then considered barely respectable for a Surrey woman to go into the Midlands. This unreasonable repugnance to moving has been overcome here, and it is only reasonable that it should be overcome in the whole Empire; but the movement needs encouragement at both ends. It should be encouraged in schools. It can hardly survive an intelligent study of geography in a wide sense. The future of Australia is an interesting question. It is possible that the chief interests of the world are shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific shores, as they shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The place of Australia in a system of Pacific States must be an important one in any case.

CHAPTER XVII

NEW ZEALAND

CARELESS readers of maps are prone to wonder, if they think at all, why New Zealand is not politically united with Australia. One reason why it is not is that 1,200 miles of stormy sea separate them ; roughly the distance in a straight line from London to Malta. Their circumstances, moreover, are different. The Australian aborigines were so few and so low in the scale of civilization that they exercised scarcely any influence upon the European colonization. New Zealand was occupied by a fine race of men, physically vigorous and not intellectually to be despised. There the Maoris were not very numerous considering the size of the islands, but there may have been 250,000 of them when the islands were discovered. They were not probably the first inhabitants, but they had exterminated any previous comers. It is very seldom the case, though perhaps it is true of Australia, that the savages whom Europeans have found in possession of countries are the earliest inhabitants. How in the dawn of time man got to some of the places which he occupied is sometimes a puzzle. The Maoris were bold sailors, but that they even, with their great canoes capable of carrying food and water, but without charts or compasses, should have reached New Zealand is a marvellous thing, and says much for their courage and capacity. Their voyages perhaps went much further. They have stories which seem to show acquaintance with the ice of the Antarctic. They are artistic in a way, and their fortified villages, called Pahi, proved serious obstacles to English soldiers. They were cannibals ; so were many people who lived in places where there were no large animals to be killed and eaten. The relations with the Maoris coloured all New Zealand history for half a century. Another point of difference from Australia was that there never was any transportation of

convicts to New Zealand. Though gold has been found in New Zealand, and there are other minerals and coal, none of these are so abundant as in Australia. There never was a great rush to the gold diggings, to be compared with the rush of adventurers to New South Wales and Victoria, and there are not the same great mining centres now, nor are the cities so disproportionately large compared with the country population.

The earliest phase of European relations with New Zealand illustrates the value of European political control in any place to which European adventurers resort. Ships touched on the coast, and began desultory trading with the Maoris. It was a convenient place for ships engaged in the whale-fishing to resort to for water and for repairs. Missionaries attempted to convert the Maoris, but irresponsible traders did more to corrupt them. Some Maories visited Australia; one famous chief, Hongihika, even visited England. The consequences were disastrous. The chiefs bought guns and gunpowder. The constant wars among the tribes became more and more destructive; and it is believed that in the forty years before the first proclamation of British sovereignty the Maoris destroyed more than half of each other in great wars of conquest, undertaken in one case in avowed imitation of Napoleon. Exact statistics are of course not to be had. In 1817 the Governor of New South Wales was ordered to take control of English adventurers in New Zealand. But it was impossible to make the control effective. The Home Government tried to establish settlers in 1825, but they were scared away by the ferocity of the Maoris. In 1839 a New Zealand Company, partly commercial and partly philanthropic in its aims, began successful colonization. In 1839 some settlers were established where Wellington now is, and in 1840 at Auckland. In 1841 the New Zealand colonies were formally separated from New South Wales. The fertile brain of Mr. Gibbon Wakefield, which had not been very successful in organizing settlement in South Australia, was more successful in devising a plan for New Zealand. He saw from history what a great help to the early cohesion and respectability of the North American colonies had been found in a common religious feeling. He projected and carried out schemes for planting religiously united settlers in New Zealand. New Plymouth, in the North Island, was established

for English Nonconformists, named from a reminiscence of the first settlement of the Pilgrim Fathers in New England. Then Canterbury and the town of Christchurch were founded, in the South Island for Anglicans ; and Otago and Dunedin, in the South Island, for Scotch Presbyterians. The land was sold at a fairly high rate, according to his previous plans. The proceeds partly paid for the establishment of new settlers, and in the case of Christchurch helped to build a cathedral. The populations did not remain entirely of their original complexions. There was no persecution at home to drive settlers of a particular opinion to escape from it to new lands, nor could the nineteenth century repeat the seventeenth century exclusive attitude of the settlers after they reached their new homes. Probably, however, the scheme did provide a rather superior class of settlers to begin with. People of some education, and of fixed and steady opinions were attracted.

In 1840, Captain Hobson, the first administrator of New Zealand, made the important Treaty of Waitangi with the Maori tribes of the North Island. They acknowledged the suzerainty of the British Crown, and in return any private purchase of land by settlers from Maoris was forbidden. The indiscriminate land-grabbing, so fertile a source of quarrels between natives and settlers, was to be prevented. Only a tribe as a whole might sell land to Her Majesty's Government. The provision was extended to the South Island, but there were fewer Maoris there: the troubles with them were mostly in the North Island. The Treaty was not kept. The New Zealand Company's agents broke it, and individual colonists broke it, anxious to acquire large tracts for sheep farming. A general Maori war was imminent, and was averted only by the justice and firmness of Captain Grey. This very eminent statesman, afterwards Sir George Grey, had just been restoring prosperity in South Australia. Subsequently he was distinguished in South Africa, and then in New Zealand again. He enforced the Treaty of Waitangi, and won over the natives by force of character and uprightness. A general war would have been calamitous. There were then perhaps 100,000 Maoris and not 7,000 white settlers. The latter might have been driven out. A great and costly expedition from England might have turned the tables, but then the Maoris would have been destroyed. In the existing

state of feeling at home about colonies then, it is possible that New Zealand might have been abandoned. There were very serious native wars afterwards. As self-government was extended to New Zealand the control of native affairs was handed over to the colonists in 1862. They revoked the Treaty of Waitangi, and between 1860 and 1871 there were a succession of wars with the Maoris. English troops had to be sent to New Zealand in considerable numbers, and success was by no means uniform. In 1871 the Maoris made a sullen submission, and the Home Government withdrew all troops, and intimated to the settlers that they were to look to themselves for defence in future. The proportions of the two races were then very different from what they were in the early days. Now there are, perhaps, 56,000 Maoris to over 1,200,000 white inhabitants. The provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi were renewed in 1894, and in 1900 an Act of the New Zealand Parliament forbade any alienation of the remaining Maori lands at all. The Maoris have four members in the New Zealand Parliament, and they are not at present decreasing further. They have perhaps weathered the dangerous time of contact between a white and coloured race. They are susceptible of assimilation, and some intermarriages are made. There are hopes that this interesting race will not disappear.

Representative institutions in New Zealand began in 1852, when Sir George Grey's plan of a Governor, nominated Legislative Council, and elected House of Representatives was set up. There were also six Provincial Councils, afterwards increased to nine, for the government of each principal settlement, which were all really separated geographically. Complete responsible government was not established till 1856, nor all powers (as of native affairs—see above) committed to the colony till 1862. As late as 1891 an Act of the New Zealand Parliament, restricting British immigration, was disallowed by the Home Government. In 1890 the council became nominated for seven years, instead of for life. By legislation of last year (1921), it is to become elective, with 40 members chosen in two great blocks in each island. The present elective House has 76 white and 4 Maori Members, and there is generally a Maori in the Cabinet. In 1876 the Provincial Councils were abolished, and a system of County Councils, Road Boards, and District Councils established instead.

NEW ZEALAND

There are a great many people in New Zealand engaged in public work in New Zealand. A great number engaged in the work of the Parliament is exposed to a great deal of trouble from his constituents for the money he spends for local expenditure in his constituency. **CHAPTER XVIII.**

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Some of the European occupation of South Africa was one but who of the consequences of the trade with Asia. In the possible seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was impossible for European ships to reach India round the Cape without putting in somewhere for water and supplies. It was often necessary to stop for repairs, and constantly for fresh provisions, as crews were always ill with scurvy on long voyages. The Portuguese, who had first rounded the Cape, and who traded capes and bays all along the African coast, never attacked the Cape a regular port of call. English East Indians were there more often than the Dutch at first. James Lancaster (*vide supra*) was there in 1591, and no Dutch ships are known to have come near shore till 1595. We tried to make an attempt and to barter with the Hottentots for sheep and oxen. In 1602 two English captains annexed Table Bay in the name of King James, but the East India Company took no steps to confirm the possession. In 1602 a Dutch ship was wrecked there, and the crew remained for six weeks before being taken off, and grew vegetables. This seems to have suggested a settlement; and in 1652 the Dutch made a permanent colony to grow vegetables for their passing ships, and to supply them with fresh meat butchered from the natives. During the Dutch wars with us under Charles II. it was built, and the Dutch devoted to pasture training themselves, because a war with the Hottentots interfered with the training of cattle with them, although the Hottentots of the Hottentots by Louis XVI. at all companies in the Hottentots and the Cape, could they were without among the Dutch, and their children taught smaller farmer class may in the Hottentots and the Hottentots Zealand politics. Unlike Australia, not only was a few cent of the people are in the Hottentots and the Dutch Government

cities of New Zealand contain only 20 per cent of the whole population. In a physical sense there is probably no finer branch of the British race than the New Zealanders. There is plenty of intelligence, of course ; but, as usual in new countries, the most cultivated intellects are seldom to be found in political life.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOUTH AFRICA

THE European occupation of South Africa was one of the consequences of the trade with Asia. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was impossible for European ships to reach India round the Cape without putting in somewhere for water and supplies. It was often necessary to stop for repairs, and constantly for fresh provisions, as crews were always ill with scurvy on long voyages. The Portuguese, who had first rounded the Cape, and who named capes and bays all along the African coast, never made the Cape a regular port of call. English East Indiamen were there more often than the Dutch at first. James Lancaster (*vide supra*) was there in 1591, and no Dutch ships are known to have sent men ashore till 1595. We used to take in water and to barter with the Hottentots for sheep and oxen. In 1620 two English captains annexed Table Bay in the name of King James, but the East India Company took no steps to confirm the possession.

In 1648 a Dutch ship was wrecked there, and the crew remained for six months before being taken off, and grew vegetables. This seems to have suggested a settlement; and in 1652 the Dutch made a permanent colony to grow vegetables for their passing ships, and to supply them with fresh meat bartered from the natives. During the Dutch wars with us under Charles II a fort was built, and the Dutch took to pasturing themselves, because a war with the Hottentots interfered with the bartering of cattle with them. After the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV, in 1685, 200 French Huguenots came to the Cape. They were distributed among the Dutch, and their children taught Dutch. About 200 Dutch accompanied them, a few German Protestant refugees came out in the next thirty years, and a few Dutch orphan girls were sent out by the Dutch Government

The whole white population was very small, perhaps 1,500 at the beginning of the eighteenth century. They were governed by the Dutch East India Company. Till well on in the eighteenth century they were all near Cape Town. Then they began to spread into the country as pastoral farmers. They had had wars with the Hottentots, and the latter were much diminished—some tribes quite broken up by small-pox—leaving a more free scope for European settlement. We were allies of the Dutch from 1688 to 1780. Our East Indiamen could stop for supplies at Table Bay; they were highly charged for them by the Dutch, but there was no difficulty in obtaining them. In 1780 we were at war with Holland. The Cape was a hostile port, the French were at war with us and held Mauritius, and our trade with India was seriously imperilled. An English attempt on the Cape was frustrated by French ships. The memory of this state of things from 1780 to 1783 had its effects when the French revolutionary wars broke out. Holland joined France, the Prince of Orange took refuge in England, and we again saw our Indian trade threatened with interruption. So in 1795 we sent an expedition to the Cape to take possession in the name of the Prince of Orange, until the end of the war. We found the colony in rebellion against the Dutch East Company, whose administration was very bad. The Boer farmers out in the country had proclaimed two separate republics, and in Cape Town the officials were mostly of the Orange party and made a very half-hearted resistance to our occupation. This lasted till 1802, when by the Peace of Amiens we were reluctantly compelled to return the Cape Colony, not as we had hoped to the Prince of Orange, a friend, but to the Batavian Republic, which was under the thumb of Napoleon, First Consul of the French Republic, and was likely to join in the next war against us. This came about even earlier than was expected—in 1803. Napoleon, shortly Emperor, was making his famous bid for “ships, colonies, and commerce” and before that bubble was burst by the cannon of Trafalgar we were intent upon safeguarding our trade routes. An expedition to the Cape was planned before Trafalgar was fought, and sailed in 1805. Early in 1806 it landed. General Baird had to fight one battle with Dutch, French, German mercenaries, and Hottentots, but gained possession fairly easily. This time we had come to stay.

We were still nominally trustees for the Prince of Orange; but in 1814, for the same reason for which we kept our conquest of Mauritius—the safeguarding of the route to India—we kept the Cape. We paid the new King of the Netherlands £6,000,000 for the Cape and part of Guiana in America.

As usual, we had entered upon an adventure of great complexity, and of unknown developments, with very little knowledge of the conditions. We did not understand the difficulties involved either with the European and non-British population, nor with the natives. The former were, after all, not then numerous. There were about 26,000 white inhabitants, half concentrated near Cape Town, half scattered very widely. They had about 30,000 slaves—negroes from the Gold Coast, Malays from the Dutch East Indies, and Hottentots. The natives whom we knew were nearly negligible. The Bushmen—the primitive inhabitants—were a very low race of savages, troublesome thieves on a small scale, but few and dwindling in numbers like Australian black-fellows. The Hottentots, their conquerors, were rather higher in civilization and rather more numerous, but they were diminished in number, disorganized, and not dangerous. Of the Bantu peoples we scarcely knew anything in 1795, though the settlers in the eastern districts knew them, to their cost, and we had to fight them before the final annexation. The advent of the Bantus has caused one of the two great difficulties and controlling conditions of South Africa. What they were in origin is disputable, and not pertinent, but they are immensely superior to the Hottentots, physically and mentally; they are not negroes and are intellectually far above them. They were intruders into South Africa as much as the Europeans were. They were coming south, overland, while the Dutch were working north from the sea, and about the same time. They were all classed together as Kaffirs, but Kosas, Zulus, Matabele, Basutos, Bechuanas, Mashonas, were different divisions of them. They were capable of political organization under powerful chiefs, and of military discipline. Chaka, the great Zulu conqueror, was an Attila or a Tamerlane on a somewhat smaller scale. Thus in South Africa we have had to deal with the question of an alien European population, as we have had to do in Canada, but a population not chiefly concentrated in one province as there, and surrounded by increasing numbers

of the British race, but occupying the whole country more or less. Also we have a vigorous and increasing native population, more formidable than the Maoris of New Zealand and far more numerous, and not diminishing. There is, in addition, another body of natives—Hottentots and descendants of freed slaves, Malays, and immigrants from India—all together in a country the climate of which seems to be equally favourable for the increase of European, African, and Asiatic peoples. The problems of India can never be complicated by the presence of a considerable European colonization; Canada has her French people as well as British, but no formidable red Indians, and no blacks; New Zealand has a few Maoris, but only a minority now; Australia has no natives who matter, and no non-British population; the West Indies and West Africa have no one except blacks, some Hindhu coolies in the former, and only white governors and commercial people in small numbers; South Africa has all the different elements, and Dutch, British, and Bantu are all flourishing.

The Zulu conquerors were driving their kinsmen, the Kosas towards what is now the Cape Province in the eighteenth century, before our first conquest of the Cape. In 1781 the Fish River was taken to be the boundary of the white and Bantu invaders. There was sure to be further trouble, but when we annexed the Cape we had no idea of the series of Kaffir wars which were to last for a century after 1781, and are not certainly ended now.

A further consequence followed from Zulu and Matabele conquests. Sometimes the conquerors occupied the land which they overran. Sometimes, by merciless devastation and slaughter, they swept the weaker tribes entirely away. What are now Natal, the Transvaal, and Orange River State were temporarily at least half-emptied. A great expanse of unoccupied land was left into which the Dutch Boers, the pastoral farmers, were able to migrate when they were dissatisfied with the British Government in their earlier homes.

They were continually dissatisfied. At first, when in 1818-21, the British Government subsidized British emigration to Algoa Bay and British population began to grow in the western part of the Cape Colony, there was no great antagonism. The missionaries however had already begun

to cause friction. The original Dutch population had the religious attitude of Dutch Calvinists of the seventeenth century. They had been induced with difficulty to allow of even a Lutheran Church in Cape Town. They forbade Moravian missionaries to convert natives, whom they regarded as their Gibeonites, "hewers of wood and drawers of water," while they were the chosen race of conquering Israelites. The London Missionary Society which came to South Africa in 1799 in the wake of the British occupation, began to convert the natives, and to stand up for them against the Dutch. The latter, be it conceded, were often living in isolation with their wives and families, among a number of natives whom they naturally regarded with dislike because they were afraid of them, not without cause, and whom they had a distinct interest in keeping in subjection. When quarrels arose it was the missionaries who commanded attention from the English Government rather than the Boers. They were sometimes unwise, but on the whole they represented the cause of humanity and enlightenment. It was a missionary of the London Society—David Livingstone—who, after he had severed his connexion with the Society, it is true, was the greatest pioneer of European civilization in Africa who has ever lived.

In 1828 the old Dutch system of local government was abolished. Resident Magistrates took the place of Landrosts, and the English language was employed as much as possible in legal proceedings. The old Dutch law, however, was preserved.

In 1834 Boer discontent became greater still. The abolition of slavery was as little desired by the Boers as by the West Indian planters. The latter, with their business connexions in Liverpool and Bristol, were able to obtain the compensation voted by Parliament to the former slave-owners; the latter—ignorant farmers scattered about the country, to whom a journey to Cape Town was an unusual adventure—did not in practice receive all that they might have had. Added to this was a political grievance. Since 1811 the Bantu tribes had been pressing upon the colonists. The Zulus had driven the other natives out of Natal in 1830. The situation was something like that in the Western Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries, when Huns were pressing upon Goths, and Goths were driven over the Roman

frontiers. The Kaffirs from beyond the Great Fish River burst into the western parts of the Colony in 1834. The English settlers suffered perhaps more than the Dutch, but the calamity was general. In the next year the colonists and regular soldiers drove back the Kaffirs to the river Kei, over 70 miles eastward. Sir Benjamin d'Urban, then Governor of the Cape, established a zone of British influence as a buffer, bringing the tribes between the two rivers under British control and protection. It was probably the wisest course to follow, but the Home Government, fearful of increased responsibilities and disliking the whole business of colonial wars, reversed his policy in 1836, and withdrew the frontier again to the Fish River.

The result of this, and of the grievances about abolition and the treatment of the natives generally, was the great Boer trek. The farmers inspanned their oxen, and went off in their wagons with their families, driving their cattle with them, into the deserted interior, to get out of the way of a government whose policy was uncongenial to them. It was a movement of which we had no previous experience. When American colonists had quarrelled with the Home Government they had rebelled. They could not migrate *en masse*; they were nearly all dependent upon seaborne traffic, and they were up against forests not the open prairies of the west of America. The Boers had no ties with the sea-coast, and would move easily over the veldt, and find what they wanted upon it—great grazing grounds. They crossed the Orange River into what is now the Orange State Province, and further over the Vaal into the Transvaal, or they crossed the mountains into Natal, and found open country there too! Everywhere the Zulus and the Matabele had cleared the ground of most of the previous occupants. What was to be done about the migrants? The first thought of most of our statesmen then would have been to let them go. On the other hand, as they were sure, first or last, to come into collision with Zulus or others, would it be possible to drop all responsibility for them? Could we allow them to be massacred, and refuse help if asked to give it afterwards in wars over the beginning of which we had had no influence? Not could such wars be localized for certain. If Boers beyond the Orange River got into trouble with the natives, victorious natives would not stop north of the Orange River. The

first great interference with the trekking Boers was not on these grounds only. The Boers who had entered Natal from the interior could protect themselves. After one reverse they completely defeated the Zulus on Dingaan's day, December 16, 1838. The long-barrelled muskets were more than a match for the assegais. But the Government did not wish to see an independent power established upon the coast; it was opening a door for foreign powers to enter into South Africa. We had already founded Durban—named after the Governor—upon the Natal coast, and in 1843 we proclaimed British sovereignty. Most of the Natal Boers withdrew to the Transvaal, after some fighting. Some remained and submitted, but English colonists arrived in Natal in some numbers, and after a while it became more British than Dutch. Meanwhile fierce Kaffir wars were fought in 1846 and 1851, and in other years. The Home Government would gladly have washed its hands of South Africa altogether, but, as Sir James Grahame said to Mr. Greville, "We must keep a Gibraltar on the route to India." If we held the coast it was impossible not to be responsible for the interior; yet it seemed absurd to allow continually trekking Boers to lead us on by their migrations into adventures half-way up a continent, as they might do if we always extended our rule wherever they went. What the Government did was to overrule continually the advice of the men on the spot, and to vacillate between extension and retreat, till neither colonists or natives had any trust in their policy. Thus in 1848 we proclaimed the country between the Orange and Vaal rivers English territory. The Boers resisted in arms, and Sir Harry Smith, fresh from victories over the Seikhs, and from whose wife the town was named which became so famous in the wars of 1899-1900, defeated them at Boomplaats. The more decided malcontents withdrew to the Transvaal; some British colonists came in their place, and the Orange River Territory was anxious to remain under us, and with our protection. Then in 1854 it was made independent, against its will, as the Orange River Republic. In 1852 we had recognized the independence of the Transvaal by the Sand River Convention. Sir George Grey, however, Governor from 1853 to 1859, carried out a more systematic native policy. He brought the tribes between the Cape Colony and Natal under British protection, and conciliated them by firm

and just rule. Of this eminent statesman's services in Australia and New Zealand we have written above. In 1854 an elected Legislature was established at Cape Town, but not responsible government, which was granted to the Cape in 1872, but not to Natal till 1893.

CHAPTER XIX

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

IT cannot be said that Kaffir wars ceased with Sir George Grey. With the Basutos several fierce conflicts raged, until in 1868 they settled down as a British Protectorate. Their territory is a native block between the Orange River Province and Natal, with some 500,000 Basuto inhabitants to less than 2,000 Europeans. The other principal troubles raged round the Transvaal. The Boers were in perpetual collision with various Kaffir tribes, and were not sufficiently organized to effect a complete conquest of them. In 1876 they suffered defeat when attacking the stronghold of Sekukuni, a Bapedi chief. The majority of the people distrusted the President, Burgess, because he was not sound in Calvinistic orthodoxy, and refused to answer to his summons to arms, or if they came fought half-heartedly. The administration had almost ceased to work, and the treasury was empty. The Zulu military autocrat, Cetewayo, was lying on the frontier, and might at any time invade the Transvaal. It was imperative to prevent the total overthrow of a white State by native forces—a calamity which would have involved all South Africa in native troubles. Sir Theophilus Shepstone was sent to Pretoria, to act as occasion required, and in 1877 declared the annexation of the Transvaal. The English and German population who had come into the towns were in favour of the step; the Boer farmers disliked it, but made no immediate resistance. Two deputations came afterwards to England to deprecate the annexation, but Lord Beaconsfield's Government confirmed it, and Mr. Gladstone, who in opposition had criticized it, took no steps to reverse it when he came into power in 1880. The petition of the Boers, "to give us back our country," reads oddly from men who had ousted native rulers from the country little over forty years before.

The manner of the annexation was ill-managed. It might very likely have been secured by a popular vote in 1877, and it was followed by no constitutional government. There was abundant excuse for it, and reasons against anyone, Boer or Briton, interfering with it at first. The Zulu military power was hanging as a thundercloud over the Transvaal and Natal. Not till this was broken at Ulundi in 1879, after a defeat at Isandlwana in 1878 and the successful defence of Natal at Rorke's Drift, were white men free to quarrel among themselves. The troublesome Sekukuni had been easily subdued by Sir Garnet Wolseley before the Zulu war.

Then the Transvaal Boers rose in arms. They failed to take any of the little towns, where handfuls of soldiers and of English settlers defended themselves, but they defeated small bodies of troops who were sent against them under Sir George Colley at Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill. It was the usual story of our endeavouring to conquer and hold countries with "a corporal's guard"—that is, utterly inadequate forces. Victories against great odds in India had a lasting and damaging effect upon our management of many colonial wars. The Liberal Government, which had neglected the peaceful petition of the Boers, surrendered to the pressure of defeat in unimportant skirmishes, refusing to allow Sir Evelyn Wood to repair the mishaps, which he surely could have done. The annexation was revoked in 1881, but a vague suzerainty maintained, which no one understood and which was a cause of friction. It was no wonder that in South Africa and Europe the impression prevailed that the connexion of all South Africa and Great Britain was likely soon to cease. If we ask why the Boers, who could not defeat Sekukuni, could defeat Sir George Colley, and twenty years later tax the resources of the Empire to subdue them, the answer is that they were mismanaged against Sekukuni, and that Sir George Colley had quite inadequate forces, and used them in the wrong way against expert rifle-shots. In 1899 the Transvaal, with the Orange State, Cape rebels, and European sympathisers to help them, had accumulated the best supply of munitions, rifles, and artillery which then existed anywhere.

Before the war of 1899-1902 circumstances had changed greatly in South Africa. In 1869 diamonds had been discovered in and near the Orange Free State; in 1884 gold was

discovered in the Transvaal. What had been purely agricultural and pastoral countries became mining countries also. New settlers of a new kind, not always desirable, came in. Besides, in 1889, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, working for the development of South Africa under the British Crown, had started the South African Company, and began a systematic British colonization of Rhodesia, north of the Transvaal, thereby shutting off the opening for any further trek into the interior. The establishment of the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland in 1885 had shut in the Boer Republics from the west.

Another trouble was on the horizon. Germany had begun to be a colonial power, and had come to South Africa. German South-West Africa was annexed by her in 1884. On the east coast the almost derelict Portuguese territories were tempting to the new power. The readiest access to the sea from the Transvaal led through them, to Delagoa Bay. We had to interfere to prevent a private German financier from acquiring rights in Delagoa Bay, which would be a convenient starting point for political influence. When an attempt of the Uitlanders, the new-comers in the Transvaal, to assert themselves against the exclusive rule of the Boers, was supported by an ill-judged invasion by the British South African Company's forces under Dr. Jameson, and was defeated, the ex-Kaiser let the world know that he was prepared if invited to assume a German protectorate over the Boer Republics. It was in anticipation of such help, relying also on Dutch disaffection at the Cape, that the Presidents of the Transvaal and the Orange State conspired to turn us out of South Africa. The foreign help never came from any government, though there was much misdirected private sympathy, because the European nations were too bitterly opposed to each other, and because we had not then let our fleet fall below its necessary strength for maintaining our own naval defence of our own Empire.

Presidents Kruger and Steyn also supposed that public opinion in England would not agree to a war for the forcible retention of revolting colonists. Fifty years ago it was thought to be a truism that, warned by the American War of Independence, we should never again fight to maintain a colonial Empire. The active secessionists in South Africa in 1899 were quite as large a proportion of the population as

the actual supporters of Independence in America in 1775. But an Imperial sentiment had grown up in England, and we fought, and more than that the other Dominions came to help, against the disintegration of the Empire. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand fought. India wanted to fight, but was not allowed. We fought, and we won. We had no foreign coalition to meet as in 1778-82, and we had command of the sea. The war was spun-out, but it was to a foregone conclusion from the time when the Boers were unable to take Ladysmith and Kimberley, and remained round them instead of sweeping the country to the sea. We had another great advantage over the England of the eighteenth century, in statesmanship. Had we beaten the Americans then we could not probably have reversed our mistaken commercial policy in the colonies. The mercantile interest in England was too strong, and the Navigation Acts were supposed to be necessary. As soon as things settled down in South Africa after the Peace of Pretoria in 1902, we gave responsible government to each of the late Boer Republics in 1907, and in 1910 the Union of South Africa was made. In four years' time after that our late opponents in the field, Generals Botha and Smuts, were not only governing South Africa as an integral part of the British Empire, but were organizing and leading its forces for the conquest of German South-West Africa, of German East Africa, and for help in Egypt and Europe, and were actually putting down the irreconcilable party among the Dutch, their former comrades, who rebelled under the absurd delusion that if they and the Germans won the latter would allow them independence, or even any reasonable liberty. They would soon have discovered the difference between a British Imperial connexion and the tutelage of the drill-sergeant and policeman.

The Union of South Africa had been advocated by Sir George Grey in 1858, and supported by Brand, then President of the Orange State. Twenty years later Lord Carnarvon, Colonial Secretary, and Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of the Cape, wished for it. The obstacle was the independence of the Dutch Republics and their refusal to join a union under the Crown, and the dislike of the English people in the Cape Colony and Natal to any union on other conditions. Had Delagoa Bay not belonged to Portugal, and had the Portuguese east coast been occupied by Boers, the need for union would

not have been so great. The natural outlet to the sea from the interior would have been on that side, and the Dutch Republics might have united without the rest. As it is, the seaports of the Transvaal and Orange State are in Cape Colony. The railways run through more than one State and are vitally important, in the absence of navigable rivers, and the great distance from each other of the chief centres of European habitation. The circumstances of the country do not call for a federal union like that of Canada. There the chief original cause for a federal State, leaving large local independence to each member, was the essentially French character of one province—Quebec. In South Africa, though Dutch and English are both there, they are not so decidedly separated in local habitations. The Transvaal has now a large non-Dutch population, and the two races, while preponderating one here, and this there, are fairly balanced, province by province, and are mixing more and more by migration. The common interests are more evident than the local, while in the Canadian Dominion the local interests, of British Columbia, for instance, are quite as obvious as their common interests with, let us say, Nova Scotia. The South African Union therefore is not a federal State. The four provinces—the Cape, Natal, Orange State, and Transvaal—have their local Councils; but these are not miniatures of the central government with parliaments and ministers, though somewhat more important than English county councils. They elect, for instance, in conjunction with the members of the assembly from their province, thirty-two members of the Senate of the Union. The remaining eight are nominated by the Governor-General, with provision for the nomination of four specially acquainted with native affairs. Otherwise the councils are boards for local administration, and the framing of regulations of local application, under administrators appointed by the Governor-General. Native members may sit in the councils. In the Central Parliament members must be of European descent, but in the Cape Province natives have votes. The House of Assembly has 132 members distributed between the four provinces in proportion to population.

In regard to this Legislative Assembly of the Union the Governor-General is a constitutional sovereign, acting through ministers, who are completely responsible to it.

He has another character as High Commissioner for South Africa, in which he represents the authority of the British Crown over the protected States. Here he is more in the position of an Indian viceroy. Basutoland, finally settled as a Protectorate in 1869, Bechuanaland in 1885, and Swaziland in 1900, are native territories with a very few white residents, ruled by their own chiefs by native laws, under the control of a Resident Commissioner, who is under the Chief Commissioner for South Africa. Zululand (annexed 1897) is administered under Natal. Rhodesia is in a different position. Mr. Cecil Rhodes founded it as a home for white men under the management of the South African Company in 1889. From 1893 to 1896 the wars with the Matabele and the Mashonas conquered it. The Company appointed an Administrator, and an Executive Council. A Legislative Council was partly appointed and partly elected. The High Commissioner was supreme over all, but the Company was closely controlled by the Colonial Secretary at home. In 1922 Southern Rhodesia had the choice of admission into the South African Union, or of having a responsible government of its own. It elected for the latter, which is in course of establishment. In Northern Rhodesia native chiefs still administer most of the territory, under supervision by the Rhodesian Government. Northern Rhodesia is extremely rich in natural products, copper and rubber included, but is too hot for extensive white occupation. In time both Rhodesias will probably be joined to the Union. The white population is predominantly British, not Dutch.

The native question was, and remains, one great difficulty in South Africa. Inside the Union the native population is very much larger than the European, and is increasing. Individuals among it have shown themselves capable of high intellectual cultivation. As a body they are not of course equal to the whites, but many of them may be so before long. If admitted to equal political rights they would entirely swamp the whites at elections. The critical time is not yet reached, but it may be before long a question how a responsible government, based on a franchise limited in most places to a small minority of the population, and electing a parliament entirely so limited, can go on. In the West Indies, because the governing whites were a small oligarchy, they had to give up their political powers. South Africa is not

the West Indies, however ; the white population, though less than the coloured, is much greater than in the West Indies, and British political aptitude has surmounted many difficulties, and may yet find a way by which the fine Bantu race may be allowed political development without ousting all white men from the Union Parliament. Some solution which will satisfy the more educated natives is certainly desirable. Among the more ignorant the Ethiopian movement—Africa for the Africans—has taken some hold and is a sign of possible trouble.

Since the Peace of Versailles (1919) the Union has had a mandate to administer the former German territory of South-West Africa. This is under a Commissioner appointed by the Governor-General, with a small Advisory Council. He is responsible to the Union Government. This country is naturally part of that South African land which is suitable for European habitation, though hot and not fertile. It should never have been allowed to be separated, and probably never will be separated again, from the rest. Further north, beyond Rhodesia, the Central African Protectorates and Colonies are not a natural annexe to the South African Union. They are not white men's lands, till the interior highlands are reached far to the north. Nor is the Portuguese coast, though its union with the interior would be convenient, a country where a white population could thrive. Protectorates of tropical countries are perhaps as well administered, or better, by Great Britain than by the daughter nations. They cannot form part of the real political body of the Union.

CHAPTER XX

AFRICA—*continued*

IN America and in Asia the extension of European trade and colonization was carried out in rivalry between European nations, and great wars were waged in Europe itself for the control of other continents. There has been fighting enough in Africa—in South Africa by ourselves, as we have seen in the last chapters, and in North Africa by the French, but there has also been an attempt at peaceful division of spheres of influence. Central Africa was almost entirely unknown in 1815, when the Napoleonic Wars ceased. Forty years later maps of Africa used to show a coast line full of names, and a blank interior, in which the upper course of the Nile was conjectural, the Niger imperfectly marked, and the Congo and Zambesi represented by their mouths only. From about that time exploration began to be carried out very rapidly. Livingstone, working from the south, from 1841 onwards, explored Bechuanaland, discovered Rhodesia, and crossed the continent from the centre westward, and then back eastward to the Indian Ocean. He penetrated later to Lake Tanganyika, and before he died in 1873 had laid the foundations for a civilized central Africa. Cameron and Stanley crossed Africa between 1873 and 1877. Burton, Speke, Grant and Baker, working from the east coast, had found the great lakes at the head of the Nile between 1858 and 1864. Not only was the interior of Africa penetrated, but it was shown not to be the desert which it had been supposed. Private adventurers, and then European nations began to mark out districts for exploitation as commercial fields. Among these nations was Germany. She assumed the rule of German South-West Africa, and of Togoland and the Cameroons on the west coast, in 1884. In 1885 a Congress at Berlin met to make a peaceful arrangement of spheres in Africa for different powers. The arrangements

were fairly well completed by 1891, so far as we were concerned, by treaties with Germany and Portugal. The white map was pushing into Africa, and could not be excluded. When that happens it is incumbent on governments to assume control, as we pointed out before. It is a tribute to a slightly advanced stage of national relations that the Europeans did not begin at once to fight for Africa as they had done for America. It was a misfortune that the great European War of 1914-18 was extended to Africa. It could not be helped, but the effect upon the African populations of their extensive use as soldiers is not likely to lead to peaceful progress hereafter.

We are not concerned with the territories of other countries. The British Empire in Africa, beyond the Union and the Protectorates administered by the Governor-General as High Commissioner, are as follows: East of Northern Rhodesia is Nyasaland, a Protectorate, assumed in 1891, on Lake Nyasa. It is inland, but at the mouth of the Zambesi a plot of land, Chinde, is leased from Portugal, where goods for Nyasaland may be landed duty-free. Further north is Tanganyika, formerly German East Africa, taken over by us as mandated territory in 1919, having been conquered with great difficulty in the war. Zanzibar, the Arab sultanate on the coast, has been formally a British Protectorate since 1890. It was always intimately connected by trade with India and the Persian Gulf. Kenya, in British East Africa, with an important port at Mombasa, including some other small Protectorates, is administered under the Colonial Office. Parts of the interior are fit for European settlement. It comprises at least 200,000 square miles. Inland from it is the Uganda Protectorate upon the Great Lakes. Kenya first began to be acquired in 1888, and Uganda became formally a Protectorate in 1894. Unconnected with these, on the coast opposite Aden, is the Somaliland Protectorate, declared in 1884. Its origin is to be found in jealousy of French and Italian attempts to rule the outlets of the Red Sea. Its retention helps to suppress some piracy and slave-running. Further north is the Sudan, on the Upper Nile, extending from Egypt to the Uganda Protectorate. It was reconquered from the Mahdi's successors in 1898, and formally taken over as a jointly administered territory, between England and Egypt, in 1899. The Governor-General is

English, and the garrison is officered by Englishmen. The territory had formerly been conquered by Egypt, very badly administered, devastated by the slave trade, and finally made the scene of a great Mohammedan revival of fanatics, followers of a new successor of Mohammed as "Prophet of God." The essence of the movement was a crusade for the propagation of the faith, and Egypt and Abyssinia were both in imminent danger of being overrun. When once we had interfered in Egypt we could not help interfering with the Mahdists. During their less than twenty years of rule they are computed to have reduced the population of the Sudan by about two-thirds. There is no question of the benefit to the country of the present regime, but it is one of the heavy responsibilities which we have incurred as a consequence of our former action. We must console ourselves by the knowledge that we keep the peace in a formerly devastated country, that the cotton trade is very valuable, and that if we withdrew Egypt would certainly be unable to take our place, and would again find barbarians threatening to come down the Nile. Egypt we are supposed to protect no longer.

We interfered in Egypt in 1882. The country was in fact mortgaged to his European creditors by the Khedive, and England and France had united to administer the finances in their interests, and in the interests of the unfortunate peasantry whom the Khedive's Government oppressed and fleeced. A military rebellion threatened the Khedive's rule and the European traders, who did all the business of the country. It also threatened possible complications with the Turks, who were still nominal suzerains of Egypt. Our vital interests in the Canal compelled intervention. The French declined to act with us, so we conquered the mutinous army. By the logic of facts we became the protectors of Egypt. Lord Cromer's financial administration, from 1884 onwards, rescued the real native Egyptians from their oppression, and for the first time in the course of all known history governed them for their own good. Egypt has not been governed by Egyptians since the days of the Pharaohs. The present leading people are Turks, Albanians, Levantines, or at the best Arabs, who are themselves intruders into Egypt. A generation of good rule has, as usual, obliterated the memory of the evils which preceded it. In the course of the late war we declared the independence of Egypt from the Turks, and

since then, in deference to Mohammedan sentiment, we have professed to abandon our own Protectorate of the country. We are, however, still in military occupation of the Canal and its neighbourhood, and must so remain. In fact, Egypt is dependent upon our protection in the background against Turkish intrigues, and the menace of Soudanese and bordering tribes of Arabs, and the whole business of the country is dependent upon European capital and Levantine traders. Facts are more potent than political aspirations; nor is Egypt the only country to which this applies.

Turning to the west coast we find the oldest British settlements in Africa. From north to south Gambia is the first, and the oldest. An English factory was established there in 1620, but it was not permanently held till 1662. For long it was disputed with the French. It commands the mouth of the best navigable river in West Africa. Sierra Leone was acquired in 1787, and was made an asylum for freed slaves. It used to be an emporium of the slave trade: its roadstead is the best upon the coast. The Gold Coast was visited by Elizabethan seamen. The Royal African Company began to build forts and factories—depots for slave-trading chiefly—in 1672. In 1750 the management was taken away from them, and put in the hands of a new company of merchants till 1821. Then it was taken over directly by the Colonial Office. The Dutch and Danes had forts on the coast intermixed with ours. The latter were bought out in 1850, the former in 1872. The Protectorate was extended into the interior, after the second Ashanti war in 1896. The Ashantis were not the original masters of the coast. They were an inland people who had begun to conquer towards the coast about 1750. The overthrow of their kingdom was an incalculable blessing to all their neighbours and to themselves.

Lastly, the Niger Protectorate, on the lower and middle course of the Niger, became a British Protectorate in 1891. The Royal Niger Company, formed in 1882, chartered in 1886, had opened the district to trade. Lagos is its port. It was a great slave-trading centre, and was finally annexed in 1861. In Northern Nigeria native rulers govern under the guidance of British advisers. The whole of the trade of the original West African Settlements was subordinated to that in slaves. The later retention of the coast was largely

because of the desire to put down the slave trade. The trade now, in more legitimate merchandise, is immensely greater than in slave-trading days, and is a source of immediate profit to the natives themselves. This is especially the case in what was Ashanti, where Coomassie, the former capital of a most brutal tyranny, is now a great centre of negro cocoa-growers. Cocoa has nearly supplanted palm oil there.

Chartered companies have played a great part in the opening of Africa, as they played a part in our earliest trading and colonization in America. The Niger Company led to the Nigeria Protectorate, the British East Africa Company to the Kenya and Uganda Colony and Protectorate, the South Africa Company to the acquisition of Rhodesia. In another part of the world the North Borneo Company has led to a great advance of trade, and of peace, in Borneo. These nineteenth century Companies differ, however, from the old Companies. The Crown by the Charter assumes no sovereignty over territories occupied by the Companies under concessions from native rulers. Where, as is generally the case, British rule, or a Protectorate, has supervened, it has not been directly administered by the Company, except in Rhodesia. Nor have the charters conferred any monopoly of trade.

Three inhabited islands in the Atlantic may be called African possessions of Great Britain. St. Helena was acquired in 1651 as a watering place on the way to India. Ascension was occupied in 1815 as a precaution for the safer custody of Napoleon at St. Helena. It is now an important wireless telegraphy station. It was administered by the Admiralty till this year, 1922, when it was taken over by the Colonial Office. Tristan da Cunha was occupied in 1816. It was supposed to be useful to whaling ships in the South Atlantic. It is the most out-of-the-way of all British islands, but the 127 inhabitants refused lately to leave it for land offered them in South Africa.

Two mandated territories in West Africa, formerly German, the Cameroons and Togoland, are administered by England and France, the spheres of administration being locally separate. Our part of the former is under the Nigerian, of the latter under the Gold Coast, Government.

CHAPTER XXI

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OPPPOSITE to the Somali coast in Africa we find an example of a possession acquired deliberately as a link in communications. Aden in Arabia was bought in 1838 when steamships had begun to use the Red Sea route to India. Transit was then overland across the Isthmus of Suez. The opening of the Canal in 1869 made such a station still more indispensable. As a fortified coaling station it is of the first importance. Coaling stations, he it remarked, were not needed till the nineteenth century was well advanced. With Aden may be classed the Island of Perim, taken 1857, and Socotra; taken 1886. They were all three under the Bombay Government, but are now under the Colonial Office.

In Asia two mandated territories are under our control at present, as a result of the war. Palestine is administered by a British Commissioner, Irak or Mesopotamia is under an Arab king, with our advice and protection. Whether one or both of these responsibilities may not be given up soon is uncertain. Palestine, besides what may be called the sentimental attractions, is not without its uses to a power which wishes to keep the Turks and independent Arabs away from the Suez Canal and from Egypt. The great Egyptian kings of antiquity always had to control Palestine. In Mesopotamia the lower part of the plain watered by the Euphrates and Tigris, and their mouth on the Persian Gulf, are important for the trade of the Gulf and India. The oil supplies, moreover, are worth preserving. Before the war we protected the independence of Koweit, at the head of the Persian Gulf; because we did not wish the terminus of the Euphrates Valley Railway on the Gulf to be in the hands of the Turks, and therefore under German influence. The railway, still incomplete, will no doubt be one day finished from the Bosphorus to Koweit. Cyprus, leased from

the Turks in 1878, and annexed in 1914, may be considered as another consequence of the desire to safeguard routes to India.

Beyond India our acquisitions have been the result of trade expansion. In Further India were the "Indies" of the early commercial voyages. It was the stiff Dutch attitude there which drove our Company to the mainland of India where spices were less plentiful, but where Empire awaited them. Since those early days we began to come back by conquest into the original sphere of European activity. Malacca was one of the earliest Portuguese settlements (1511). The Dutch took it from them in 1640. We took it from the Dutch in 1798, during our last era of colonial conquest from other Europeans till 1914-8. It was handed backwards and forwards, till in 1824 the Dutch gave it back to us in return for the surrender of some claims in Sumatra. In 1819 Sir Stamford Raffles had marked the site of the island of Singapore as the natural trade centre of the Malay Peninsula. It was finally bought in 1824. Like Alexander and Constantine the Great, Sir Stamford Raffles was the founder of a world's emporium. More than 11,000 steamers entered and cleared at Singapore in 1821, and, most significant, 51,000 native craft in the whole colony, Singapore, Penang, Malacca and Labuan. Before we policed the Eastern seas piracy was flourishing, and the native junks went in terror of Malays, Chinese, and other sea-robbers. Penang was taken in 1786, Wellesley in 1798, when the Marquis Wellesley was Governor-General. All these places were under the Indian Government till 1867, when they were organized under a governor of their own. The European population is confined mostly to officials and officers. There are a few commercial people, but the climate is not one for Europeans to live in.

The Federated Malay States, on the Malay Peninsula, were brought under our protection by treaties from 1874 to 1898. Johore had connexion with the Empire first in 1885. It is now protected by a treaty of 1914, before the war. The other non-Federated States had been more or less subject to Siam, and were transferred to our protection by a treaty with Siam in 1909.

These States for the most part flourish exceedingly. They are immensely rich; rubber and tin are two of the great

products of the States of Malaya. The people themselves share the increase of wealth following upon peaceful and orderly government, the abolition of piracy, and the cessation of the old-time wars of the Burmese and Siamese. Johore is particularly well governed under a Mohammedan Sultan advised by us.

The North Borneo Company acquired rights in Borneo in 1877, but their sphere is not a British Protectorate. Brunei was acquired in 1888 by treaty. Sarawak, being ruled by an Englishman as Rajah, became formally a Protectorate in 1886.

In the China seas we conquered Hong-Kong, and had it confirmed to us by treaty in 1842. We leased Kowloon, on the mainland close to it, and extended the area of the leased territory in 1906. We took a lease of Wei-hai-wei in North China in 1898, chiefly because Russia was establishing herself in Manchuria and Germany in Kwangsi. Hong-Kong nearly vies with Singapore, as a barren island converted into a great port. Wei-hai-wei is a port of call for steamers to North China, but was not specially conspicuous as a commercial nor as a military station, and was restored to China in 1922 under the Washington Pacific Agreement.

There is one more region of British Imperial expansion. The Pacific Islands carry on the flag, from Australia to North America. The administration or protectorate of the Pacific Islands was a consequence of the private enterprise of traders, sailors, and missionaries. As elsewhere, the exploring and adventurous European brought on State control in the interest of the native even more than of himself. The acquisitions by other European powers in the last century and in the beginning of this added fresh reasons for the occupation of islands which in the hands of a possibly hostile power might be threatening to Australia or New Zealand. New Guinea should have been all Australian long ago. ~~At~~ too late Queensland annexed the south-east part of the country in 1883. The Germans annexed the north-east, and the west was allotted to the Netherlands. The German part was taken over by Australia after the war. Norfolk Island has always been administered with Australia.

New Zealand administers part of Samoa, taken from the Germans, the Cook Islands, and a few other small islands, some uninhabited.

Nauru Island is jointly administered by Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

The High Commissioner of the Pacific presides over the British Solomon Islands, protected since 1893; the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, protected since 1892, annexed 1915; Fanning Island, an important telegraphic station; Tonga, protected since 1900; Pitcairn; and some other small islands.

The New Hebrides are under a joint English and French control. Fiji is separately administered. The protectorate was assumed by the wish of the inhabitants in 1874.

It is unfortunately the case that in the Pacific contact with Europeans has had many disastrous consequences for an interesting race of natives. Drink, disease, and "black-birding"—slave kidnapping in fact—demoralized and destroyed many. At the same time some evils, like cannibalism and inter-tribal wars have been diminished. As usual it was the unauthorized adventurers who did most of the mischief. The interposition of governments has restrained them.

CHAPTER XXII

THE UNITED EMPIRE

TO recapitulate briefly the forms of government in the various parts of the Empire : Great Britain enjoys the responsible government which has served for a pattern to all the other self-governing States of which it is composed. Northern and Southern Ireland, by an arrangement too recent to be criticized historically, are trying the same form. The presence of members from Ulster in the House of Commons at Westminster makes the connexion of that part of Ireland and of Great Britain as near a federal union as we have yet reached in Imperial relations. The Dominions enjoy responsible government under the Imperial Crown. All their Acts have to be allowed, but are allowed as a matter of course, by the consent of the Crown. They are in effect nations, and are ranked as such in the League of Nations. Other colonies have representative but not responsible government, assemblies wholly or partially elected, which legislate but cannot change the Executive Government. The purely Crown colony is governed, under the Colonial Office, by some Governor or Commissioner, who is advised by a Council which he nominates or which is nominated for him from the Colonial Office. The Indian Empire, and its provinces, have a government different from any of these, of a special kind to meet special conditions. The Island of Malta has something like the dyarchy of Indian provinces; certain matters are committed to ministers responsible to an elected assembly; over others the Governor is supreme. Protectorates vary from countries in which a British resident or commissioner is in effect an all-powerful prime minister to a native ruler, to those in which native rulers conduct their own affairs under the advice of some British officer in the background, or where British residents are controlled by such an officer, while the natives are left much to themselves

but protected from outside interference. These differ little from spheres of influence, which really mean a preserve where other powers are not free to set up any rule. The practical—some would say the happy-go-lucky—instincts of Englishmen in politics have avoided any attempt at a rigorous uniformity of treatment of parts of the Empire. We have no passion for uniformity, nor much respect for theory. At least our politically trained people have little. It is to be feared that those who have not been brought up in an atmosphere of practical politics—perhaps some women voters among others—are more inclined to follow the other fashion of finding a political theory first, and then applying it without regard to suitability of circumstances. The great differences of the sort of people, their races, their histories, their culture, their wishes, and their needs, in the long roll of dominions, colonies and protectorates which we have named, would render one form of treatment not only absurd but impossible. This diversity, though inevitable, has one drawback. It renders a closer Imperial union even more difficult than it otherwise would be. If the whole Empire were made up of self-governing dominions they might be united in a federal union under a common Parliament and responsible ministry. There would be great difficulties, but the form of government would be familiar to all, in accordance with their habits. This has been the case in successful federations. All the States of the American Union were Republics, very similarly governed, though not all exactly alike. The same was true of the Swiss Cantons, of the Kingdoms and Duchies of the late German Federal Empire, of the States united in Australia, and of the States united in Canada. If we had none but Crown colonies, one common plan would be possible. But if Great Britain, the two Irelands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and Newfoundland, formed a federal State, they could not keep it to themselves. The Indian Empire would have to be admitted, or cut loose from the Empire. Ceylon and the West Indies would clamour for admission, or at least for responsible government, as a prelude to admission. Would such a federal union be a success? Would the Federal Parliament command respect? Could the Federal Parliament and Cabinet, and the Dominion Parliaments and Cabinets, and the Provincial Parliaments and Cabinets of the parts of the Dominions be all manned efficiently? Are there not rather

too many parliamentary seats as things are for the number of capable politicians who have leisure to fill them? What would happen if, on a question of Imperial policy, the votes of Newfoundland, the West Indies, and Ceylon, just turned the majority for South Africa, India, and New Zealand, against the votes of Great Britain, Canada, and Australia? Perhaps this distribution of votes is not likely; but a federal system implies some surrender of local independence. None of the Dominions wish to surrender any independence; nor do we. It is not always remembered that a Federal Parliament would put the Houses of Lords and Commons into a secondary place. It would immensely increase the powers of the Crown: not of the actual monarch, but of the central executive power which wields the prerogatives of the Crown, which would have no regular parties of supporters and of opposition to deal with, but would, if able and unscrupulous, play off one country against another. As it is, the Empire probably ensures the continuance of our ancient monarchy. The young nations would never find a point of union in a British president elected every few years; certainly not in a president elected in another Dominion. One great reason for a more formal union of the Empire has been thought to lie in a common fiscal policy. Unfortunately it is precisely the most difficult sort of union to attain. The Dominions are all more or less protectionist, Great Britain is for free imports.¹ The Dominions will make allowances for British imports, but they will not give up their fiscal independence. Nor will we. An Imperial *Zollverein*, free trade within the Empire, and a tariff against the rest of the world has its attraction in theory, but would not work at present. We do far too large a trade outside the Empire, and so do India and the Dominions, to tamper with it with impunity.

Union for mutual defence is an easier matter. In 1902 it was computed that in Great Britain naval and military expenditure, which was available for the defence of the whole Empire, came to 29s. 3d. a head, in Australia to 3s. 6d., and in Canada to 2s. This appeared scarcely fair, and to remedy the inequality various schemes have been propounded at

¹ Great Britain is not really free-trading. She hampers commerce and industry with too many regulations. But Great Britain is for free imports of food and raw materials, and will so continue.

Imperial conferences. The provision of trained forces available for Imperial purposes was talked about. After our fashion, the thing had even then—in 1902—been done, and was done again, without any scheme. When the Boer War threatened the disruption of the Empire, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand came to fight against such a mischief. When the Germans struck for world-power in 1914, all the Dominions, and India, the West Indians, the West Africans, the Maoris, the Red Indians, the Pacific Islanders—everybody came. If this force had been organized beforehand perhaps even the ex-Kaiser would not have thought it contemptible; but it could not have been organized except under the pressure of the occasion. If anyone is ever foolish enough to follow in the footsteps of the Kaiser, he will perhaps remember it, and reflect that it can be organized again.

The Imperial Conference of 1907 led to what preparation was necessary and feasible. A plan was prepared by 1909 for an Imperial General Staff, the military forces of the several Dominions were standardized, the formation of units, transport arrangements, and the pattern of weapons being assimilated to those in use in the British Army. The same year saw a great movement for contribution to the naval defence—the absolutely vital link of Imperial defence and connexion. The Dominions contributed money for ships with some proviso for their usual station in their own seas, or built ships themselves. Canada and Australia have their own small fleets. It was natural that these countries, with a seafaring population and much mercantile shipping of their own, should want to have their own fleets. The sea is, however, one, and the strategy of a fleet is a world-wide affair. The local fleets were in the war all under one command.

A certain unity of action has been reached in the matter of cables, and of mails. In wireless telegraphy, and in the air, it is being worked out. The conclusion surely is that where unity of action is desirable it will be attained, without elaboration of new constitutional devices, which would interfere with accustomed political arrangements, and strain rather than strengthen the true bonds of union—the mutual affections and esteem of a parent and a grown-up family.

Imperial conferences have provided for consultation upon common interests. In 1887, when many Colonial statesmen were present in London for Queen Victoria's Jubilee, a purely

consultative conference was held. It was repeated at Ottawa in 1894. In 1897 the Colonial Premiers present in London for the Diamond Jubilee were all sworn in as Privy Councillors, and a constitutional Union of the Empire was discussed, but shelved as premature. The conference was repeated in 1902. In 1907 it was held, and it was fixed as a quadrennial meeting, for the future. In 1911 an important decision was come to: that when instructions were being framed for British representatives at international congresses, they should be submitted to the Dominion Governments before being finally adopted. During the war the Imperial War Cabinet came into existence, and actually controlled policy. At the international meeting at Versailles in 1919, the Dominions appeared among the assembled nations, and have their places in the League as national powers. In 1921 the Premiers of the Empire met in conference under the Prime Minister as chairman. The fact of independence, and the fact of Imperial solidarity are both unmistakable. To attempt to organize the latter prematurely might seriously intrude upon the sentiment for the former. Everything comes to him who knows how to wait for it. Meanwhile the natural progress of the world is in favour of union.

Time was when a man who went to the colonies was lost to his relations at home for ever. Travel was very slow and very expensive. Postal communication was rare and uncertain. News from home seldom reached the emigrant, and in Canada even the English newspaper was a rarity. Steam and electricity have changed all that. The Empire penny post was one of the most practical steps ever taken in promoting Imperial unity, and it is to be much hoped will be before long restored. This affects private persons and personal sentiments of union. Political union is much strengthened by the power of rapid communication. If during the eighteenth century Great Britain and her North American Colonies could have exchanged views by a weekly mail, and if telegraphic instructions and warnings could have passed between American governors and British ministers, disruption might possibly have been averted. When communication is frequent emigration does not mean a severance of all former ties. It is remarkable, perhaps not quite explicable, how largely the proportion of emigrants leaving the United Kingdom for the British Dominions increased in the first

part of the century compared with those going to the United States and elsewhere. In 1900 only 33 per cent went to places in the Empire; in 1906 it was 54 per cent; in 1912 it was nearly 80 per cent. As a rule, when emigration from Ireland has increased immigration into the United States has increased. As a factor for inducing unity the return of Colonials to England may be added. They do not return to live here usually, but sojourns for pleasure, for business, and, above all, for education are more and more common. In 1914 onwards the manhood of the Dominions began to flow back to England, for another reason. The bonds of unity forged in France and at the Dardanelles will not be lightly broken by either side.

The question will be asked, What use is it after all? If a real League of Nations, not laboriously transcribed on paper, and liable to be little more considered than that paper if once conflicting passions are aflame, but a League based on common origins—blood, nurture, tradition, and affection—strengthened by participation in common ideals, and rendered habitual by frequent intercourse; if such a League is not to be counted as a good thing, then we need not value our common heritage in the British Empire. But if otherwise—if an alliance of kindred nations, who will never go to war with each other, but who will stand together in all cases when peace and justice require it, is a good thing for themselves and the world—then let us do our best to act worthily of so great a responsibility which has come down to us.

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